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ABSTRACT
Jordan is a developing country which, ever since it was established, 
was and still is dependent on foreign aid for its survival. The 
availability of foreign aid may have led to ignoring the need for 
developing its fiscal system to sustain the economic and social develop­
ment achieved. Such a relaxation in government attitude undermined %
the role of fiscal policy as a means of achieving the macroeconomic
objectives, be it economic growth that is more dependent on the
mobilization of domestically generated resources; its role in a
stabilization program; or as a vital tool in securing better distribution
of income and wealth among the different segments of society.
The main objectives of this thesis are to analyse the structure and
performance of revenues and expenditures and examine whether their
operations have been consistant with the country’s development strategy.
ithe heart of >
We hold the view that revenue and expenditure policies lie at/the national 
economic and social development. Revenue policies 'determine the 
magnitude of the resources available to support government programs and 
to finance economic development, as well as the relative burden to be 
borne by the various segments of society in providing these resources. 
Expenditure policies determine the allocation of available financial 
resources of the various components of government, reflecting national 
economic and social objectives and priorities. Together, they constitute 
the core of government efforts to direct the development of the country 
so as to achieve national development.
Accordingly, the study investigates three main areas of interest, that 
is, (a) Analyzing the structure and performance of different components of 
the fiscal system; (b) Assessing their growth in the context of economic 
development and (c) Specifying certain desired policy and procedural changes 
where fiscal innovation may take place to improve the effectiveness of the 
system and to enlarge its contribution to development objectives.
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CHAPTER ONE
POST INDEPENDANCE DEVELOPMENT CONSTRAINTS AND PROCLIVITIES
1.1. The Political and Economic Setting Prior to 1954
Early in the sixteenth century and up to the First World War, 
the area which ultimately became Jordan constituted the Syrian province 
of the Turkish Ottman Empire. The Ottman reign however, began to' 
decline early in this century , The most important effect of this decline 
was eventually the disappearance of central authority which deteriorated 
security in the area. By 1918, when the Ottman Empire was defeated,
Great Britain assumed reponsibility for the region.
Present-day Jordan first emerged as a political entity in 1921, when 
Great Britain sub-divided into two parts the territory included in the 
mandate for Palestine that it had received from the League of Nations.
In 1921, the Arab Emirate of Transjordan was established on the*
East Bank of the Jordan River. In May 19239 Great Britain formalized
\i
this arrangement, recognizing Transjordan as an entity and an autonomous 
power. The West Bank, however, was retained under the direct administration 
of Britain. In 1946, the British mandate ended, and the Hashemite 
kingdom of Transjordan was officially proclaimed, hence, full independnace 
and sovereignty over its territory was achieved. After the 1948 war 
which resulted in the de facto partition of Palestine and the creation of 
Israel, the part of Palestine which was retained in the hands of the Arabs 
was incorporated into the country in April 1950, forming the re-named 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
Unlike many present LDC’s, Jordan has a unique history mainly 
characterized by a mixed colonial background. Jordan’s geo-political 
situation made it subject to political upheavels in the area which 
brought about Vast adverse effects manifested themselves in certain
2economic irregiLari-ties to be discussed later in this chapter. Further 
more, it is argued that this unique historical background made the process 
of internal integration rather hard to achieve as a result of consecutive 
disintegrating factors which, had, and still have, their direct adverse 
effects on the economy of the country.
Jordan possessed the rather negative advantage of beginning from a 
low level of development. Per capita net national product in 1953 
was probably not much more than.U.S. $ 100, just a little less than that 
of Egypt at the time (about $ 120), but above that of India ($ 60) and 
Pakistan ($ 70)K
Furthermore, as a newly established developing country, Jordan 
inherited insurmountable problems arising out of the events of 1948.
2In the late 1940's the population of Transjordan was estimated at 300.000. 
Within a few months, the population was trippled without a corresponding 
increase in resources of the same size or extent. Such a vast increase
in population, however, resulted in high unemployment, associated with
\
a dependancy rate of about 5 to 1.
The economy of Jordan was predominantly agricultural at the time 
of the country's creation. It was estimated that 75 percent of the non­
refugee population depended on agriculture or animal husbandry for their
livelihood, a rather high percentage, and the greatest part of domestically
3produced income was derived from these two sources . However, the sector
1 Charles A. Cooper & Sidney S. Alexander, (eds.), Economic Development 
and Population Growth in the Middle East, (New York : American Elsevier 
Publishing Co. Inc., 1972), p 213.
2 Oddvar Aresvik, The Agricultural Development of Jordan,.(New York : 
Preager Publisher, 1976), p 1.
3 Raphael Patai, The Kingdom of Jordan. (Princeton : Princeton U. Press, 
1958), p 119.
3depended heavily on scarce and unevenly distributed rainfall, which 
again is a limiting factor for cultivation, not to mention the scarce 
supply of irrigation water. Among the field crops, wheat and barley 
were the main rain-fed grown crops. Grapes, olives and tobacco were 
the other principal crops. Production was handicapped by the application 
of primitive methods of cultivations, the inadequate transport system, 
the absense of mechanization and the unavailability of fertilizers.
Jordanian endowment of basic resources was meager, except for the 
large deposits of phosphate rock and salt. Manufacturing industry was 
practically non-existent. Whatever small-scale industries, if any, 
were limited to a few food processing plants, particularly flour milling, 
along with small handcrafts, mainly house produced.
With its vast population increases and low per capita income, 
associated with the state of tension arising out of the Arab-Israeli war, 
Jordan provided a small market, thus hindering new private investments 
which resulted in a handicapped manufacturing industries.iI
Meanwhile, the forgoing discussed situation resulted in a low 
economic activity during the British mandate. Hence, Jordan relied 
heavily on imports of consumer, as well as capital, goods to satisfy 
the growing consumer needs. Exports were mainly composed of 
agricultural products, particularly field crops, Furthermore, the country 
was faced with high transportation costs as a result of re-routing its 
trade directions to Beirut via Damascus or to the Port of Agaba the only 
sea outlet.
By and large, it may be argued that the political instability and 
its resultant factors arising out of the 1948 events affected almost 
every aspect of life in Jordan. Demographic and economic effects will be 
singled out however, and their implications on the various economic 
sectors will be discussed in the respective sections of the present chapter.
4However, economists differ inrtheir explanation of the process 
of economic development as well as the criteria they employ in their 
analysis of such development. A number of recent studies^ analyzing y  
certain aspects of Jordan's development process concentrated on the 
structural imbalance associated with Jordan's economic development, 
the orientation of the economy towards the services sector in particular.
Taking this into consideration, it is the objective of this chapter 
to give a fairly complete analysis of the resultant structure and 
performance of the economy. It will be argued, however, that 
Jordan accomplished a remarkable development by most standards, in 
comparison with countries in the same level of her per capita income 
and population. For example, the average growth of domestic product 
per capita between 1960 and 1968 was for Syria 4.1, Lebanon 4.6, Israel
7.1, Iraq 4.3, Egypt 4.3 and for Jordan 6.7 per cent^. This development 
and growth attainment came about through the effort of the Jordanian 
people themselves supported by considerable help from Arab and friendlyi
nations in the Vest, particularly the United States; Britain and West 
Germany. However, time has come for Jordan to develop and mobilize her 
own domestic resources if this pace of economic development and growth 
is to be sustained.
Within this framework, and as was mentioned above, the implications of 
the arising conditions on the population and labour force will be discussed 
first, and then the effects on the respective major sectors of the economy 
and the main economic indicators will be dealt with in subsequent sections.
4 A representative sample might include:
Zuhair A.R. Khalifeh, Economic and Commercial Aspects of the Phosphate 
Rock Industry in Jordan and it^s Relation to World Production and Trade in 
Phosphate. An unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Keele Univ., 1978, Ziad M. Fariz, 
The Role of Foreign Trade in the Economic Development of Jordan. An 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Keele Univ., 1978;' Bassam K. Sakit, Foreign Aid 
to Jordan (1924-25/1972-73) Its Magnitude, Composition and Effect, An 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Keele Univ. 1976; Michael P. Mazur, Economic 
Growth and Development in Jordan, (London: Groom Helm Ltd., 1979).
5 United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1972. (New York: U.N. Publication«.
1973), Tables 137 anal SSI ----- -------
51.2 Population and Labour Force
The aforementioned political situation resulted in drastic 
population changes. Within sixteen years 1951-1967, the population of 
Jordan was united once as a result of a war (1948) and further divided 
and separated as a result of a war (1967). In 1946 the population of 
Jordan was estimated at 300.000 persons, increased to 1.39 million 
in 1954. Such an increase was mainly due to the influx of refugees 
estimated at 350.000 persons after the 1948 events, along with 460.000 
persons the inhabitants of the West Bank.
Since the country was established, only two censuses have been 
carried out. The first took place in 1952, and was an extended 
census of housing, where coefficients of occupation were used to 
estimate the national population. The second census was carried out 
in 1961 which was the only full census of population, however it 
embodied several deficiencies, the most important of which is that the 
army's personnel were excluded.
| g
Crude death rates in Jordan have been under-estimated*. However, 
to correct this unreliable data, the Department of Statistics suggested 
a 47 per thousand birth rate coupled with a 16 per thousand death rate 
which eventually resulted in a 3.1 per cent estimate for the annual 
population growth rate^.
Furthermore, during the period under consideration the urban/rural 
distribution of the population was subject to a perceptible change.
6 Crude death rates were underestimated because many death cases, 
especially in rural areas, were not recorded.
7 Department of Statistics, Analysis of the Population Statistics of 
Jordan. (Amman: Department of Statistics Press, 1966).
6As (Table 1.1) demonstrates, about 52 per cent of the East Bank's 
population was in urban areas and 42 per cent in rural areas. However,
by 1972 a considerable change had occured so that 79 per cent lived in
■ 8urban areas along with 21 per cent in rural areas .
Table (1.1)
Percentage Distribution of Population by 
Sex and Mode of Living in the East Bank.
9 •Mode of Living
Sex 1961 z 1972 Z
Urban Rural Scattered Total Urban Rural Total
Male •53.4 50.7 51.2 52.0 51.0 51.6 51.0
Female 46.6 49.3 48.8 48.0 49.0 48.4 49.0
Total 51.5 39.5 9.0 100.0 79.0
\i
21.0 100.0
Source : A. Steitieh, et.al., Population, Employment, 
and Economic Development of Jordan, (Amman :
Jordan/FAD/UNFPA P02, 1978) Table A-Z, P70.
Several factors together gave rise to the aforementioned population 
distribution. Firstly, the concentration of production activities in
8 The Jordan's - Department of Statistics definition of "Urban" refers 
to towns with 10.000 inhabitants. The refugee camps within cities were 
considered part of the urban centers. "Rural" the rest of the population 
gatherings.
See Jordan - Department of Statistics, The Multi-Purpose Household 
Survey, January - April, 1976. (Amman: Department of Statistics Press, 
June 1977) p, 2.
9 The 1961 estimates were based on the 1961 population census which was 
relatively urbanized, while the 1972 estimates were based on the January - 
April Multi-Purpose Household Survey, 1972.
7certain urban areas particularly in the Amman-Zarka area which gave 
rise to rural-urban migration. This internal migration however, could be 
divided into two main streams: a) forced migration due to the Arab- 
Israeli wars of 1948 and .1967 which resulted in a large masses"6f 
population moving from one location to another. This direction of 
settlement again resulted in an over populated Amman-Zarka area. In 
1972, for example, the population of Amman was estimated at 550.000 
persons, whereas in 1967 Amman had a population of 320.000 and the other 
two principal towns, Zarka and Irbid, 213.000 and 110.000 respectively.
Hence the Amman-Zarka area had about 43% of the population of the East 
Bank which was estimated at 1.774.000 in 1972*°.and b) Rural-urban 
migration caused primarily by economic and social factors. Mazur noted 
in this respect that between 1952 and 1961, while the total population
i
grew at an annual average rate of 2.8 per cent, the rural population averaged
1.4 per cent annual growth rate and the urban population 5.0 per cent**.
Secondly, this internal migration was further Enhanced by Jordanians 
who left the country to work, particularly in the neighbouring Arab oil- 
producing countries. This kind of migration further manifested itself 
in the Jordanian economy after the oil price boom in 1973, which eventually 
led to an increased economic activity in these countries leading to a vast 
demand for Jordanian as well as labour from other countries.
Unfortunatly, the existing statistics on labour force and employment 
are not up-to-date. As was noted earlier, the last population census 
was carried out in 1961, and there is no accurate information of subsequent
10 Kingdom of Jordan, Jordan 1973 - A brief survey. (Amman : Ministry of 
Culture and Information, n.d.), p.5
11 Michael F. Mazur, op.cit., p.28
8population movements. Nevertheless, estimates comparing the sectoral.,
12 *distribution of labour force indicate a decline in the proportion of 
labour force working in agriculture from 38 per cent in 1961 to 18 per 
cent in 1975; an increase in the proportion of those working in the mining 
and industry remained the same standing at 19 per cent.
Migration to the oil-producing countries was estimated to be between
150.000 to 200.000. Although this migration has substantially increased 
Jordan's foreign exchange earnings from remittances, it caused however, 
acute shortages in key sectors of the economy. These have been 
satisfied by importing labour. It has also exerted strong internal 
pressures on wages and prices.
The government continuously attempted to alleviate the adverse 
effects of this outward movement of labour by encouraging the setting 
up of vocational training; it encouraged the formation of cooperative 
housing societies that offer prospective home owners loans on favourable 
terms; a social security law was enacted in 1978 and social security fund 
was subsequently established in 1979; the opening of cooperative shops 
for government employees to buy items at reduced prices, and finally 
encouraging more females to participate in the labour force.
Having briefly discussed the population and manpower situation, 
consideration will now be given to the implications on the economic 
structure and performance of the economy during the period 1954-1967 
with particular emphasis given to the agricultural and industrial 
sectors.
12 Hanna S. Odeh, Economic Development of Jordan, 1954-1971, (Amman : 
Ministry of Culture and Information, n.d.) p.2, see also, National 
Planning Council, The Three Tear Development Plan, 1973-1975. (Amman : 
1972). — - ------------- ------------------------ ---
91.3 Economic Structure and Performance Prior to 1967
1.3.1 National Income and Expenditure.
Economic development has been defined^as the process whereby 
a country's real per capita'national product (GNP) or income increases 
over a sustained period of time through continuing increases in per capita 
productivity^.
To assess the general performance of the economy over any one period 
it is natural tq examine the main indicators, namely, the growth trends 
in the gross national product, the gross domestic product, and per 
capita national income.
As was alluded to earlier, Jordan achieved significant development 
and growth during the period 1954-1966. This is evident when growth 
trends in GNP are traced. Gross National Product grew at an average 
annual growth rate of 11.8 per cent, increased in absolute terms from 
JD 52.4 million in 1954 to JD 130.8 and JD 185.7 million in 1962 and 1966 
respectively, an increase of 254 per cent of the whole period of 12 
years, (Table 1,2) Though these figures are in current prices, yet 
it is well in mind that during the said period Jordan enjoyed a 
price stability i.e. inflation rate did not exceed the 2Z level.
While total consumption grew by 10.5 per cent gross capital 
formation grew hy about 13.2per cent. Furthermore, total export of 
goods and services grew by almost 15.3 over the 12 year period, increasing 
from only JD 6.1 million in 1954 to JD 32.1 million in 1966. However, 
exports were concentrated into few items such as phosphate, fruit and
13 For the purpose of this thesis, it is felt that this is an acceptable 
definition frequently employed in the literature, however, there are 
conceptual and practical problems with it.
14 Dominick Salvatore and Edward Bowling, Theory and Problems of Development 
Economics. (New York, McGraw Hill Book Co., 1977)
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vegetables. Total imports of goods and services, on the other hand, 
increased considerably in gross terms from JD 19.8 million in 1958 
to reach about JD 77 million in 1966, an annual growth rate of 1Q.7 
per cent.
Most growth in the GNP components took place in the net factor 
income from abroad, which increased from as low as JD 1.1 million in 
1954 to about JD 15.2 million in 1966, a growth rate of 24.4 per:cent 
annually. This vast growth rate came about as a result of an increased 
number of Jordanians working in the oil producing Arab countries and 
thus reflected an increased amount of remittances.
Gross Domestic Product grew at an annual average rate of 11*3 
per cent. It increased from JD 61.7 million during the period 1954-1958 
to reach about JD 154J million in the 1963-1966 period, an increase of 232.7 
per cent over the whole period of thirteen years. This is a higher 
rate of growth than is to be found in almost any other country with 
the same level of development*^. \i
i
This level of growth occured while the price level has apparently 
remained remarkably stable during a period in which other countries 
have experienced serious inflationary pressures**’. However, available 
data suggest that growth rates were slower in the 1961-1966 period as v 
compared with the 1954-1959 growth rates, either in GDP or in GNP.
15 Person noted that between 1950 and 1967, the LDC's as a group 
increased their total production and services (GDP) by an annual 
average rate of 4.8 per cent. See Lester B. Person, Partners in 
Development (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969), p. 27.
16 National Development Board, The Seven Year Program for Economic 
Development of Jordan, 1964-197oT (Jerusalem-Jordan : The Commercial 
Press, n.d.), p.2.
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Furthermore» this performance took place counter to all pessimistic
opinions of those interested in the future development of Jordan at the 
17time . The World Bank sent a mission in 1955 to assess the potentialities
of the economy and to formulate an economic development plan. The
mission set a target rate of growth of GNP of 4 per cent» but suggested
however» that even the achievement of this rate of growth would not be
18easy to attain, given the prevailing circumstances .
The examination of total resources (» GDP + Imports) and their 
uses reflects a relative change in the components of these resources.
The ratio of gross domestic product to total resources increased 
slightly from 68.5 per cent during the period 1954-1958 to 70.5 per 
cent in 1963-1966. On the average it maintained a ratio of 69.5 per cent 
during the whole period. Moreover, the ratio of imports of goods and 
services to total resources dropped slightly from 32 per cent to 
30 per cent between the same two periods. By and large, total available
resources maintained an annual average rate of growth of 11.1 per cent
i/
throughout the whole period under consideration.
On the other hand, however, even though total consumption 
expenditures grew at an annual average rate of .10.5 per cent, its 
ratio to total resources showed a marked decline from 81 per cent 
during 1954-1958 to 76.3 per cent during 1963-1966, yet on the average it 
maintained a ratio of 78.7 per cent over the whole period. This 
tendency signifies the fact that more resources were released and 
channelled to capital formation over the said period. A more obvious 
change in the use of resources could be seen by looking at the rate of
17 See IBRD, The Economic Development of Jordan, (Baltimore : The John 
Hopkins Press, 1957), also see Hamilton F. Armstong, ed. "Survey No. 2. 
Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq," Foreign Aid Program, Compilation of Studies 
and Surveys, 85th cong. 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.,: Gov. Printing Office, 
1957).
18 Ibid., p.l
13
growth of gross capital formation which grew at an annual average rate 
of '19.2 per cent. Its ratio to total resources increased from 9.6 
per cent in 1954-1958 to 11.6 per cent in 1963-1966, further theI ' ,  ,  • ,  . t
ratio of GCF to GDP increased also from 14.0 to 16.4 per cent between the 
same two periods. Table 1.3.
On the other hand, the examination of the sectoral contribution
to GDP reveals a similar structural change among the main sectors of the
economy. The contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP declined
from 29.8 per cent to 16.4 per cent in 1960 and 1966 respectively,
averaging about 21 per cent over the whole period 1954-1966, Table 4.
19The industrial sector by contrast evidenced steady development.
It's share in GDP increased from 8.8 per cent in 1954 to about 13
per cent in 1966, therefore averaging 10.2 per cent over the thirteen year
period.
Moreover, this structural change resulted in a gradually increased
20importance of the services sector , within whichtthe share of the construction 
■ . ; \ 
and transportation sub-sectors in GDP increased markedly due, among
other things, to the need for housing resulted from the influx of
refugees after the 1948 events, associated with the government's
expenditures being concentrated in the development of infrastructural
base, roads and transportation in particular.
The influx of refugees which was estimated at 350.000 persons,
coupled with the 460.000 inhabitants of the West Bank, led to higher
demand for consumer goods which could not be met by domestic production,
thus providing a potentially larger market as well as allowing for
more imports of consumer and capital goods which helped the establishment
of new small-scale industries.
19 The industrial sector is composed of the Mining, Manufacturing 
and Electricity sub-sectors.
20 The Services sector, is composed of the Construction, Transport,
Trade and Banking, ownership and doweling, Public Administration and Defence and other services sub-sectors.
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During this period however, the government of Jordan felt the need
21for formal economic planning. As Chenery noted that, "a development
programme serves a variety of purposes. It is at once a political
symbol of a governments' commitment to economic and social progress, a
general strategy for remodelling.the economy and its institutions, a
basis for decisions on individual investment projects and a standard
against which to measure results".
Adhering to this notion therefore, the Jordan Development Board
started formalized planning in Jordan, for the first time, by publishing
the first Five Year Plan 1962-1967. However, as a result of the lack of
the aggregate data necessary for planning, the plan was rather a number
of project proposals with apparently no clear strategy.
Assuming a continuing level of budget support matching that o f .
the 1961-1962, the Plan projected an 8 per cent annual GNP rate of 
22growth . The basic assumption of the plan proved invalid shortly after
the start of its implementation. Therefore, the plan had to be revised,
!
so it was replaced by the new Seven Year Program for Economic Development 
of Jordan, 1964-1970. The goals of the plan were put in order of priority 
as follows: (1) major reductions in the external balance of trade 
deficit and such reduction in dependance upon budget support as Jordan 
may be able to sustain; (2) an increase in per capita income; (3) a 
reduction in the level of unemployment.
Stating the goals and their order of priority in this way reflects, 
among other things, the governments' concern about the major bottlenecks
21 H.B. Chenery, "Alternatives to Development Planning", in E.A.G. 
Robinson, ed.. - Problems in Economic Development, (London : Macmillan & 
Co. ltd, 1965), p 391.
22 Jordan Development Board, The Five Year Development Plan, 1962-1967, 
(Amman, n.d.).
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in the economy at the time. Even though the Plan was optimistic in 
its aggregate projections nevertheless, it appears that by 1967 the 
plan achieved most of its objectives. GNP grew at an annual average of
11.8 per cent coupled with price stability. Even though dependance on
t
foreign aid decreased relatively, however, it did not reach the level 
projected.by the plan.
1.3.2 Development in the Agricultural Sector.
Jordan has always been described as predominantly agricultural, ... 
however, available data reveals that this importance given to the . 
agricultural sector among other sectors of the economy has been declining. 
This is evident from the declining share of the agricultural sector 
in GDP, from almost 30 per cent in 1954 to 18.5 per cent in 1966,
Table 1.4.
During the period 1959-1961, 51.3 per cent of the value of total 
agricultural production came from fruit and vegetables, 19.3 per cent
s,
.from grains, legumes and tobacco, 27.2 per cent from livestock, poultry
i 23and fish, and 2.2 per cent from forestry and miscellaneous sources .
This large contribution came about mainly through the extension 
of irrigation, especially the East Ghor Canal Project which diverted the 
water of the Yarmouk River into a 70 km canal in the Jordan valley running 
parallel to the Jordan river on its East Bank; and the introduction of 
improved agricultural technology most effectively in irrigated areas.
However, most of Jordan's agriculture especially field crops depends 
heavily on scarce and unevenly distributed rainfall which results in 
subjecting the agricultural production to vast production fluctuations. 
During the period 1954-1966, the value of grains and legumes production 
fluctuated between as low as JD 2.1 million in 1960 and a high of JD 10.8
23 Jordan Development Board, The Seven Year Program For Economic 
Development of Jordan, op. cit., p. 74. "
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million in 1964, which apparently was a good crop year due mainly to 
good weather conditions.
Moreover, during the period under consideration, considerable 
changes in Jordanian cropping patterns took place as is demonstrated 
in Table 1.5 below.
Table (1.5)
Changes in Cropping Patterns in Jordan (selected years) 
(per cent of total cultivable area)
1956 1961 1964 1965
(i).i. Field Crops 84.7 74.9 74.0 72.9
(ii) Vegetables 5.1 10.1 11.0 11.3
(iii) Fruit Trees 10.2 15.0 15,0 15.8
All Crops 100.0 100.0 100.0
V
100.0
Source: FAo, Mediteranean Development Project,
Jordan Country Report (Rome, 1967), p.50
While the percentage of areas cultivated with field crops to 
total cultivable areas declined from 84.7 per cent in 1956 to
72.9 per cent in 1965; the percentage of the areas cultivated with 
vegetables picked up and increased from 5.1 per cent in 1956 to 11.3 
per cent in 1965. Furthermore, the percentage of the areas cultivated 
with fruit trees went up also from 10.2 per cent in 1956 to 15.8 per cent 
in 1965.
jltis argued however, that this cropping pattern was the result of, 
inter alia, government policy which concentrated on irrigated agricultural 
land in the Jordan valley in particular,¡and more or less neglected 
development, if any, in the rain-fed areas.
19
The agricultural production was left to the private sector,
however, the government have a heavy responsibility in assisting the
farmers to increase efficiency and expand production. Nevertheless,
this governmental interference in the agricultural sector lacked a
steady and clear strategy which resulted from a varied range of
governmental departments being responsible about one part or another 
24in this sector . Furthermore, even though the agricultural sector
contributes on the average about one-fifth of the GDP, and employs about
40 per cent of the total labour force. Yet self-sufficiency in
25food production has not been attained .
By and large, production methods remained primitive and depended 
heavily on labour intensive methods. However, it could be argued 
that the abundance of cheap labour during the period under consideration 
was one of the main barriers that hindered the introduction of modern 
technology.into this sector.
■/"1.3.3. Developments in the Industrial Sector. \
Industrialization, was at the time, a recent phenomenon in Jordan, 
however, the sector was subject to a gradual development. In the early 
1950*s the industrial sector was restricted by several constraints, 
among which were : (1) The political and military tensions in the area 
which inhibited new investments; (2) Scarcity of local raw materials;
(3) The small size of the Jordanian market; (4) Lack of skilled manpower; 
and (5) The high cost of transportation, since Jordan had to re-rout 
its trade direction to Bierut via Damascus, a rather costly trip.
24 While the National Planning Council is responsible for the overall 
Policy, the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for an overall 
implementation of government policy, further the Jordan Valley Authority 
is responsible for the Valley's development, and so on.
25 Ministry of Culture and Information, Jordan 1973, A Brief Survey, 
op. cit, p. 45.
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By the late 1950's some of these factors were demolished. The 
influx of an estimated 350.000 refugees associated with 460.000 the 
inhabitants of the West Bank, as was mentioned earlier, provided a 
relatively larger market through more demand for consumer goods. This 
was coupled with relatively stable political situation throughout 
the 1950's, except for the 1957-1958 crisis, and a gradually increased 
government expenditures in the infrastructural base. All these factors 
together, inter alia, gave rise for a rapid industrial development 
by the early sixties.
Since 1954, the value of industrial production increased from JD
6.0 million to over JD 42.3 million in 1966, and its share in the Gross 
Domestic Product increased from about 8 per cent in 1954 to 13 per cent 
in 1966, Table 4.
It could be argued that these growth rates were mainly attributed 
to an increased domestic demand and import substitution. The increased 
demand came about as a direct result of an annual', average rate of 
growth in GDP of 10.8 per cent. Allowing for 2-3 per cent inflation 
rate would result, however, in a 7-8 per cent real.growth rate in GDP. 
This growth in GDP was accompanied by drastic population changes alluded 
to earlier.
As an indicator of import substitution, Padma Desai used the change
in the ratio of domestic production to total available supplies .
Applying this indicator to Jordan, Mazur noted that in all but the
relatively unimportant paper and printing sector, the ratio's rose,
27generally by significant amounts .
26 Padma Desai, "Alternative Measures of Import Substitution", Oxford 
Economic Papers, (Nov. 1969) s pp 312-324.
27 Michael P. Mazur, op. cit., pp 209-212
21
The industrial activity is, as it is the case in agriculture, 
left to the private sector. However, successive governments in Jordan 
have taken an active role in promoting the growth of this sector. In 
addition to encouraging investments through favourable legislation, such
t
as exemption from various taxes and other charges of fixed assets
and their necessary replacement parts; exemption of the net profits
from income tax and social services tax for a period of six years from
28the day of declaration of the project »they also have participated in 
large projects; extended loans to some industrial undertakings and 
also guaranteed loans for a number of the large projects.
Two main characteristics are considered however-typical in Jordan's 
industrial sector. One is that the sector being dominated by few 
large-scale establishments such as phosphate mining, petroleum refining 
and cement production. Apart from these, other industries include a 
number of foundaries, a tannery, several marble factories, textiles, 
oil pressing, bottling and brewing, some food products, cigarettes,
f  \i
and batteries. Secondly, apart from phosphate, batteries and cigarettes, 
most of the industrial production was directed to satisfy domestic 
demand and few industries were able to provide for export.
1.3,4 The Balance of Payments.
There is a fundamental linkage between the economic performance of 
the country and the current situation of its balance of payments which 
is considered, for a developing country, a major aggregate constraint on 
the pace of economic development. The existance of a deficit on current 
account, means after all, a transfer of foreign resources into the country 
to fill the foreign exchange gap.
28 For details see, Government of Jordan, "Encouragement of Investment 
Law No. 53 of 1972," which superceded Law No, 1 of 1967, and their 
amendments thereafter. Also see, Government of Jordan Investment 
Conditions and Opportunities in Jordan, (Amman : 1972)
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Traditionally, this was the case of Jordan. The balance of payments 
has been characterized by a large structural imbalance, in which 
exports have covered only a relatively small fraction of imports. 
Furthermore, the trade deficit has been widening with the passage 
of time.
Jordan’s value of imports increased considerably over the period of 
analysis. It increased from JD 1§.8 million in 1954 to JD 76.7 million 
in 1966, an average annual rate of growth of 10.7 per cent. Furthermore, 
its ratio to total foreign trade (total Exports ♦ total Imports) 
maintained a high level of 87.5 per cent. During the same period 
exports stayed at a very low level both in their volume and value.
The value of exports increased from only JD 6.1 million in 1954
to JD 32.1 million in 1966, however, exports showed an annual average rate
of growth of 15.3 per cent which exceeded that of imports, table 1.6.
This trade pattern which was a resultant of the overall structure
of economic activity led to growing trade deficit which increased
■ |
from JD 13.7 million in 1954 to reach JD 44.6 million in 1966, hence
i
maintaining an average growth rate of 12.0 per cent.
This trade deficit was always referred to as a major problem
facing Jordan. However, it is argued that an actual deficit'need not
always be the basis for a balance of payments problem. Bernstine,
for example, noted that "a country whose balance of payments is not
a proper one has a payments problem". He describes a "proper"
balance of payments as an equality between payments and receipts for
current transactions and "ordinary" capital movements --- which means that
the country is not compelled to economic activity below a "desirable"
29level or to restrict imports solely for balance of payments purposes .
29 M.O. Clement, et. al., Theoretical Issues in International Economics 
(Boston : Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), pp 234-235.
23
Table (1.6)
Total Imports, Total Exports and 
Trade Deficit, 1954-1966
(In millions of JD's)
Year
Total
Imports
Total
Exports a Ratio of Exports 
to Imports
Trade
Deficit
value %
change
value %
change
value %
change
1954 19.8 - 6.1 - 30.8 13.7 -
1955 26.8 35.4 7.3 19.7 43.5 19.5 42.3
1956 26.2 -2.2 9.4 28.8 35.9 16.8 -13.8
1957 32.4 23.7 10.7 13.8 33.0 21.7 29.2
1958 36.7 13.3 9.9 -7.5 27.0 26.8 23.5
1959 43.4 18.3 11.8 19.2 27^2 37.6 17.9
1960 47.1 8.5 12.8 8.5
!27.2 34.3 8.5
1961 46.6 -1.1 16.9 32.0 36.3 29.7 -13.4
1962 51.8 11.2 19.1 13.0 36.9 32.7 10.1
1963 61.0 17.8 20.4 6.8 33.4 40.6 24.2
1964 56.7 -7.0 24.6 20.6 43.5 32.1 -20.9
1965 63.5 12.0 28.6 16.2 45.0 34.9 8.7
1966 76.7 20.8 32.1 12.2 41.9 44.6 27.8
Average
1954-1966 45.3 10.7 16.1 15.3 37.6 29.2 12.0
Note: a Total Exports includes Re-exports.
Source: (i) I.M.F., Balance of Payments Yearbook, 1954-1959,
(Washington, D.C., : I.M.F., n.d.), vols. 8 and 12.
(ii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin 
vol. 5, No. 12, Dec. 1969.
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Furthermore, import surplus is usually considered a rough measurement 
of the need of foreign resources, hence one is tempted to argue that 
in order for Jordan actually to receive any desired transfer of real 
resources from abroad, imports have to exceed exports by the full amount 
of the desired resources. However, it must be clear that the reasons 
behind giving foreign aid are far more complicated than a mere 
structural imbalance in the country’s balance of payments.
This line of argument however, proves valid when the means of 
financing this import surplus are considered. Import surplus is 
financed by two main sources: Firstly, a surplus on the services 
balance, and secondly, and more importantly, net transfer payments from 
abroad.
Within the services balance, tourism became significant to Jordan
i
since the early 1960's. In 1964 tourists expenditures in Jordan 
amounted to about JD 8.0 million according to the balance of payments 
estimates, while payments of Jordanian outside Jordan amountedto JD 4.0 
million. This means that a net payment of JD 4.0 million of foreign 
exchange. These receipts of foreign exchange from tourism increased 
to JD 11.0 million in 1966, Table 1.7.
The second item which offsets the trade deficit is transfering 
payments, which includes transfers of Jordanians working abroad and 
transfers to the central Government in the form of foreign aid. These 
transfers increased substantially with the passage of time to reach 
about JD 35.0 million in 1966, while were as low as JD 12.9 million » 
in 1954.
It could be maintained here, that the above discussed pattern of trade 
along with the overall economic structure which was discussed earlier in 
the chapter led to the fact that economic development in Jordan became
Hanna S. Odeh, 
Economic Development of Jordan 1954-1971, 
Amman, 1972
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highly dependent of foreign aid inflows. Indeed, without international 
transfers the deficit arising in the current account would probably not 
have reached such extreme levels and expenditures would probably have 
been restricted^, thus slowing the pace of Jordanian economic development^*-.
1.4 Economic Structure and Performance after 1967.
As was already demonstrated in the previous parts of this chapter, 
for several years prior to 1967, the Jordanian economy enjoyed a high 
rate of growth accompanied by financial stability. However, the 1967 
war and its aftermath created a development hiatus and resulted in a 
host of problems. It could be argued that the war not only resulted in 
a curtailment of the pace of economic development of the country, but 
more importantly changed the direction of the economy, hence, affecting 
every aspect of life in Jordan.
The first direct result of the 1967 war was the occupation of
the West Bank, an area however, constituted only 6 per cent of the
\
total area of the country, yet it had contributed’some 25 per cent of 
Jordan's cultivable land along with tourist places of great potential. 
Therefore, it had not only supplied about 40 per cent of its agricultural 
production, but also it meant a loss of a major source of tourisms 
income. Over and above, an estimated 300.000 refugees from the West Bank 
fled to the East Bank creating serious social and economic problems.
This situation was further aggravated by a period of internal 
disturbances which was initiated from a military confontation between the 
Palestinian resistance movement and the government of Jordan, which was
30 This point will be subject to careful examination in chapter three.
31 Michael J. Marto, A Monetary Supply Model : Jordan, An unpublished 
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, June 1970)
p. 46
an indirect result of the war. Furthermore, the closure of the Suez Canal
disrupted Jordan's foreign trade, particularly phosphate exports to
Europe. The overall result was a partial paralysis, and of course a
lower rate of economic growth. .
It is not surprising, therefore that GNP dropped drastically by
the end of 1967, for the first time, by 23.3 per cent over that of 
321966 . Similarly, GDP recorded a drop of 23.1 per cent over the same
two years. Moreover, although GNP at current prices showed an average 
annual growth rate of 14.9 per cent, real GNP growth did not exceed 
4.3 per cent over the period of 13 years. Likewise, while GDP at 
market prices grew by 12.4 per xent, it recorded a 2.9 per cent annual 
average at real growth rate over the same period. Table 1.8.
The arising situation necessitates a sharp need for foreign aid 
to keep the government functioning and to cope with the 1967 war results 
and its aftermath. This financial assistance was made possible by Arab 
countries after the Khartom Arab Summit which pei^nitted substantiali. . • ;' i ; t
government expenditures.
In 1969, the economic activity picked-up and stimulated by good 
harvest along with a boom in the construction sector which led to an increase 
in real GNP by 17.1 per .cent over that of 1967. This increase however, 
came about after a rapid industrial recovery. The cement factory was 
producing at full capacity to fulfill the vast domestic demand 
resulting from the construction boom. Cement production rose from 
321 thousand tons in 1967 to 481 thousand tons in 1969. Oil refinery 
was also faced with an enlarged market for its products resulting 
from the existance of the Iraqi and Saudi armies stationed in the
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32 It should be noted here that the above figure of a drop in both GNP 
and GDP must be taken with caution, because they do not represent only 
economic facts but rather a change in the estimation as well* Data after 
1967 belongs to the East Bank only. However, when figures for GNP and 
GDP were taken before and after 1967 for all Jordan they still recorded 
a drop of 4.2 per cent.
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Table (1.8.)
Gross National Product, Gross Domestic Product and 
their Growth rates in the East Bank, 1967-1979 
(In Current and Constant 1967 prices).
, (In million’s of JD's)
Year
Gross National Product Gross Domestic Product
Current
prices
Constant
1967=100
Current
prices
Constant
1967=100
Abs • %change Abs.
Z
change Abs.
Z
change Abs.
Z
change
1967 142.5 -23.3 142.5 -23.3 131.2 -23.1 131.2 -23.1
1968 166.4 16.8 166.9 17.1 156.1 18.9 156.6 19.3
1969 197.4 18.6 183.6 10.0 183.4 17.5 170.6 8.9
1970 187.0 -5.3 162.9 -11.2 174.4 -4.9 151.9 -10.9
1971 199.4 6.6 167.0 2.5 186.2 6.8 155.9 2.6
1972 221.0 10.8 170.7 . 2.2 207.2 11.3 160.1 2.6
1973 241.5 9.3 168.9 -1.0 218.3 5.4 152.7 -4.6
1974 279.3 15.7 162.8 -3.6 247.3 13.3 143.8 -5.8
1975 342.5 22.6 178.3 9.5 278.6 12.7 162.0 12.6
1976 542.5 58.4 253.2 42.0 401.7 44.2 187.5 15.7
1977 623.5 14.9 253.5 0.01 477.6 18.9 194.2 3.5
1978 714.1 14.5 272.1 7.3 569.1 19.2 216.8 11.6
1979 853.2 19.5 284.6 4.5 685.2 20.4 228.5 5.3
Average
1967-1979 - 14.9 - 4.3 - 12.4 - 2.9
Source: (i) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 
vol. 16,'no. 3, March 1980
(ii) Department of Statistics, National Accounts in Jordan,
1952-1976, (Amman : Department of Stat. Press, March, 1978).
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country at the time, therefore petroleum production increased from 
385 thousand tons in 1967 to 464 thousand tons in 1969.
However, this fairly rapid revival was disrupted yet again by the 
internal disturbances mounted into the country during the second half, 
of 1970, which again resulted in a serious set-back, hence economic 
activity came to a standstill for more than two months. Furthermore, 
the situation was further agravated by the closure of both.the Iraqi 
and Syrian borders in the mid 1971‘as well as stoppage of the flow 
of financial assistance from Arab countries. Meanwhile, the United 
States resinned its financial assistance to Jordan which was halted in 
1967.
Nevertheless,.during the period 1967-1972, economic planning was <• 
carried out on an ad hoc basis. This is understandable if one takes into 
consideration the huge uncertainties at the time, be it the general 
political situation in which an era of no-peace no-war dilema prevailed 
or the rise of the Palestinian resistance movement which brought the
j
economic activity in the country to a halt.
However, by 1972 the situation eased off to an extent whereby
economic planning had to be resumed. Therefore, the National Planning 
33Council launched the Three Year Development Plan, 1973-1975. The 
Plan aimed at : (a) creating at least 70.000 jobs; (b) achieving an 
8 per cent annual growth rate of GNP; (c) enhancing and reactivating economic 
and social activity; (d) augumenting the reliance of the general budget 
on domestic revenues; and (e) strengthening the balance of payments and 
reducing the trade balance deficit.
33 In 1971 the National Planning Council replaced the Jordan Development 
Board
34 National Planning Council, The Three Year Development Plan, 1973-1975, 
(Amman, 1972), p. 20
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However, although the 1967-1971 period was characterised by a 
fairly*reasonable price increases, yet in 1972 inflation started to 
be the new phenomena on the Jordanian scene, as is depicted by the 
Amman cost of living index Table 1.9.
Table (1.9)
Amman Cost of Living Index (1967=100)
1967 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Index 100 114.8 119.7 129.4 142.9 171.5
Change 14.8 4.9 9.7 13.5 20.6
Sources: Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, 1974.
As the index increased from 129.4 in 1972 to 142.9 in 1973, an increase
\ 35of 13.5 points revealing a new experience of inflation above 10 per cent . 
The largest increase took place in food items which was further enhanced 
by a severe weather conditions during 1973 sharply reducing the harvest, 
however, recovery has continued in other sectors of the economy.
The world phosphate prices showed a remarkable increase by the early 
1974, rising from only U.S. $14 to $63 per ton, therefore increasing the 
foreign exchange earning from Jordan's phosphate exports. At the same 
time, phosphate production was increased considerably from 1.080 
thousand tons in 1973 to 1.675 thousand tons in 1974, a 55 per cent 
increase.
35 Jordan experienced the largest increases in the cost of living 
index throughout the Arab World in 1972. The Cost of Living index 
(1970=100) in 1972 was as follows: Syria 106.0; Lebanon 106.6; Iraq 109.0; 
Saudi Arabia 109.0; Kuwait 100.0; and Egypt 105.3. IMF., International 
Financial Statistics, 1976.
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Moreover, 1974 was an excellent crop year as a result of a 
favourable weather conditions: Wheat production increased considerably 
from only 50.4 thousand tons in 1973 to 244.5 thousand tons in 1974; while 
barley production increased from as low as 5.9 thousand tons to 40.2 
tons during the same period.
These favourable conditions were further augmented by the fact that 
the 1973 oil-price boom manifested itself in an increased economic 
activities in oil-producing Arab Countries, which has its indirect 
effect on the Jordanian economy through an increased opportunities for 
Jordan's labour force in the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. This movement 
of manpower, while resulted in an increased remittances from Jordanian 
working abroad from only JD 24.1 million in 1974 to JD 159.4 million 
in 1978, it nevertheless caused acute shortages in the key sectors of the
teconomy, These shortages were made-up by importing labour force, particularly 
from Egypt and Syria.
By October 1974, the Arab Summit which was held in Rabat, granted
i
Jordan more financial resources to maintain its military strength. This 
flow of financial resources gave rise for more government expenditure as 
will be discussed in chapter three. Therefore, while the pre-1972 
era was mainly shaped by political factors, the post-1972 period in 
contrast was mainly affected by economic factors.
The prevailing conditions in 1974 were further enhanced by new 
factors in 1975. The increased flows of foreign aid; remittances from 
Jordanians abroad; and phosphate sales were further augumented, inter alia 
by an increased economic activity resulting from the civil war in 
Lebanon.
These factors together led to a construction boom by late 1975 
and early 1976, This is obvious if the total area of building
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permits are taken into consideration. This indicator showed a 62 
per cent increase in 1976 over that of 1975. However, this increased 
construction activity seemed to have subsided in the sense that 
previous growth rates of this activity in the sector were not repeated 
in 1977. Moreover, these factors led to tight labour market in Jordan 
along with huge land speculation which has never been experienced 
before.
Furthermore, 1975 marked a new era of Jordanian - Syrian economic 
cooperation. Such cooperation is reflected in a series of joint 
ventures, among which a land transport corporation which have a fleet of 
300 trailers; a free trade zone area alongside the bo rders; a linked 
electric power stations; and economic planning is being set on the 
highest level of governments. This economic cooperation will, its hoped, 
provide Jordan with a potentially larger market for her exports.
By 1978, the economy witnessed a decreased rate of inflation from
15 per cent to 7 per cent. This reduction in the measured inflation rate. . ... v . . .
came about as a result of a tight monetary and credit policy adopted 
in 1977 and reflected itself in early 1978.
Moreover, as was elluded to above, the manpower shortages resulted 
from the outflow of Jordanians to the oil-producing countries have been 
satisfied by importing labour, hence the balance of payments registered, 
for the first time ever, an outflow of remittances estimated at JD 20.0 
million in 1978. *2
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36 The area of building permits (for residential and commercial purposes) 
is considered, particularly in the case of Jordan the best indicator to 
measure the construction activity for several reasons, the most important 
of which are (1) limited landscape within the cities and towns boudaries,
(2) it is a reliable estimate since the permit obtained is used to get 
cement and other building materials (due to shortages), hence must be 
used in a short period of time.
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It remains to be said that this period of the mid 1970's was 
distinguished by the launching of the Five Year Development Plan,
1976-1980. The Plan was eventually conditioned by the forgone factors 
arose by 1975 which gave rise to direct the attention of the planners ' 
towards solving the new bottlenecks in the economy, particularly in the 
labour market as well as the inflation rate.
Development strategy in the new period, 1976-1980, was formulated 
to give priority to the commodity producing sectors and related
i
infrastructural projects. The strategy was intended to correct the 
structural imbalance in the national economy and to disperse the fruits 
of development outside the densly populated areas. In terms of principals, 
organization and policy measures, the development strategy could be 
formulated by:
1) A better and more equitable distribution of national income.
2) Geographical distribution of projects and of population among production 
areas, as well as directing population movements towards such areas.
i
3) More active participation of all segments of society including women.
4) A clear family planning policy which enables all families to determine 
the ideal number of their members.
5) Educational planning arising at increasing investment in education 
without impairing its quality. Training of women and locating them in 
areas that serve to expand their participation in the labour force is 
required.
6) Achieving agricultural development by increasing productivity in 
irrigated or rain-fed areas and by expanding irrigated areas.
37 National Planning Council, The Five Year Development Plan, 1976-1980 
(Amman : RSS printing & publication corp., n.d.).
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7) Expanding the exploitation of minerals already existing in the
38country . In addition, efforts should be concentrated on prospecting 
and exploring for other minerals,
8) The Rationalization of foreign trade.
Within this general framework of development guidelines, the plan's
39main goals were set as follows.
a) Achieving a 12 per cent annual growth rate of GDP
b) Augumenting the reliance of the budget on domestic revenues.
c) Reducing the trade deficit to JD 131 million by 1980
d) Distributing development gains among various regions and 
people of the country.
Available data allows for a quick examination of the t&rget fulfillment 
of the plan in the first two years 1976 and 1977, given the fact that the 
plan still in progress.
The first two years witnessed growth rates, after adjusting for
inflation, of only 60 per cent of the target specified by the plan,
40namely 7 per cent . On the other hand, the targets for the growth of 
domestic revenues, both absolutly and as a ratio to total revenues, 
seem to have been met.
However, the plan target of having a trade deficit of only JD 131 
million by 1980 is obviously beyond reach. Imports have been growing 
in a much faster rate than exports. By the end of 1977 the trade 
deficit stood at JD 371.1 million.
38 It is worth noting that two major projects started in 1979 namely, 
the extraction of Potash and chemical fertilizers project in Agaba.
39 Ibid.
40 Royal Scientific Society, "The Performance of the Five Year Plan 
in the First Two Years, 1976-1977." a mimo.
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Finally, the only available data on the distribution of income 
41pertains to 1973 . However, it is possible, though not certain, that
the income distribution has deteriorated over thè last several years in
42favour of the well-to-do rather than for the poor .
«
The above briefly discussed indicators signifies the fact that
the Five Year Plan was somewhat over optimistic. However, do these
weaknesses in the plan document threaten any concrete harm to Jordan.
development efforts? Mazur, suggests that over optimism in- aggregative
projections is unlikely to have any more serious consequences than
43mild embarrassment for the Planners .
1.5 Concluding Remarks.
Ever since the country was established, Jordan was subject to
drastic changes. Such changes stemmed from two major sources; Firstly,
that Jordan had a unique history mainly characterized by a mixed colonial
%
background, and Secondly, an ever changing political and military
situation in the Middle East which affected Jordan the most, since it has\ wi
always been in the forefront of every activity in the area, be it 
political or otherwise.
This setting within which the country found itself, brought 
about vast changes. Within sixteen years the population of Jordan was 
united once and further disintegrated as a result of the conflict in the 
area. The adverse effects of such changes were mostly observed in an 
increased labour force and hence, unemployment prevailed, especially right 
after the 1948 events. Not to mention that the government had to divert 
some of its available resources to cope with the arising problems.
41 Gazi Assaf, The Size Distribution of income in Jordan in 1973, (Draft). 
(Amman : Royal Scientific Society, June 1979).
42 RSS, op.cit.
43 Michael P-. Mazur, op.cit., p.266
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Prior to the 1967 war, the Jordanian economy witnessed a remarkable 
development and growth rates by most standards. Either GNP and GDP grew 
by more than a 10 per cent annually accompanied by financial stability 
which signifies a real growth rate in per capita income and a better 
standard of living. However, the picture has been changing rapidly since 
then, in terms of marked inflation rates and acute labour shortages, 
along with vast land speculation and a construction boom.
This pace of economic development and growth was accompanied, as is 
to be expected, by certain transformation changes within the various 
aspects of the economy, such changes ought to be spelled out in the 
following. v
1) As was alluded to in the text, and rightly noted by many others, the 
relative importance of the sectors of the economy had changed. The 
agricultural sector’s relative importance was declining throughout the 
period. This was accompanied by a noticable growth in the industrial 
sector. However, this growth was not enough to lead'the country's pace 
of economic development. Furthermore, these changes give rise to the 
services sector to dominate the economy and hence, shaping up the direction 
of economic resources.
2) Secondly, but less importantly, a relative change in the resource 
pattern was observed in a relatively declining share of total consumption 
in GDP.
3) Jordan further witnessed a structural imbalance in her balance of 
payments. An ever-growing import bill coupled with a small share of 
exports mainly dependent on a few large scale export oriented industries 
gave rise to a troubled trade balance however, the trade deficit being 
financed by transfers from abroad.
4) Furthermore, Jordan has a financial imbalance due mainly to the 
inadequacy of domestically generated revenues which eventually led to more 
dependence on foreign aid.
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The country in fact received an increasing amount of foreign aid, 
which made it possible for Jordan to pursue the aforementioned 
growth rates and to keep the government functioning in times of 
hardships. Indeed, one could argue that without foreign aid, the 
balance of payments would be seriously in deficit and this would most 
certainly retard economic development.
However, the striking feature iS that throughout the period under 
examination, foreign aid has been taken for granted and hence development 
plans and their respective policies were formed as though foreign aid 
would continue to be an integral part of resource availability,
Apart from some governmental attention during the mid 1960's, no serious 
effort has been taken to mobilize domestic resources to assume a more active 
role in furthering economic development.
•- i
Moreover, it should be stressed that foreign resources inflows are 
not likely to continue indefinitly, since on the one hand, it follows to 
the greatest extent possible the political situation which is itself
; n
volatile. On the other hand, it is main objective is to provide the missing 
link in the chain of the development process, so that further progress 
became automatic and self-sustaining.
Lastly, from the forgoing analysis it would seem that the economic 
development plans have been rather over optimistic. However, they 
provided the necessary direction to the economy, maintained and 
reactivated the path of economic development and growth trends.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING 
FISCAL POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The object of the present chapter is to provide some theoretical 
considerations relevant to the role of fiscal policy in promoting 
economic development as it is one of the major policies that influence 
the main economic variables. Therefore, fiscal policy could be viewed 
as a tool to correct the direction of the economy as well as a means 
of mobilizing resources for economic development. Accordingly, we will 
first discuss the macroeconomic objectives of fiscal policy with particular 
emphasis on developing countries. Also we will appraise the main criteria 
on which to evaluate a given tax structure. Lastly, we will critically 
analyse the different hypotheses related to the determinants of the 
behaviour of government expenditure.
ii
2.1. The Macroeconomic Objectives of Fiscal Policy
Fiscal'policy in the macroeconomic sense has an important bearing 
on the level of employment and prices, on the rate of growth, as well as 
upon the pattern of income distribution in the society. Consequently 
fiscal policy in developing countries has three major objectives*:
(1) To make available for economic development the maximum flow of 
human and material resources consistant with minimum current consumption;
(2) To maintain reasonable economic stability in the face of long-run 
inflationary pressures and short-run international price movements;
(3) To reduce, where they exist, the extreme inequalities in wealth, 
income and consumption standards which undermine productive efficiency, 
offend justice, and endanger political stability.
1. Walter Heller, "Fiscal Policies for Underdeveloped Countries", in 
Richard M. Bird and Oliver Oldham, Reading on Taxation in Developing 
Countries. 3rd ed. (London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1975),
p.S.
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In reading closely into the foregoing objectives one could find 
that they are not basically different from those objectives assigned to 
fiscal policy in a developed economy which are usually perceived as the 
allocative, stability and distributive objectives. However, such 
similarities in objectives should not obscure the differences among 
developed and developing countries, be it general economic conditions, 
political, cultural or otherwise. These differences, of course, call 
for different emphasis as to the use of fiscal instruments, to tackle 
a certain problem, to be consistant with the particular conditions of 
developing countries.
2.1.1 Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
Developing countries have been striving to achieve a reasonable
tdegree of economic growth and development. For such efforts to 
materialize, capital formation, inter alia, is of course a prerequisite
to any policy of self-help. To make available the necessary investments,v
'it is without doubt recognized that domestically generated savings should 
play a vital role. However, it is equally recognized that domestic 
savings in almost all developing countries still form a very small 
percentage of GNP. This is mainly due to the fact that the vast 
majority of the population live on or around the subsistance level as 
a consequence of the low level of per capita income. Furthermore, the 
marginal propensity to consume in those countries is high enough to leave 
nothing but a relatively small share of income available for capital 
formation.
It is therefore, primitive to ascertain that fiscal policy has a
great role in this respect. As Professor Nurkse puts it: "I believe
that public finance assumes a new significance in the face of the problem
of capital formation in "underdeveloped" countries^. , Hence, given the 2
2 Ragnar Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p.143.
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low level of domestic savings in these countries, economic development
hinges upon the ability and willingness of the governments to promote
■ 3 :both voluntary as well as obligatory savings through taxation .
This task of fiscal policy is in fact different from that of a
developed economy whereby a high average income ensures an almost
automatic generation of effective demand and private savings. It is
therefore, rather obvious that given the vital importance of private
savings in developed countries, fiscal policy should concentrate on
lessening the interference of taxation with the incentives to channel
- 4'-' '■■■-'those savings into productive investments«.
By contrast governments in developing countries are called upon 
to interfere in the economic life. This is in fact because they 
assume wider functions than those of developed countries. In the 
former, governments have to provide what is referred to as "social over­
head capital" or infrastructual investments. This is mainly due to 
the fact that the private sector is generally unwilling to provide the 
necessary investments in areas such as education, health, transportation, 
dams construction, etc. The reasons behind the private sector aversion 
could be, (a) that such projects need a vast amount of capital which 
is not readily available, or, (b) financial returns on investments in 
such areas are remote while the private sector looks for a short-term 
yielding project, (c) or simply because of the high risks usually involved 
It follows then, that due to the fact that investments in such areas 
contribute considerably to the process of economic development, if not 
even considered prerequisites, governments are compelled to provide the 
necessary investments. By the same token, governments of developing 
countries have to play a vital role in mobilizing enough resources so as
3 Raja J. Chelliah, Fiscal Policy in Underdeveloped Countries 2nd ed.
(Londons George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969), p.22. ~~~
4 Walter Heller, op. cit. p.6.
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to ensure a state of steady growth. Here taxation is an important 
instrument; as Heller puts it: "to break out of this [vicious] circle, 
apart from foreign aid, calls for vigorous taxation and government 
development programmes"^.
The foregoing discussion leads us to believe that the role of fiscal
policy in developing countries essentially has to be concerned with allocating
more resources for investment and restraining consumption. This task of
fiscal policy could be broken down into three main parts, that is, the
financing of social overhead investments directly from governments;
participating in privately owned projects by injecting needed capital; and
providing the necessary incentives for the private sector to carry out its
own investments. By contrast, fiscal policy in developed countries is
concerned mainly with regulating the total flow of purchasing power, with
determining the level of effective demand. This statement in fact reflects,
«*
among other things that in developed countries the Keynesian unemployment
arises when the level of aggregate demand is deficient for purchase of the
\
full employment output. Therefore, if long-run disequilibrium and unemploy­
ment are to be avoided, then, income must grow at a rate just sufficient to 
ensure the full capacity use of a growing capital stock^.
However unemployment in developing countries is assumed to be of quite 
different nature. Unemployment arises for several reasons apart from deficient
effective demand. This may, at least partially, explain the distinctive
8role of fiscal policy in developing countries. For Musgrave , unemployment 
in those countries arises for several reasons among which the following 
could be singled out:, '
(1) The lack of incentives to work which is a resultant factor from low 
wages due to the small capital stock. 5678
5. United Nations, Technical Assistance Administration, "Taxes and Fiscal 
Policy in Underdeveloped Countries". (New York, 1954), p.3.
6. Raja J. Chelliah, op. cit., p.44.
7. Ibid, p.47
8. R.A. Musgrave, op. cit., pp.203-211.
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(2) A further cause of unemployment may be found in rigidities in the 
proportions in which labour and capital can be combined, and
(3) The situation may be such that increased output could be achieved 
with little additional‘capital, provided the necessary organizational 
effort and know-how were forthcoming. Therefore, the primary role
of fiscal policy in developing countries is to raise the necessary 
savings in order to increase the productive capacity. ,
By and large, the role of fiscal policy as a means of mobilizing 
resources could best be explained in a simple mathematical model of 
the Domar-Harrod type . It is well to bear in mind however, that this 
model embodies certain weaknesses which are documented in economic 
literature^ Yet, it has frequently been applied to explain aspects 
of developing countries V
12Basically, the Domar-Harrod model assumes a fully employed economy . 
In this model, if the actual rate of growth, r, is (more than the
■. j o . . !■■■''
desired rate of growth , g, then this will eventually produce a 
situation of cyclical instability or a secular inflation and vice versa. 
Now, in order to achieve a steady growth in the model and to avoid such
9. Other models such as the "Dual-economy" type has a special appeal 
in the case of developing countries, in which it is assumed that 
the economy is composed of two main sectors, namely, the agricultural 
"subsistance" sector, and the non-agricultural "modern" sector.
10 See for example, Amartya Sen. Growth Economics. Penguin Books, 1971.
11 Chelliah, op, cit., p.47 who used it to explain the role of fiscal 
policy in India.
12 The following discussion is based on R.A. Musgrave and P.B. Musgrave, 
Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed.,, (Tokyo:
McGraw Hill kogokush Ltd., 1976), p.742.
13 Here two observation should be made about the cyclical instability 
involved in the desired "Warranted" rate of growth; (1) Once all 
unemployed are back at work, the natural rata of growth must set a 
ceiling against which, alas, the faster desired rate of growth must 
eventually collide, and (2) The desired rate of growth, even if 
originally established will not persist after being disturbed.
For more details see P.A. Samuelson, Economics, 10th ed,, 1976, 
pp. 748-758. “
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instability, the full employment rate of growth rn, should equal r and g.
Suppose that the objective is to achieve a 2% annual rate of 
growth in per capita income. With, say, a 2% annual rate of growth of 
population, GNP must then grow at slightly above 4% annually.' To 
achieve this GUP rate of growth requires a certain rate of capital 
formation, Z. This could be crudely estimated by the Incremental 
Capital-Output Ratio (ICOR), which is defined as follows:
Z = M  „ L_ (1)AY AY
where,
K = capital stock
I = annual investment (* AK).
Y ■ national income (GNE)
if g is the desired rate of growth.
g
AY
Y (2)
\
then the required investment rate may be obtained by substitution
as
I _ AK  ^ AY 
Y “ AY * Y (3)
Therefore, if Z - 3%, and g * 4%, i  ■ 12%.
Now, to assure economic balance, this investment ratio must be 
matched by an equivalent saving ratio in the economy, if the 4% desired 
rate of growth is to be attained. Then we must have,
Sp + Sg - Zg Y (4)
where,
Sp » private savings, Sg ■ Government savings.
But we know that private savings is a function of disposable income 
which is given by
Sp - s (Y - T) (5)
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where,
s = the marginal propensity to save and,
T * total tax revenue 
equation (5) could be rewritten as
Sp - s(l - t)Y (6)
where t is the total tax rate.
Likewise, government savings is given by,
Sg « tY - aY (7)
where a is current expenditure of government as a fraction of 
national income,
By substituting equations (6) and (7) into (4) we get,
t - (8)
Equation (8) therefore provides an estimate of the necessary tax 
rate required to achieve the target rate of growth of national income.
We already have Zg * 12%, then if we know the marginal propensityrtd.- 
save, s, and a, t could be estimated.
This is a simple model where consumption is assumed to be a function 
of disposable income, in real life it may be a function of many other 
variables. The effects of taxes is assumed to be upon consumption 
while it may be on savings as well.
This leads us to consider briefly the effect of fiscal policy on 
capacity output and growth. In the context of a full employment model, 
income may be spent either on consumption or saving (investment). 
Therefore, Government revenues be it in the form of taxes or domestic 
borrowing may reduce expenditure by an equal amount. The main issue here 
is whether such a reduction takes place in private savings and thereby 
investment or private consumption. It is argued that such an issue 
may not arise in the context of developing countries since private savings 
are not institutionalized. The demand for money is a demand for liquid
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money given the fact that financial assets aré generally not widely 
available. This may be the case for lack of developed capital markets; 
lack of confidence in already existing financial institutions; 
or merely due to the existence of inflationary tendencies.
Now, it is generally accepted that, for a wide range of reasons, the 
marginal propensity to consume in developing countries tends to be high 
and therefore there are small savings available for investment. Due to 
the own characteristics of developing countries, the market mechanism 
alone is therefore unable to generate the necessary savings, hence the 
need for fiscal action in order to raise the necessary resources on the 
one hand, as well as providing the needed incentives to channel other 
savings into investments. Finally, as to the tax rate resulted in the 
above formulation, it remains to the government concerned to decide 
whether this tax rate is feasible, depending on the particular circumstances 
and economic conditions of its own.
2.1.2 Stabilization Aspects of Fiscal Policy i
f
Developing countries are generally characterized by a relatively 
large trade sector and particularly depending, in most cases, on a 
few exports of primary products. Also they are dependent on foreign 
sources to satisfy their needs of manufactured goods and often of 
foodstuffs as well. This dependency leads to the vulnerability of 
their economies to the world market fluctuations and their destabilizing 
influencies. However, it may well be argued that any export-orientated 
economy runs this risk. Yet, the degree of externally induced 
instability differs between an economy which depends on one or two
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export-orientated primary products and an industrially diversified one.
In periods of high international demand, exports of developing 
countries tend to increase with a consequent increase in the exports 
sectors income. This may be followed by a year lag of imports demand, 
therefore heavier demand for goods and services takes place partly 
covered by an increase in domestic production and the rest is covered by 
imports. A decline in exports may lead to a movement in the opposite 
direction. A contracting demand for exports leads to a similar 
contraction in overall demand in the economy, coupled with a decrease in
revenues, thereby affecting the levels of income and employment particularly
. '>
in the export sector. The government is faced with a situation whereby
its revenues decreases and at the same time needs to maintain the level
of its expenditures. This in turn leads to a deficit with its
inevitable inflationary effects, y
It is clear from the above argument that changes in the level of
foreign demand thus have an inordinate impact on the domestic economy
14and the foreign trade balance .
In developed economies, fiscal policy is an economic stabilizing 
device. In developing countries this role of fiscal policy is 
conditioned by both the externally induced destabilizing influences as 
discussed above as well as by the characteristics of their economies.
This is not to suggest however, that developing countries have no fiscal 
devices to counteract the world market fluctuation effects on the 
domestic economy. Export and import taxes as well as the manipulation 
of exchange rates may be used in such circumstances in order to lessen 
the exposure of their economies to the vagaries of external destabilizing
14 For more details on this argument see, R.A. Musgrave, Fiscal Systems, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); Also see, Alan Peacock 
and Douglas Dosser, "Stabilization and Economic Planning in African 
Countries" Public Finance, vol. 17, no.3, 1962.
47
Influences.
However, it should be kept in mind that the use of fiscal and/or
monetary policies in such situations as a counter-cyclical device
may introduce' wider disturbances. For example, the use of export
duties as a stabilizing device may render the government revenues
to greater instability, due to the fact that such duties will eventually
fluctuate according to changes in foreign demand for or prices of exports.
On the other hand, when the demand for exports i& high, the volume of
imports is also high as a result of greater availability of foreign
exchange as well as increased demand as said before; import duties then
bring in correspondingly greater revenues. On the other hand, if the
demand for exports falls, there is a stringency in the foreign-exchange
market, import restrictions are tightened, and there is a corresponding
15fall in the revenue from import duties .
Peacock and Dosser, in a study where a basically Keynesian model is 
adopted to developing countries in Africa, suggested some other devices.
As export receipts fall, there will be a fall in government receipts.
The government can respond in a number of ways^.
(1) reduce its current or capital (development) expenditure
(2) reduce its own imports;
(3) draw down its foreign exchange reserves (or negotiate a loan 
or grant from a foreign country or international agency);
(4) meet the deficit by borrowing or money creation through a fiduciary 
issue.
Each of these sets of devices has its attractions as well as objections. 
Even if developing countries wanted to adopt anti-cyclical fiscal measures
15 R. Chelliah, op. cit. p.37
16 Allan Peacock and Douglas Dosser, op. cit., p.243.
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in order to lessen the vulnerability of their economies to the 
adversities of outside pressures, they might find it harder to achieve 
tangible results due to the characteristics of their economies. In 
predominantly agricultural economies, supply is likely to be relatively 
inelastic. Moreover, the organization of production is characterized 
by many institutional rigidities. Furthermore, embarking on
l *
stabilizing fiscal measures requires the political will as well as the 
economic skill in adopting such measures.
Prebish^ suggested that the solution to such cyclical tendencies 
which emanate from the exposure of developing economies to world
\'-'t
market fluctuations would be to make the internal structure of the 
economy strong enough to divert the effects of such fluctuations 
outward so that internal economic activities could progress without 
periodic interruptions. Therefore, Prebish suggests structural 
changes rather.than simple straightforward anti-cyclical fiscal measures. 
The needed structural changes involve, among other things, incomei
redistribution and changes in the pattern of consumption. •
However, one could safely argue that the aforementioned structural 
changes advocated by Prebish are essentially of a long-term nature.
In a stabilized progranme, time is so important a factor if the 
conteracting measures are not to cause long-term hardship for the 
economy. Therefore, it remains that fiscal measures are quite useful 
particularly if coordinated with other necessary policies to fulfil the 
target of economic stabilization, be it price stability or the problems 
of unemployment. ,
It was only relatively recently that developing countries embarked 
upon programmes of industrialization or some kind of import substituting
17 R. Prebish, "Economic Development or Monetary Stability": The 
False Dilemma". In I. Livingston, The Economic Policy for 
Development. Penguin Books, 1977, pp.345-384.
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industries in order to lessen the exposure of their economies to the
18 . .vagaries of international markets . This is, however, by no means 
to suggest that industrialization by itself will bring about stability
to developing economies. Yet, the fact remains that diversification
*
of the industrial structure and the dependence of the economy on few 
primary products makes it less susceptible to external destabilizing ; 
influences. .
By and large, it is argued that the successful application of fiscal 
measures as stabilizing devices needs above all a reasonably developed 
economic structure so that the economy responds adequately to the 
measures taken. This seems to be the basic problem of developing 
countries. Moreover, there should be a certain level of coordination 
between the fiscal policy adopted and the monetary authorities in order 
to achieve the required targets of stability.
2.1.3 Fiscal Policy and Inequality
The task of fiscal policy as an income redistribdtor device is 
another major objective. In developing countries, economic development 
does not seem to result in alleviating the poverty and misery of the 
people. In other words, it is recognized that achieving a certain 
acceptable level of economic development did not necessarily bring with 
it a desired degree of equal distribution of the fruits of such 
development.
In developing countries, the function of fiscal policy as a device 
of income and wealth redistribution is largely one of attempting to
18 This view is reflected, for example in the study by UNECLA "Theoretical 
and Practical Problems of Economic Growth", Doc. ElCN. 12/221,
May 1951; see also UN, "The Economic Development of Latin America 
and Its Principal Problems", (1950), chap. VII; And more recently, 
for a detailed discussion of the views of different economists, see 
M.G. de Varies, "Trade and Exchange Policy for Economic Development:
Two Decades of Evolving Views", Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 18,
■ No. 1, 1966.
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attain that degree of redistribution of income through taxation and
government expenditure which most neatly balances (a) the humanitarian
interest in sharing economic well-being more equally against, (b) the
efficiency interest in maintaining sufficient inequalities of reward to
serve as an incentive to the exercise of special economic effort and 
19inequality. The potential of fiscal measures for the redistribution of 
income is greater in developed countries for several reasons among which,
(1) the degree of monetization of the economies; (2) the highly 
developed institutional framework; (3) the degree of progressiveness 
of taxes, and above all (4) the political will in these countries to 
achieve a more socially acceptable degree of income and wealth redistribu­
tion.
However, the situation in developing countries is quite different.
The aforementioned conditions which presumably foster the potential 
and effectiveness of fiscal measures do not exist. Even where they 
partially exist, it is argued that they are not sufficiently developed 
to offer a reasonable basis for a more acceptable degree of income and 
wealth redistribution.
This pessimistic view concerning the efficacy of the fiscal system
as an instrument of income redistribution in developing countries was
bluntly advocated by Mahbub ul Hag of the World Bank recently. He
referred to the prevailance of a "misguided faith in the^fiscal system
of developing countries and a fairly naive understanding of the inter-
20play of economic and political institutions
Notwithstanding the fact that this pessimistic view as well as the 
reasons behind it are partially supported by facts, yet it was only
19 Walter Heller, op. cit., p.21 '
20 Mahbub ul Haq, "Employment in the 1980's; A New Perspective", 
International Development Review, December, 1971.
51
relatively recently that studies?^- on developing countries offered a
more optimistic indication. Some of these studies pointed out the fact
that some developing countries collected more than 20% of GNP in taxes.
For example, Tunisia, Congo, Guyana and Brazil collected 20.7%, 23.4%,
22
20.6%, and 20.6% of GNP in taxes respectively . This eventually
would give these countries a substantial scope for using the fiscal system 
as a redistribution device. It is equally true though that some other 
countries such as Pakistan, Phillipines and Paraquay collected less than 
10% of GNP in taxes , which in turn would make it rather difficult 
for them to pursue a redistributive path of income and wealth by fiscal 
means.; .
However, one should emphasize the fact that generalizations that
emanated from cross-country studies must be taken with caution due to
the great many differences among the countries themselves as well as
among the regions of the developing world. Furthermore, the bulk of
these international cross-country studies did not provide hard evidence
or strong reason to believe that the fiscal systems in developing countries
are inevitably regressive and ineffective as a means of distributing 
24income ....
The foregoing discussion however pessimistic, does not rule out 
therefore the role that fiscal policy can play in income redistribution.
21 See for example, Raja J. Chelliah, "Trends in Taxation in Developing 
Countries", I.M.F. Staff Papers, vol. 18 (July 1971) pp.254-327; 
UNECA, "Public Finance in African Countries", Economic Bulletin
for Africa, vol. 1 (June 1961) pp. 1-28; UNEPAFE, "Tax Potential 
and Economic Growth in the Countries of ECAFE Region". Economic 
Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, vol. XVII (September 1966) 
pp.29-48.
22 Chelliah, op. cit. p.261
23 It is worth noting here that these calculations of tax ratios are based 
on the 1966-68 period, and eventually since then there is reason to 
believe that a reasonable degree of change took place either in the 
tax systems or the degree of development which inevitably has its 
effects on the performance and tax effort of these countries.
24 R. Bird. op. cit., p.3.
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This qualification is dependent on the potential outcome of economic 
development in developing nations in terms of institutional build-up, 
monetization of their economies, as well as modernization of tax systems 
and other administrative machinery. Furthermore, it is believed that 
in spite of the exisiting negative factors that may hamper the use of 
fiscal measures for income distribution, still fiscal measures can 
achieve a degree of socially acceptable distribution through the 
indirect taxation of luxury consumption. Revenues from such sources 
could be channelled and transformed into investments in human capital, 
be it in health, education or nutrition. Certainly the provision of
m
such investments on the expense of the lavish consumption will improve the 
situation of inequality even if by a small margin.
2.2 The Optimal Tax Structure
The appraisal of a given tax structure should take into consideration
a number of important factors that emerged from different approaches to
\
taxation. Clearly one could think of a number of requisites for a 
good tax structure.
The first consideration is the question of justice and fairness.
A good tax structure should be equitable. More specifically, it should
meet the double criteria of horizontal and vertical equity. In the
first place there is the need to ensure that people in similar
circumstances are treated alike. Equitable Taxation holds this to be
a basic requirement for a good tax system. On the other hand, vertical
equity calls for different treatment between people in unequal
circumstances^related to society's evaluation of various states of well- 
25being . Both concepts are mutually interrelated.
V . •
Both the ability-to-pay and the benefit-received approaches
25 R.A. Musgrave, "ET, OT, and SBT", Journal of Public Economics, 
vol. 6 (1976), pp. 3-16.
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to taxation have a role to play in the quest for justice in taxation.
The latter approach presupposes that everyone receives some benefit from
Governments’ provision of goods and services and should therefore
contribute to the cost of sustaining them .. It is well recognised
however, that there are many individuals with limited financial
resources whereby if a tax is levied on them would result in a burden
too heavy to be borne. It is therefore generally accepted that those
who are barely able to sustain themselves should be exempted from paying
27taxes even though they do gain some benefit from government .
The benefit approach appears to have two attractions. On the
one hand is that it appeals to people on equity grounds. On the other
hand, it gives simultaneous determination of both the tax level and the
28government expenditure . However, in spite of the fact that in
certain cases involving direct taxes, i.e. the company income tax, the
*
benefit approach can be considered quite effectively, yet it is evident
that this principle of taxation has quite limited application.
The ability-to-pay approach is more generally accepted and its
use more strongly defended than the benefit approach in the search for
justice and equity. It is commohly believed that net income rather
than gross income is a reasonably satisfactory measure of the ability
to pay taxes. Ability to pay is also a function of wealth and wealth
29may be just as, or even more, important than income
It is generally accepted that the higher the persons income the 
higher the proportion of that income should be paid in taxes to the
26 R.A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, (Tokyo: McGraw-Hill
Kogakusha, Ltd., 1969) p.67.
27 J. Scherer and J. Fate, Public Finance and Fiscal Policy. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p.165.
28 Charles M. Allen. ' The Theory of Taxation. (Penguin Books Ltd.,
1971) p.99.
29 Ibid., pp.131-133.
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government. In other words, this indicates that the rate of taxes
should be progressive. There is, however, little agreement as to what
is the appropriate level of progression. Clearly this depends to a
considerable extent on thè prevailing circumstances of the particular
country in question, be it economic, political, social or otherwise.
Another factor which could be taken into consideration in appraising
a tax system is that taxes should be chosen so as to minimize interference
with economic decisions in otherwise efficient markets'3 . Imposition..
of excess burden should be minimized. This in particular is related to
lessen the tax burden on profits of corporations that is believed to
contribute most to economic development, hence providing incentives
for more investment in capital goods. The so called neutrality approach
to taxation seeks to minimize the extent to which taxation distorts 
31individual choices
A good tax structure should also ensure that the administration and
\ 0 9compliance cost should be so low as is compatible with other objectives . 
Moreover, the tax structure should permit an efficient and non-arbitrary 
administration and should be understandable to the tax payer. Most 
of the literature on the requirement for a good tax system tends to give 
this aspect less importance. In developing countries, however, tax 
administration could be a decisive factor and should be given the necessary 
consideration if the objectives of the tax system, in general, are to 
be achieved.
The tax structure should be designed in such a way to facilitate the
30 R.A. Musgrave & P.B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 
2nd ed., (London: McGraw-Hill Ltd., 1976), pp.210-211.
31 Charles C. Allan, op. cit., p.81.
32 W.P. Heller and K. Shell. "On Optimal Taxation with Costly 
Administration", American Economic Review voi. 74, 1974, pp.338- 
345. ,
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use of fiscal policy for stabilization and growth objectives. As it
was argued in the previous section, these are considered the most
important macro objectives for fiscal policy, in which taxes are the
primary tools for the achievement of such objectives. Taxes could be
used to promote growth in the economy. Thus taxes and negative taxes
(subsidies) are used so as to intervene in the market to induce greater
33output of goods and services .
Finally, a good tax system not only should generate adequate 
revenues, but there is a need for such revenues to be elastic in an 
upward direction. As will shortly be discussed, there is considerable 
evidence to suggest that as the national income expands there is a 
tendency for the public sector to expand at a faster rate. This in 
turn implies the need for government revenue to expand. Therefore taxes 
must produce adequate revenue to finance an expanding government 
spending, leaving aside the question whether this expansion is desirable 
or not. \I
Moreover, it is desirable that this increase in revenue from taxes 
should occur naturally and without the need for increases in the tax 
rates given the fact that a change in the tax structure needs a 
relatively long period of time to materialize. This can be achieved
if the tax system is designed so that the marginal rate of tax is in
—  34excess of the average rate . -
It is apparent that the foregone suggested criteria upon which to 
appraise a given tax structure may embody some conflicting objectives.
For example, in order for a tax system to meet the equity objective 
both horizontally and vertically, may need to forego the requirement
33 Charles C. Allan, op. cit., p.148
34 David Walker, "Taxation and Taxable Capacity in Underdeveloped 
Countries", in Milton Taylor ed., Taxation for African Economic 
Development (London: Hutchinson Educational Ltd., 1970)pp.203-234
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for a simple tax administration. It follows though, that a more 
complex tax administration may raise the administrative and compliance 
cost of assessing and collecting taxes. Moreover, particular taxes 
may be judged favourable from one criteria and unfavourable from 
another.
Therefore, when such conflicting objectives arise, a good tax 
structure must ensure, apart from the fair burden distribution as well 
as other objectives, that such conflicting requirement be dealt with 
simultaneously according to the priorities of the society, and to try 
to minimize to the greatest extent possible the spillover negative 
effects that may arise.
It was only relatively recently that economists have introduced 
a time dimension to the evaluation of a tax structure during which they 
envisage a change in the tax structure that takes place with the process 
of economic development over time.
Musgrave divided the factors affecting the tax structure as 
development proceeds into two main groups, namely economic factors and
political and social factors.
35Musgrave suggested that economic factors, such as those alluded 
to in the outset, affect the development of the tax structure in two 
ways. Firstly, as the structure of the economy changes with economic 
development, the nature of the tax base changes as well, and with it the 
"Handles" to which the revenue system may be attached. Secondly, as 
the country moves from its stage of economic development, this brings 
with it a change in the economic objectives of the tax policy as well as 
the economic criteria by which a good tax structure is to be judged.
Furthermore, as the economic institutional structure develops, and 
the private sector better organized, then taxation of the private sector 
corporation becomes more .feasible as a result of an increased and 
35 R.A. Musgrave, Fiscal Systems, op. cit., pp.125-136.
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identifiable tax base. Thus, there is reason to expect that economic 
development coupled with the expected structural changes in the economy 
will bring about an increase in the share of direct taxes.
This argument was then supported by Thorn, who on data provided by 
Kuznets, indicated that in the early stages of development most countries 
tended to depend more on indirect taxes, however he concluded, there is
a tendency in most countries beyond a certain point for the proportion
36of tax revenues provided by direct taxes to grow . The basic reason
behind this tendency might be explained by the relationship between
per capita income and direct tax base. In other words, the rising per
capita income gives rise to broader income base for direct taxes.
Furthermore, the inherent characteristics of the various types of
taxes coupled with changes in administrative capability, both of which
are related to the level of economic development, give greater scope
for more reliance on direct taxes as a means of increasing government 
37revenues - . >
. . 38In a study of tax structures in thirty developing countries, Chelliah ,
did not confirm such a conclusion, but was only able to identify a
decreased reliance on taxes on international trade. However, he noticed
that a shift within direct taxes has taken place in favour of income
taxes rather than property and poll taxes. In a yet more recent study
39Chelliah and others found that emphasis on different taxes varied
36 R.S. Thorn, "The Evolution of Public Finances During Economic 
Development", The Manchester School, vol. 35, 1967, pp.19-51.
37 Ibid, p.23
38 Raja J. Chelliah, "Trends in Taxation in Developing Countries", I.M.F. 
Staff Papers, vol. 18 (July 1971), pp.254-327.
39 Raja J. Chelliah, Hessel J. Bass and Margaret R. Kelly, "Tax Ratios and 
Tax Effort in Developing Countries, 1969-1971", I.M.F. Staff Papers, 
vol. 22, No.l. (1975), pp.187-205. It is worth noting here that the 
present study by Chelliah et al., was extended to cover 50 
developing countries as well as a new period, namely, 1969-71 which
to a certain extent may explain the changes in the results reached.
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among developing countries with respect to their regions. Countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa have higher-than-average income taxes 
and taxes on production. Tropical Africa, by contrast, is the most 
dependent on international trade taxes. Vhile Asia and the Far East 
have the lowest ratio of income taxes. Above all, percentage 
variations between regions is least for import taxes.
By and large, these studies suggested that there is a tendency 
for taxes to change with the change in the level of economic development. 
In fact the level of taxes has affected not only the stages of economic 
development as usually measured by the per capita income, but by a wide 
range of other factors alluded to earlier, which collectively reflect 
changes in the structure of the economy. Such factors and their effect 
on the tax ratios will be subject to empirical investigation later in 
chapter six.
2.3 On Some Determinants of Government Expenditures
In the previous two sections, the macroeconomic objectives of 
fiscal policy, as well as the requirements for a good tax structure, 
were briefly discussed. In this section, however, we intend to review 
in general terms, some of the hypotheses that were suggested in 
explaining the behaviour and pattern of growth of government expenditures.
In studying the pattern of government expenditure and their 
determinants, two approaches are usually followed, the "normative" and 
"positive". The former approach concerns itself with what "ougjit to be" 
on the basis of certain desirable characteristics developed in isolation. 
The later is concerned with "what is, was, will be" which involves 
appealing to facts by a rigorous analysis of the economic structure of 
the country concerned. Our review here will be confined to the positive 
approach.
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The underlying impetus of the normative approach in explaining the 
government expenditures behaviour has been Lindhal’s "Optimum budget"^, 
model where the analogy of taxes to market price was drawn; and consequently, 
a similar price quantity equilibrium was suggested.
Likewise, the positive approach has an ancestor. This is the 
well known Wagner’s "Law of increasing government activity"^» Notwith­
standing the fact that the law generated a great many studies on the 
relationship between government expenditures and the stage of economic 
development, it nevertheless resulted in widely varied interpretations 
as will be discussed shortly.
However, the explanations of the determinants of government 
expenditure stem from two main directions, some concentrated on the 
demand side, others departed from the supply side of the issue. By and 
larger these explanations could be broadly categorized into three main 
groups. Firstly, those which related government expenditure to the 
stage of economic development; secondly, those which related such
I
expenditures to revenue constraint as well as time and war (displacement 
effect); and thirdly, those which related government expenditure to 
differences in the economic system, political factors, and other 
conditioning factors such as the degree of openness of the economy.
Here, we intend to discuss the first two groups in some detail and 
cover the rest very briefly. . » ;
40 See Erik Lindhal, "Just Taxation: A Positive Solution", in R. Musgrave 
and Allan Peacock (eds.), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance
(New York: The MacMillan Co., 1958), pp.168-176; see also R.A. Musgrave. 
The Theory of Public Finance, op. cit., pp.74-77.
41 Adolf Wagner, "Three Extracts on Public Finance", in R.A. Musgrave 
and A. Peacock (ed.), ibid.» pp.1-8. Also a critical review
of the law is found in A. Peacock and J. Wiseman, Growth of Public 
Expenditure in the United Kingdom, (London: Oxford U. Press, 1961), 
pp.1 6 - 2 0 . It is worth noting here that we are not interested in 
the philosophical argument of Wagner's Law but rather in its outcome 
as to the growth of government expenditures as well as the 
alternative hypothesis revolved around it.
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2.3.1 Government Expenditure and the Stage of Economic Development 
There has been a growing concern recently about the pattern of 
growth and behaviour of government expenditures. Several studies of 
the behaviour of government expenditure concluded that government
expenditure is positively related to the stage of economic development,
/
Lo'as measured by per capita income. Such studies^ revolved around 
Wagner's law mentioned earlier. Essentially it is taken that Wagner 
argued that government expenditure tends to rise at a rate faster than 
that of national income. This was interpreted as saying that the 
income-elasticity of government expenditure is greater than unity.
In justifying the existance of the law, Wagner offered three reasons as 
to why the aforementioned development would take placeHJ.
Firstly, an expansion would come about with respect to the 
administrative and protective functions of the state because of the 
substitution of public to private activity.
Secondly, Wagner also explicitly predicted a considerable relativeI
expansion of "cultural and welfare" expenditures, especially with 
respect to education and income redistribution, and,
Thirdly, Wagner suggested that the inevitable changes in technology 
and the increasing scale of investment required in many activities would 
create an increasing number of private monopolies. Accordingly, he 
predicted that such changes would create 'market failures' which have 
to be offset by more state domination.
42 A representative sample may include: R.A. Musgrave and J.M. Culbertson, 
"Growth of Public Expenditure in the U.S. 1890-1948", National Tax 
Journal, (June, 1953), 97-115; A.M. Martin & A.W. Lewis, "Patterns
of Public Revenue and Expenditures, "The Manchester School, (1956), 
203-244; H.T.Oshima, "Shares of Government in G.N.P. in Various 
Countries", American Econ.; Rev. (1957), 381-390; J.G. Williamson, 
"Public Expenditures and Revenues: An International Comparison",
The Manchester School, (1961), 43-56; R. Thorn, ••"The Evolution of 
Public Finance During Economic Development", The Manchester School, 
(1957), 19-53.
43 R.M. Bird, "Wagner's Law of Expanding State Activity", Public Finance, 
vol• 26, (1971), 1-24.
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Looking at the foregoing statement there seems to he no a priori 
reason as to why government expenditure should rise at a rate faster 
than that of national income. However, it may be true that with the process 
of economic development, the increasing complexity of the economic 
organization may generate a new set of basic public services which are 
of a remedial sort^. For example, the development of the modern sector, 
the emergence of corporations and the expanding markets may require 
further organizational bodies and the services of regulatory agencies. 
Furthermore, it is generally accepted that economic development is 
usually accompanied by an expanding urban centre, and some even argued 
that it is also accompanied by an increasing population, despite the fact 
that there has been no solid justification as to why this may happen.
However, if this is the case then it follows that it is reasonable to 
expect an increase in government expenditures in administrative services 
as well as expenditure on law and order.
Moreover, it is also reasonable to expect that with rising income,........  ♦
people expect better diets, better health treatment and better education 
facilities*:1 which would mean that even with population remaining 
unchanged, welfare expenditure must rise to accommodate such expectations.
It is widely held that economic development is usually accompanied by 
inflationary pressures, so accepting this would mean that the increasing 
prices would exert pressures for an increase in welfare expenditure 
in order to maintain their real value.
It is conceivable therefore, that the demand for certain government 
expenditure may rise with rising income, which at the end means that the 
income elasticity of such expenditure, taken separately, is positive.
Yet the fact remains that for Wagner’s hypothesis that the income- 
elasticity of government expenditure is greater than unity to hold,
44 R.A. Musgrave, Fiscal Systems, op. cit., p.79.
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may require that most of these expenditure components must have an
income-elasticity greater than unity. To reiterate, although it is
conceivable that expenditure on certain government expenditures may
rise with income, it is however, not certain whether this rise will be
greater than that of income. In other words, one cannot be certain
that all or most of these services have an income-elasticity greater than
unity. It may even be argued that if there exists an excess capacity
in such services it may render it unnecessary to expand their supply
when income rises, but rather requires a better utilization of the
existing services. It would, therefore, seem that when the components
of government expenditures are taken separately, the plausibility of
the hypothesis that government rises at a faster rate than that of
national income, is inconclusive. This conclusion is shared with 
45Pryor , who for example had shown that in developed countries, at least, 
disaggregated government expenditure did not conclusively support such
an hypothesis. V1
On the other hand, several writers such as Musgrave, Andie and
46Veverk'a have suggested that Wagner stressed the market failure to 
explain the income-elasticity of government expenditure. However, Bird^ 
contended that, although it has not proved possible to adduce any 
evidence of the prevailence of market failures, it does not appear that 
this factor has played anything like the role Wagner originally envisaged 
for it, nor have expenditures on administration risen as Wagner apparently 
expected.
However, over the past few years several noteworthy studies have
appeared in print which attempt to subject Wagner’s law to empirical*
45 Frederick Pryor, Government Expenditure in Capitalist and 
Communist Nations. (London; George Allen & Unwin Ltd.. 1968) pp.79.
46 Musgrave, op. cit., S. Andie and J. Veverka "The Growth of Government 
Expenditure in Germany since the Unification", Fiananzarchive. 
(January, 1964).
47 Richard M. Bird,.op. cit., p.8. *
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investigation, some of them have already been alluded to earlier.
Their conclusions have been on both ends of a scale. A number of
these studies have been sceptical as to the existence of the law on the
grounds of its philosophical basis which in their view invalidates ?
the law. To quote Gupta, "his justification of his "law" is based on
his particular social and political philosophy and on the validity of
the organic theory of the state"^. Musgrave went even further in
concluding that "the evidence remains puzzling and in need of further
explanation, including greater emphasis on what we have called the
49non-economic factors" . Others, on the other hand, while rejecting 
some of Wagner’s original ideas have found qualified support for the 
law in their empirical investigation. Bird, for example, concluded 
that "it appears that Wagner’s "law" holds in aggregate terms for most 
periods for all the countries mentioned", and further, that the most 
rapid expenditure increases have generally been in the social services, 
a result again not inconsistent with Wagner's original ideas
In line with this confusion two points seem to be worth commenting 
on:
Firstly, most of the aforementioned studies have drawn their 
inferences from international cross-sectional comparisons at a point in 
time. This is an objectionable test of a hypothesis, the essence of 
which is a postulated change over time in a particular country. Actually 
the cross-sectional approach disregards, to a certain extent, the 
differences among countries, be it economic, political, cultural or 
otherwise.
Secondly, several studies have drawn their inferences from
48 S.P. Gupta,"Public Expenditures and Economic Growth: A Time Series 
Analysis", Public Finance, vol. 22 (1967) p.426.
49 R, Musgrave, op. cit., p.124
50 R. Bird, op. cit., p.8.
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observing the behaviour of the expenditure ratio, i.e. the ratio of
government expenditures to G.N.P. in lieu of the more accurate technical
income-elasticity. As Pryor makes very clear: "if the expenditure/GNP
ratio rises, this mean that the income elasticity is greater than unity;
51if this ratio falls, the income elasticity is less than unity" .
Again this is also objectionable because both concepts are not basically 
interchangeable. Furthermore, fluctuations in G.N.P. influences the 
ratio, particularly so in developing countries where such fluctuations 
aré very frequent. It follows that a rising expenditure ratio may 
come as a result of a declining G.N.P. rather than an increasing' 
government expenditure.
Moreover, the different interpretations of Wagner's law which
- 52some writers related it to his own impreciseness, as did Pryot in
writing that "Wagner’s style is so murky that my interpretation is
open to some doubt", resulted in a different formulation with respect
to the index used to reflect the behaviour of government expenditures .
Peacock and Wiseman, used the functional relationship E ■ f(GNP),
while Pryor used government consumption expenditures Cg « f(Y).
Goffman, on the other hand preferred per capita GNP, E * For
Musgrave it is expenditure ratio as a function of per capita GNP,
* f C-jp-). Yet Gupta used per capita expenditure as a function of
• E GNPper capita GNP, —  = f(—^—). For each of the above formulations,
the law holds if the respective income-elasticity is greater than unity.
To recapitulate, it appears that the evidence gathered by the vast 
volume of studies, however imperfect and scattered, appears more to 
support than to controvert Wagner's law.
51 Frederic L. Pryor, op. cit., p»304, ff.5. .
52 Frederic L. Pryor, op. cit., p.50, ff.l.
53 For a more detailed account of these indices please see Ved. P. Gandi, 
"Wagners's Law of Public Expenditures: Do Recent Cross-Section 
Studies Confirm it?" Public Finance, vol. 26, (1971), pp.44-56.
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2.3.2 The Revenue Constraint
An alternative to the demand orientated approach was found from
the supply of revenue side. While the former has linked the behaviour
of government expenditure to the growth and level of per capita income,
the latter suggests that it is the fixed government revenues that
condition and shape the pattern of government expenditure. The
argument springs from the high correlation between government revenues,
. 5 4particularly tax revenue, and expenditure . Having this correlation 
in mind, it has been argued that tax revenues are fixed due to a 
complex of reasons, be it economic, political or otherwise. However, 
this argument might only hold in the short-run because of the governments 
inability to influence either the tax rate or the tax base, moreover, 
changing a tax structure, as was argued earlier, needs a long period 
of time let alone the fact that the tax base is to a certain extent 
dependent on economic development. More specifically, it is dependent 
on the raising of income which gives rise to more t$ x collection.
i
It could also be argued that the revenue constraint may operate
due to the fact that the variables which presumably affect the behaviour
of government expenditures are, more or less, the same factors determining
the taxable capacity. Given the fact that the tax revenues form the
largest part of government revenue, it follows then that the effect of
such factors would be expected to affect both expenditures and revenues
in the same direction. If we take into account that, particularly
in developing countries, domestic revenues in most cases are short of
meeting the expenditure level, then it is to be expected that the
revenue constraint would ,, most of the.time, be operating.......
54 Musgrave has found that the correlation coefficient between the
expenditure ratio (E/GNP) and the tax ratio (T/GNP) for a sample of 
developing countries to be as high as 0.92, however, the coefficient 
was found to be comparatively smaller for countries with per capita 
income less than $300. See R.A. Musgrave, Fiscal Systems,op. Cit.y 
p.lll, ff.14. His findings were also confirmed by H.T. Oshima, op. 
citj and J.G. Williamson, op. cit.
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If the revenue constraint, however interpreted, is considered in 
the case of developing countries against that of developed countries, it 
might be argued that this constraint is less serious in the latter than 
it is in the former. The reason for this inference is due mainly to 
two reasons. On the one hand, the tax systems in the developed countries 
are flexible enough to allow for a reasonably quicker change either 
in the tax rate or the tax base, moreover, the tax handles in such countries 
are available and adequately developed. On the other hand, it is 
argued that the highly articulated money markets in developed countries 
allow the governments to offset any deficiencies in the tax revenue 
by borrowing from the already developed money markets. By the same 
token, it is argued that since the foregoing conditions are basically 
non-existent in developing countries it would result in a more serious 
revenue constraint. This constraint may be eased in the case of 
developing countries by the inflow of foreign aid. However, it is 
argued that foreign aid itself will in most cases form a constraint 
on government spending, except for a number of countries which have 
relatively easier access to foreign resources due mainly to political 
reasons. Yet, even in such countries once the aims of the donor 
countries, for one reason or another, disappear then it seems that in 
such a situation the revenue constraint would be more serious than ever.
By and large, any of the sources of financing may form a revenue 
constraint. However, the extent to which any of these sources may be 
serious in conditioning government spending depends in the end on its 
relative importance to the overall government revenues.
Several attempts have been made to detect the presence of the concept.
Lotz^ for example, in a cross-section analysis of 37 developing
countries has used the expenditure ratio, (i.e. , as a revenue
constraint. He seems, in essence, tq have tackled the problem from
55 Jorgen Lotz, "Patterns of Government Spending in Developing Countries", 
The Manchester School, vol. 38, 1970, pp.119-144.
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the other end because it is frequently argued that there is a two-way 
effect between revenues and expenditures, the revenue may affect the 
expenditure and vice versa. This, in fact, may be the case if the 
issue is considered on the basis of the benefit anlysis, particularly 
if the fees and charges are considered. However, due to the fact 
that this source of financing is relatively small in developing 
countries, this will cast some doubts on the relevance of using the 
expenditure ratio as a proxy variable to the revenue constraint.
Furthermore, it is objectionable on the grounds that he essentially
Eused the total (i.e. to explain changes in its components.
56Alternatively, Pryor argued that there exists a trade-off 
relationship between the various components of government expenditures. 
The presence of such a trade-off is more obvious when the revenue 
sources become so stretched, hence, expanding expenditure in one 
direction must entail curbing expenditures in another direction.
2*3.3 The "Degree of Openness" Hypothesis \
Alongside those who considered the revenue constraint as an
important determinant of government expenditures, others on the basis
of their discontent with the per capita income as an index to the stage
of economic development suggested that the openness of the economy
may be a more relevant factor governing the behaviour of government
expenditure. Three indices have alternatively been used to represent
the degree of openness of an economy, (a) The ratio of imports to
GNP, (i.e. ; (b) Some writers preferred the export ratio to GNP
Esc( Qjjp) as a better index; and (c) Yet others thought of the trade 
balance ratio to GNP (i.e. as being more relevant. However, the
most commonly used index is that of the import ratio.
56 F. Pryor, "Public Expenditure in Communist and Capitalist Nations'.',, 
op. cit., pp. 441-443; see also R.A. Musgraves, op. cit.,
p.121.
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The rational behind the importance of the foreign trade sector
seems to be twofold. On the one hand, since it has been argued that
the lack of availability of tax handles in developing countries may
be an important limiting factor to the size of the public sector it
follows then that an expanding foreign trade sector will provide such
handles. This is because taxing such a sector is administratively
easier; politically more feasible, and to a large extent equitable.
On the other hand, a more open economy may be more amendable to
fluctuations and as the proportion of transitory income to total income
increases, this would give rise to a higher savings rate
Hinrich, in a cross-section analysis of 60 developing countries
has indicated that the "degree of openness" as measured by the import
ratio provides a much better index of economic development than per
capita income. He contended that his findings revealed a highly
significant relationship between the revenue share in G.N.P. and the
import ratio for all countries with per capita inconie below $750.
However, he reiterated that, its effect falls with a rise in per 
59capita income
Hinrich’s conclusion might be something to be anticipated, as we 
argued earlier (p.55) that with the process of economic development 
there may occur a change in the composition of imports in favour of 
capital goods. If this takes place, then it seems reasonable to 
expect a decline in import duties and more emphasis be placed on 
direct taxes. This possible shift in the composition of imports
57 R.A. Musgrave, Fiscal Systerns, op. cit., p.119.
58 S.K. Singh, Development Economics, (London: Lexington books, 1975^ 
p.124.
A higher transitory income may give rise not only to voluntary 
savings but also to compulsory savings through taxation.
59 H.H. Hinrich, "Determinants of Government Revenue Shares Among 
Less-Developed Countries", The Economic Journal, (Sept. 1965), 
pp.546-556.
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and its subsequent effect on import duties may render the later to 
enormous fluctuations, hence, revenue generated from this source could 
be vulnerable. However, this element of uncertainty, though logical, 
does not necessarily eliminate the effect of the degree of openness 
of the economy on the size of the public sector, but rather may foster 
the seriousness of the revenue constraint on government expenditures.
2.3.4 The Displacement Effect and Other Factors
It is imperative to say that the supply orientated approach towards 
the explanation of government expenditure is complementary rather than 
a substitute to the demand orientated approach.
While criticizing Wagner’s Law basically on its philosophical 
background, Peacock and Wisman adopted his approach to provide their 
own hypothesis on what determines the behaviour of government expenditures. 
Wagner, however, was concerned with the secular growth of government 
expenditure with respect to G.N.P. (or any variant of income), while 
Peacock and Wisman were concerned with the time pattern of growth of 
expenditures. The displacement effect which they suggested to explain 
this time pattern relied basically on the occurrence of wars (or social 
upheavals) and, hence, on the impact of such disturbances on the 
prevailing notion of a tolerable burden of taxation in contradistinction 
to the desirable size of public expenditure. They assumed that, based 
on their study on the U.K. mentioned earlier, there is a shift in 
peoples ideas about the tolerable burden of taxation due to the occurrence 
of wars or social upheavals which may give rise to a shift in the level 
of public expenditures with respect to national income^*. In their 
particular case study they found that "although British government
60 Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wisman, The Growth of1 Public Expenditure 
in the United Kingdon. (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1966).
61 s.P. Gupta, op. cit. p.427
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expenditure declines after the wars, it does not return to the pre-war
level, ..., and the share of government expenditure in national income
62remains greater after the wars than it was immediately before them .
The above statement implies the incorporation of a reinforcing
t
mechanism, namely a "ratchet effect", i.e. after expenditures have
risen to a certain level they would not fall to their previous level.
This particularly subjected the hypothesis to considerable criticism,
furthermore, when the hypothesis is supplemented by the "social
upheaval" concept becomes too broad and can explain almost anything.
This reduces its credibility as a scientific concept.
Apart from the foregone discussed hypotheses, several other
factors have been suggested to account for some of the changes in
63government expenditure. Martin and Lewis , for example, have emphasized 
the peoples changing conception of the state's role over time.
Musgrave^^, on the other hand, stressed the importance of the political 
factors in determining the government expenditures. lj In spite of the 
fact that no quantification of the extent to which their effect is 
important, yet B i r d ^  argues strongly that such factors constituted 
a crucial missing link in studies of government spending. Others have 
emphasized the degree of urbanization as an important factor on the 
grounds that the growth of the urban centres would eventually bring 
about pressures on the government to increase spending on its services 
to satisfy the rising demand for such services. This was further 
linked with the political factors in the sense that the growth of 
urbanization is a potential for the emergence of pressure groups which 
eventually brings about more expenditures to satisfy the desires of
62 A. Peacock & J. Wisman, op. cit., pp.25-26
63 Martin and Lewis, op. cit., p.206. '
64 R.A. Musgrave, op. cit.
65 R.M. Bird, op. cit. p.123.
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of the community.
Moreover, ideological factors are being suggested to be of 
significance. However, Pryor in an attempt to investigate the 
extent to which such factors explain differences in government 
expenditures has concluded that such differences are not very 
significant. Williamson, as well as others, considered Kuznets- 
Clark position that productivity lags in the public sector could be 
considered a factor contributing to the rising government expenditures. 
To maintain absolute services per head, Williamson says, would then 
require proportionally more expenditure^.
Finally, the review that has been taken in this section was 
meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive in order to provide 
generalizations on the hypotheses suggested to explain the behaviour 
of public expenditure.
In the following chapter we intend to examine the pattern of 
growth of government expenditure in Jordan and when'ever possible the 
underlying factors behind it will be explicitly examined.
66 F. Pryor, op. cit., p.123.
67 j .g . Williamson, "Public Expenditure and Revenue: An International 
Comparison", The Manchester School, vol. 29, 1961, pp.46-47.
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CHAPTER THREE
PATTERN OF GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURE IN JORDAN
In the previous chapter we advanced, among other things, various 
hypotheses that tried to explain the variations in and growth of 
public expenditure. The object of the present chapter, however, is to 
examine the pattern of growth of government expenditures in Jordan, as 
well as utilizing the hypotheses alluded to above in establishing the 
possible determinants underlying the pattern of growth of government 
spending. Our attention, therefore, is given first to the pattern of 
growth of aggregate government expenditure and the factors affecting 
their pattern of growth are statistically and empirically tested. In 
section two, the analysis is carried forward on the basis of disaggregat­
ing government expenditure by economic use, namely, current and capital 
expenditure. In section three, government expenditure is further 
disaggregated on a functional basis, hence, various functional categories 
of government spending are examined.
Like most studies of government expenditure, done for other countries, 
we had faced conceptual, and more importantly, statistical problems.
In Jordan, as a developing country, there were rather more statistical 
problems than conceptual ones.
The expenditure time series vis-a-vis national income and other data . 
for the period 1954-1966 pertain to both East and West Banks of Jordan, 
and for the period 1967-1979 (inclusive) for the East Bank only*.
1. Because of this break in the time series resulting basically from 
territorial as well as population changes, results obtained from 
regressions combining the two periods should be treated with some 
caution because of the potential bias such break may have on the 
results.
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In order to make the expenditure and 
other relevant data comparable for the two periods, population changes 
are taken into consideration as well. Therefore, the post 1967 
population figures, as well as the rest of the data, belongs to the 
East Bank only.
Government expenditure includes not only the purchases of goods 
and services blit also transfers and subsidies. Although, it would 
have been more appropriate to include the expenditure of central 
government as well as those of the local authorities, yet the data used 
here excludes the latter owing to the paucity of the data. .
Moreover, the choice of the measure of national output had fallen 
on G.N.P., like most other studies of our type. Others had chosen 
G.D.P. , in studies on the economic development of Jordan, on the grounds 
that the net factor income from abroad (which makes the difference 
between G.N.P. and G.D.P.) is underestimated. Although, it is true 
that the largest component of N.F.I. (namely immigrant remittances) 
is acknowledged to be underestimated due to the fact that a considerable 
amount of remittances Is not channelled through the banking system, yet 
it is inappropriate to consider this a priori for using G.D.P. rather 
than G.N.P. given the importance of net factor income from abroad (N.F.I.) 
to the economy.
In view of the fact that the growth of government expenditure and 
national income in current prices may give an imperfect picture due to
the inflationary pressures particularly after 1972, we had to choose a
' - * ■ " 1 ■ ■ •
suitable price index to eliminate the influence of price changes and 
thus reflecting the magnitudes in real terms. But the elimination 
of prices confronted us with conceptual and statistical problems. On
2. See Michael P. Mazur, op. cit., p.3.
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the one hand, there does not exist a suitable price index. The Cost of 
Living index is available only for the period 1967-1979 and data for 
constructing an index for the whole period is scanty and highly conjunctual. 
Even if this index was available, it certainly is not the right deflator 
particularly for government expenditure. However, after careful 
assessment we adopted the implicit index number of prices of G.D.P. for the 
whole period under examination. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the most appropriate; reliable and consistant price index available.
3.1 Aggregate Government Expenditure Growth and Determinants, 1954-79.
3.1.1 Permanent Effects:
Over the past quarter of a century, public spending at current prices 
has increased by about 30 times, i.e. increased from JD 16.6 million in 
1954 to JD 495.6 million in 1979), although Gross National Product (G.N.P.) 1 
increased by only 16 times. These represent an average annual growth
rate of 15.5 and 12.3 per cent for government expenditure and G.N.P.\1
respectively, Table(3.1). While these rates of growth have been neither 
identical nor steady, they have nevertheless followed a similar pattern - 
sluggish in the early sixties, exceedingly rapid in the early seventies.
It has been argued, that the increased government expenditure may 
be attributed to the rising of per capita income. More specifically, 
it may be argued that there is a functional relationship between per 
capita expenditure and per capita income, i.e. (— ) - f (—— ), and the 
income-elasticity of the demand for public spending is positive and 
exceeding unity. To test this relationship, three functional forms 
were used, i.e. simple linear, double-log, and semi-log. Both the 
simple linear and double-logarithmic forms fit the data, however, 
the simple linear form fits the data best, the estimated equation is
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Table (3.1)
Average Annual Rates of Growth of Government
Expenditure at Current and Constant (1972) Prices, and Per Capita
G.N.P., 1954-1979 (Per cent)
. . . . .
1954-59 1960-66 1954-66 1967 -72 1973-79 1967-79 1954-79
(1) Gov. Expenditure 
(current prices) 11.1 4.6 7.6 20.8 25.7 23.4 15.5
(2) Gov. Expenditure 
(constant prices) 10.0 1.1 5.2 17.0 6.1 11.2 8.2
(3) Per Capita G.N.P. 7.8 6.1 7.5 7.0 17.8 12.8 10.2
Source : Appendix Table ( ).
G Y(__) , -16.78 + 0.58 ( p  (1)
i (27.60)
R2 - 0.97 DW - 1.75 DF - 24
where,
Q -
(^jj)t is per capita government expenditure
T " . ■ \(^) is per capital G.N.P., and
value in parenthesis is the t-value.
Evidently, equation (1) indicates a significant association between per
♦3capita government expenditure and per capita G.N.P. as is reflected by the 
high t-ratio; which is significant at the 1% level.
The income-elasticity of government expenditure from the above linear 
form, was calculated by dividing the mean of the independent variable
y G(p)t by the mean of the dependent variable (—) and the result multiplied by 
the regression coefficient, in functional form the elasticity is given by,
E <?>t .
&V t
(2)
_____ Accordingly, the income elasticity of government expenditure is well
3 It is worth noting here that the data used in all the calculations- 
in this chapter are in current prices unless otherwise indicated.
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percentage point
above unity (1.29). This indicates that a one / increase in per capita
percentage point
income is accompanied by a 1.29 / increase in per capita government
expenditures, that is, along with the increase in per capita income public 
spending increases at a faster rate. This faster rate of growth raised the 
share of public expenditure in total output (GNP), therefore indicating that 
during the course.of economic development the public sector encroaches upon the 
private sector through the fattening of the bureaucratic machine of the 
government. This is born out by a strong relationship between per capita 
income and the ratio of government expenditures. However, the original 
equation testing this relationship had a low DW-statistic signifying the 
existence of autocorrelation. When the data was subdivided into two periods 
to represent all Jordan prior to 1967 and the East Bank (after 1967 Jordan), 
the results were not much different, yet the income-elasticity of government 
expenditure ratio has increased considerably in the second period with
i
2improvements in both t-ratio as well as the R . The derived equations read
as follows: 1954-1966 : log(|). - 0.33 + 0.62 logij) (3)
Y * (7.60) F t
R2 - 0.84 DW - 1.27 DF - 11, and
1967-1979 : l o g &  - 1.42 + 1.14 l o g &  (4)
Y C (18.35) *  Z
R2 - 0.97 DW - 1.11 DF - 11
G • Ywhere = is expenditure ratio to GNP; and (—) per capita GNP.
«2s- *
The considerable increase in the elasticity in the second period may 
be due to two main reasons. On the one hand, the government has to pay for 
the cost of the war, and such a result rough as it may be, may confirm the 
existence of a "displacement effect" due to the war. On the other hand, the 
second period includes the effect of the inflationary pressures which led to 
overstating government expenditures.
However, taking into consideration the effect of prices may give a clearer 
picture. Figure (3.1) depicts the pattern of government expenditure in current 
and constant (1972) prices. During the period 1954-1966, both magnitudes 
followed a similar pattern, a result which is to be expected due to the fact that 
Jordan enjoyed a relative price stability, as was discussed in chapter one.
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Figure (3-1 ) Government Exp. at Current &
»
Year
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However, after 1967 government expenditure increased considerably, both 
in current as well as in constant prices. This pattern of growth ,
continues up to 1972. As of 1972, expenditures in current prices showed 
an exceedingly rapid increase, i.e. increased from JD 105.9 million in 
1972 to a record high of JD 495.6 million in 1979, an average annual rate 
of growth of 25.7 per cent. On the other hand, expenditure in constant 
prices showed a modest rise, increased from JD 105.9 million in 1972 to 
JD 239.4 million in 1979, an annual rate of growth of 6.1 per cent. 
Accordingly, a vast gap, widening over time, took place between current 
and real expenditure during the said period.
Such an observation is not in itself surprising, but in fact 
meaningful in reflecting the real growth of government expenditure. The 
most obvious effect of the inflationary pressures was to overstate the . 
government expenditure data, since the government was obliged to increase 
expenditure in current terms just to maintain real levels of purchases 
and transfers. This might further be reflected in ain increase in particular 
functional types of expenditure such as administration and social services, 
as will be discussed shortly. Certainly there are other effects of 
prices on the public spending such as the changes in income distribution 
and in turn their resulting effects on the tax base. However, like most 
developing countries, data on income distribution in Jordan is simply 
non-existent.
Population might be another factor which exerts a permanent effect . 
on government expenditure, though such effect is difficult to ascertain. 
Generally there is no a priori reason as to why government expenditure 
should rise with population rises, except for the fact that an increase 
in the percentage of dependent population to total population may induce 
more government expenditure in certain areas. Although some of the 
functional types of government expenditure are not elastic with population
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increases such as defence expenditures, yet some others are expected to
increase with population increases particularly the social type expenditure,
4i.e. health and education . In fact others went further to suggest that
the per capita public goods must increase as population increases,
coupled with the an above unity national income elasticity of total,
public expenditure, if expenditure ratio is to rise with per capita 
5income .
As was argued earlier in chapter one, Jordan was subject to drastic 
population changes which could approximate the effects of population 
rises on public spending. During the period 1954-66, Jordan's total 
population grew by 44.6%, while during the period 1967-79 it grew by 
107%. This is obviously not due to the natural rate of growth which is 
estimated at 3.1-3.4% annually, a rather high one. But more importantly, 
it is due to the movement of people caused by the 1948 and 1967 wars.
Moreover, the composition of population tends to be concentrated 
in the young age groups as Table (3.2) below reveals', In 1972, for 
example, 70% of the population were in the age groups below 24 years of 
age, 43.4% of which were in the age group 6-14.
It is not surprising then to find the largest part of the population 
in schools. This distribution of population inevitably puts pressure on 
certain government expenditures in areas like education and health in 
particular.
Concurrent with these high rates of population growth, immigration, 
and composition of population as described above, there has also been a 
growing trend of urbanization as evidenced in (Table 1.1,p.6). The 
percentage of people living in urban areas has increased from 51.5% in 45
4 Irving J. Coffman & Dennis J. Mohar, "The Growth of Public Expenditure 
in selected Developing Nations : Six Caribbean Countries, 1940-65",
Public Finance, vol. 26. 1971, pp.57-74.
5 For a detailed mathematical treatment see Ved. P. Ghandhi, Wagner's 
Law of Public Expenditure, op. cit., p.50.
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Table (3.2)
Percentage Distribution of East Bank 
Population by Age-Groups, 1961 and 1972
’Percentage)
Year 1961 1972
A g e - g r o u p ^ ^ ^
5 and less 21.4 22.8
6 - 14 24.1 30.4
15 - 24 19.6 16.8
25 - 34 12.9 11.1
35 - 44 8.6 8.3
45 - 64 9.6 8.1
65 and over 3.8 2.5
Source : (i) Dept, of Statistics, First Census of
Population and Housing. (Amman ; 1961)
(ii) Dept, of Statistics, Multipurpose Household 
Survey, Jan.-April, 1 9 7 2 . (Amman : June
1974).
1961 to 79% in 1972, while that of the rural areas clecreased from 39.5% 
to 21% respectively. Thorn remarked in this respect that "it is an 
almost universally observed circumstance in almost all nations of the 
world that urban population benefit from a larger sum of social expendi­
ture per capita than the rural population"^. Therefore, the observed 
rising proportion of urban population to total population accompanying 
development, all other things being equal, alone is sufficient to raise 
the relative level of public expenditure.
Apparently, the population changes in Jordan approximate the 
conditions which may cause an increase in government spending. However, 
the precise population effect upon the aggregate level of government 
expenditure is uncertain. Yet to estimate this influence, government 6
6 R.S. Thorn, "The Evolution of Public Finances During Economic 
Development", The Manchester School, vol. xxxv, 1967, pp.19-51.
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expenditure were converted into per capita terms. Figure 3.2 shows 
that during the period 1954-1966 the pattern of per capita expenditure 
in current and constant prices was not significantly different from that 
of the total government expenditure. However, significant variations 
in the time pattern took place during 1966-68, a period which is marked 
by considerable population changes. Once these changes had subsided 
after the 1967 war, per capita expenditure dropped until 1971 during which 
it picked up again. After 1972, and similar to that of the aggregate 
pattern of expenditure, a vast gap appeared between the current and real 
per capita expenditure.
The removal of the two permanent influences, namely, population and 
prices, on expenditure brings out two important points : one is with 
respect to secular growth, and another with respect to the time pattern.
As far as the former is concerned, removal of the population and price 
influences does not negate the hypothesis of an above unity income 
elasticity of government expenditure. Regarding the time pattern of 
expenditure growth, it is noticeable that both influences affect the 
trend.
However, such influences are obviously not enough to explain the 
behaviour of government expenditure. A changing pattern of government 
expenditure in certain periods may be attributed to some factors other 
than those of the prices and population. For example, the presence of 
a peak right after 1967, despite removing the permanent influences infer 
that it may be due to military and other war related expenditure. 
Therefore, other explanations are needed to be taken into consideration.
3.1.2 The "Degree of Openness" of the Economy
\
The "degree of openness" of the economy measured by the import ratio, 
as enunciated by H. Hinrichs, and later discussed by many others, to 
explain the variations in the share of the government in the national
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Fig- (3 -2 1 Goverm«nt P e r Capita Exp. (Current &  
Constant 1972 prices )  • 1954- 1979 •
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income has been mainly subjected to cross-section analysis. The 
importance of the size of the foreign trade sector stems basically from 
its detrimental effect of taxable capacity of the economy, hence, by 
virtue of its effects on the revenue shares in developing countries.
As has been argued before, taxes on foreign trade (that is, import and 
export duties) are administratively easier. Such taxes are also thought 
to be more equitable because of the distribution of their burden on the 
population. Moreover,-there could be - and in fact it is more often so - 
a distinction between luxury goods and the more essentials, therefore 
there exists a kind of selective taxation in favour of the poor vis. avis, 
the well-to-do. More importantly, the relative size of the foreign 
trade sector is considered a fairly good indicator of the degree of 
monetization of the economy. Furthermore, it is argued that the foreign 
trade sector has a spill-over effect on the other sectors of the economy, 
through which it increases the transitory income which in turn raises the 
government revenues. To recapitulate, the basic argument behind the
I
relevance of the foreign trade sector to government spending stems 
basically from its role and effect on the government revenue shares which 
presumably allow for more government expenditure.
We shall use imports as a ratio to G.N.P., as our measure of the 
openness, simply because it reflects, much better, the size of the 
foreign trade sector than exports. Therefore, import ratio is used as 
an explanatory variable for the share of government expenditure in G.N.P. 
in Jordan. Both linear and non-linear transformation were used to 
detect the type of association between the two variables.
In the (simple) linear regression there is a significant association 
between the import ratio and the expenditure ratio. The t-value is 
significant at the 1% level, and the import ratio explains slightly 
above 60 per cent of the variations in the expenditure ratio as measured
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by the (R ) of the regression.
The equation that gave these results reads as follows,
( f ) t  = 2.99 + 0.74 (| )t
(6.08)
R2 -  0.61 DW -  1.27 DF -  24
G
where, (^ ) is the expenditure ration to G.N.P. 
( ^  is the import ratio to G.N.P.
(5)
and, the value in parenthesis is the t-value
However, introducing a non-linear transformation in the form of log- 
log and semi-log respectively has not given a better fit to the data.
Yet the association between the two variables was still significant.
The two forms are given by,
Although, the DW-statistics in equation (5) above lies in the 
critical region whereby one cannot tell whether an autocorrelation 
problem is at work, again a dummy variable for the effect of 1967 events 
was introduced and gave a better result. Although a drop in the 
t-value took place, it was still significant at the 1% level of confidence 
and it gave a much better DW-statistic ruling out the effect of auto­
correlation if it existed. The results of this test is given by 
equation (8) below,
Log(|)t - -0.05 + 0.95 log(|)t
(5.43)
R2 - 0.55 DW - 1.21 DF 24
(6)
(f) - -107.8 + 38.03 log(|)t
(6.03)
R2 - .60 DW = 1.29 DF - 24
(7)
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(f)t = 15.26 + 0.34 (|)t + 14.6 D (8 )
(4.09) (7.57)
R2 = 0.89 DW = 1.67 DF V 23
Furthermore, combining the import ratio and per capita G.N.P. in
a multiple regression model gave a better result than that of equation (5)
2above, measured by an improved (R ), hence explaining relatively larger 
percentage of the variation in the expenditure ratio. Both the import 
ratio and per capita G.N.P. remained significant in explaining the 
variation in government expenditure ratio. The double-log form gave 
the best fit as given by equation (9),
Log(|)t = 0.39 + 0.15 log(|)t + 0.66 log(|)t (9)
(3.97) (2.59)
R2 - 0.63 ; DW = 1.27 DF - 23
By and large, from the above tests ve can infer that the import 
ratio (—) , when applied to given country, as is thejcase here for 
Jordan, is an important factor in G.N.P.
It has been argued however, that with the process of economic 
development the importance of the foreign trade sector in explaining the 
expenditure ratio declines. The explanation given for this inference 
relied on the fact that the composition of imports changes in favour 
of capital goods, necessary for development, on which there is little 
taxes, if any. This argument may be valid to a certain extent, but 
the fact remains that other imports increase as well. However, to test 
this contention, data for the period 1967-1979 was separated and the 
results reached were not significantly different from those reported above. 
For comparison purposes, all the results are reported in Table (3.3) 
below.
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3.1.3 Past Levels of Government Expenditure
We have argued earlier in this section that one of the explanations 
of the rising of government spending may be due to the fact that the 
government needed to keep up the previous level of its expenditures.
This in essence means that current year government expenditure may be 
conditioned by previous levels attained. This is a behavioural 
explanation analogous to that explaining the consumption behaviour.
It seems plausible to assume that certain government expenditures, 
particularly current expenditure, can be regarded as the public 
consumption, therefore should be affected by their level which was 
attained in previous years. If this is the case, then this will give 
rise to current year government expenditures and hence, one can infer 
that current year government expenditures are, at least partially, 
explained by levels attained in the previous period.
This means that government expenditures are rigged downward in the 
sense, at least, that the levels of such expenditures' achieved in the 
previous years will be maintained. However, it could be argued that if 
certain pressures are exerted on the levels of expenditures (say a 
revenue constraint) for a reasonably long period of time, inevitably 
expenditure has to be reduced. In practice, however, such a strong and 
prolonged pressure to reduce government spending below the level achieved 
in previous years do not take place except in certain extreme cases.
In order to test this hypothesis we have assumed that government 
expenditure ratio in the current year is associated with lagged 
expenditures for one and two years respectively. The results arrived 
at read as follows:
(f)t « 11.6 + 0.67 + 0.06 (f)t_2
(3.88) (0.40)
R2 - 0.79 DW - 0.80 DF - 23.
(10)
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where,
G
(y)t is the share of Gov. Exp. in G.N.P. in the current year
G(y)  ^ the share of Gov. Exp. lagged one year
G
%^t-2 t*ie s^are Gov * ExP* lagged two years, and 
values in parenthesis are the t-values
The results reported above indicate that government expenditure 
ratio is positively and significantly related to that of the previous 
year, but not related to that lagged two years as explained by the 
respective t-ratio. The relaxation of the linearity formulation into 
a non-linear transformation did not improve the fit of the data, however, 
the same association between the three variables was maintained.
Moreover, it is clear that the low DW-statistic indicates a positive 
autocorrelation. Using the method of first difference did not materialize 
in any significant improvement, yet introducing a dummy variable to
icheck for the effect of 1967 events again gave a better result. Although 
it increased the DW-statistic to 1.15 it nevertheless was within the 
critical region whereby one cannot rule-out completely the existence of a 
positive autocorrelation or otherwise. The results are given by the 
following equation (11).
<£)T t - 19.57 * O . M  ( f ^
O
•
01 (-)V t - 2 + 11.60 D
(2.99) (-0.62) (3.80)
R2 ■ 0.88 DW - 1.15 DF - 22
where the variables are as defined before.
Clearly, the introduction of the dummy variable reduced the 
Gsignificance of (^) lagged one year, yet it was still significant at the 
1% level of confidence.
One rationale for maintaining the previous level of expenditure
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may be mere adherence to habit. It may also be due to a commitment 
on the part of the government to a certain level of expenditures, 
particularly certain types thereof, whereby it may be politically 
undesirable to have such expenditures reduced. Furthermore, it could 
also be argued in the case of Jordan that the continuous inflow of 
resources from abroad may have created a built-in inflexibility in 
government expenditures which made them rigid downward. This may be 
more pronounced in connection with defence expenditure in which, at 
least part, of those resources must be spent. This leads us to 
consider whether a revenue constraint on government spending does exist.
3.1.4 Revenue Constraint
While the demand orientated hypothesis linked the pattern of growth 
of government expenditures to the level of economic development as 
measured by national income, it is argued that government spending is 
conditioned by the ability of the government to raise the necessary 
revenues. In other words, government’s expenditure 'growth and behaviour 
depends to a large extent on the income', elasticity of the revenue system 
of the country. The income elasticity of public expenditure, therefore, 
depends on a combination in this respect. These are, the income 
elasticity of tax revenue (et)* the level of non-tax government receipts, 
including domestic and foreign debts, and the income elasticity of 
non-tax receipts. Each of these variables has its own effect on 
government expenditure through its effect on the level of revenue 
availability, but this effect is more important when all variables are 
combined together and their collective effect on raising revenue is 
considered, and by virtue of the relationship between revenue and 
expenditure, their impact on the income-elasticity of public spending.
In an illuminating article, Ghandi^provided the theoretical 
relationship between the above mentioned variables and the elasticity of 7
7. Ved. P. Ghandi, op. cit., pp.44-56
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government expenditure, assuming a balanced budget, we have:
G
AG
T + N
AT + AN
AG « T + N
- V  • 1 * v "  • "
where, G = Aggregate Gov. Expenditure 
T » Total Tax Revenue 
N = Non-Tax Government receipts 
.■■■■■ e : * income elasticity of tax revenue 
> ;Y = G.N.P. (or any variant of income)
e^ = income elasticity of non-tax Gov. receipts
now,
AG
G
* en. ».
e .T + e ,N t n , where e ■ is the income-elasticity 
of Gov. expenditure.
Therefore,
e„.T + e .N -e^.N + e^.N e * t n t t or,
t  \  Ne * e, - (e^ - e ) —  t t n G (12)
Assuming that, N > o, —  < 1 and e > e . Taking these conditionsG t n
into consideration obviously, the income-elasticity of government 
expenditure (e) would be less than that of the tax-revenue (et). .
When the different sources of revenues are examined, one could expect 
to find that the non-tax receipts are far more important in developing 
countries than that of the tax receipts. As we argued earlier in chapter 
two, this is mainly due to the fact that generally the tax system fails
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to provide the necessary revenues for the financing of government 
activities. The reasons for this presumed low performance of the tax- 
system in these countries, are a mixture of socio-economic and political 
factors, such as the low level of income, the degree of monetization of 
the economy etc., and several other factors which collectively and 
separately affects the taxable capacity in the country. In such a case, 
which is more often so, developing countries resort to either deficit 
financing and/or foreign aid, which of the two sources is more important 
actually depends on the particular circumstances of each developing 
country. However, due to the limitations on the domestic economy to 
raise the necessary financing be it due to the factors alluded to above 
or merely to the absence of an institutional network, particularly 
financial and money markets, developing countries are bound to depend 
on foreign financing. In the case of Jordan, at least, this was the case. 
Foreign receipts form the single most important channel of resources 
which account for more than 50 per cent of government revenue (see Table
f
(7*1), page*.?/. These resources constitute budget-support ., an out­
right supplement to the government budget, technical and economic 
assistance and foreign loans. Actually, Jordan might be considered a
rare case in this respect among developing countries\ Few countries,
I
either in the Middle East or elsewhere in the world, could be classified 
in the same category as that of Jordan's in this respect.
It is therefore, not surprising to argue that government expenditures 
are bound to be subject to the effect of the level and availability of 
non-tax revenues. More importantly, the fluctuations in the level of 
foreign receipts as the main source of non-tax revenues may explain, 
more than anything else, the behaviour and level of government expenditures.
Accordingly, when the elasticities of tax and non-tax receipts are 
considered as explained above, one finds that their effect on the
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income-elasticity of government expenditures is profound. The 
elasticities of tax and non-tax revenues are calculated from the following 
equations, both of which gave the best fit of the data.
Log T = -3.47 + 1.27 log Y (13)
(35.12)
R2 = 0.98 DW « 1.27 DF = 24
9.52 + 0.35 Y (14)
(17.70)
0.93 DW = 2.18 DF = 24
where, T = Total tax revenue
N = Total non-tax revenues (including foreign 
aid and foreign and domestic borrowing).
Y = Gross National Product, and
values in parenthesis are t-ratio's.
Clearly, equation (13) indicates that the income-elasticity of 
tax-revenue is slightly above unity (1.27), however, given that the 
linear-form fitted the data best for the non-tax revenue, their income 
elasticity was calculated using formula (2) page2^ , and accordingly
was found to be less than that of tax revenue standing at (1.14).!
J
Moreover, utilizing the functional relationship between the income- 
elasticity of government expenditures and the other three variables as 
described in equation (12) above, confirms the low level of income- 
elasticity of government spending as given by,
e = e. -(e. - e ) (£) = (1.13)t t n b
N .where . (— ) is an average annual for the whole period 1954-1979. G
Apparently, the expenditure elasticity is slightly above unity» 
Evidently, both tax and non-tax revenues have contributed to this low
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income-elasticity of government spending. Calculating the income-
elasticities of (el, (e ) and (e) on a year to year basis for the whole t n
period 1955-1979, Table (3.4) suggests also the existence of a revenue
constraint. There appears also a correlation between the (e.) and (e ),t n
in the sense that whenever (e ) increases (e ) increases as well, andn t
both have their effect reflected in a higher income elasticity of 
government expenditure, however the latter was above unity only relatively 
in a few years out of the 25 years examined. This further suggests that 
government expenditures are constrained to a considerable degree by the 
availability of foreign receipts as suggested earlier. As figure (3.3) 
demonstrates, without foreign resources the government could by no means 
afford to keep its expenditures to the extraordinary levels they reached.
Apparently, foreign receipts continued rising over time with the 
rising government expenditures. Not only this, but the secular growth 
of both magnitudes was to a large extent identical. For example, 
in the period immediately after 1967 the rising foreign revenues allowed 
more government expenditure on the aggregate level where the government 
had to pay for the war costs, while during the period 1967-1970 which is 
marked by the civil strife the cuts in foreign receipts were eventually
accompanied by a drop in government expenditures. t
j
The seriousness of the revenue constraint stems from the fact that 
it is exogenous to the economy. : Foreign receipts, be it grants or 
foreign loans, are conditioned by the political and military situation 
in the area, as well as the interests of the donor countries particularly 
related to the budget support, hence they can hardly be accounted for 
by economic factors.
This exogenity of the factors stems from foreign receipts and may 
render government expenditures to wide fluctuations according to that of 
the former. More importantly, it governs the level of government
94
Table 3.4. Year to Year Income-Elasticity of Tax 
Revenue, Non-tax Revenue, and Government 
Expenditure, 1955-1979
Year ■*?t en (I)V e
1955 -2.21 0.53 0.99 0.50
1956 0.21 0.30 0.92 0.29
1957 6.66 7.41 0.97 7.38
1958 0.99 1.76 0.94 1.71
1959 1.23 0.03 0.89 0.11
1960 0.59 -0.45 0.81 -0.25
1961 0.44 0.12 0.82 0.18
1962 3.45 4.86 0.83 4.62
1963 0.39 -0.45 0.70 0.19
1964 -1.45 -3.26 0.81 3.67
1965 2.16 0.02 0.71 0.65
1966 -4.67 -5.88 0.77 3.45
1967 -0.06 0.99 0.30 0.25
1968 0.31 5.44 0.70 3.90
1969 0.55 0.08 0.65 0.24
1970 0.92 1.86 0.65 1.53
1971 1.25 3.34 0.78 2.88
1972 1.78 2.14 0.77 2.05
1973 2.15 0.53 0.71 1.00
1974 1.32 1.46 0.72 - 1.42
1975 1.05 1.06 0.73 1.04
1976 0.93 -0.46 0.46 -0.29
1977 1.95 4.16 0.65 3.38
1978 0.35 -0.29 0.63 -0.05
1979 0.92 2.15 0.65 1.94
Source : Appendix Table , (12.)*
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expenditures on the aggregate level, as well as affecting the pattern 
of allocations of such expenditures either by economic use or by 
function, as will shortly be explained.
It is therefore imperative to conclude with reasonable confidence 
that the revenue constraint, inter alia, may be the single most important 
factor in explaining the pattern of growth and behaviour of government 
expenditures. Any dramatic change in the political situation, which 
in turn may eventually lead to a drastic cut in foreign receipts may 
create havoc in the functioning of the government, therefore jeopardizing 
the whole development efforts of the country achieved during the past 
three decades.
Understandably, this calls for more efforts on the part of the 
government for a greater reliance on domestically generated revenues 
if such possibilities are to be avoided.
Having discussed the pattern of growth and possible determinants~ 
of aggregate government expenditure, our analysis will now be carried 
forward to examine the data from another point of view, namely, on a 
disaggregated basis as to economic use (current and capital) and 
different functional forms of government expenditures.
3.2 Government Expenditures by Economic Categoriei : Current and 
Capital Expenditures.
In the previous section we established that the pattern of growth 
of aggregate government expenditures was affected by many variables, 
however, no one variable alone could explain the behaviour of government 
spending on the aggregate level. Here, we shall examine the data on 
government spending from another point of view, namely, by disaggregating 
government expenditures by their main economic categories (current and 
capital expenditures). After all, the allocation of government spending 
as to current or capital reflects, among other things, government's
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jpolicy. Expenditures so classified depend on the budgetary definition 
as to what is current and what is capital expenditures.
The Trade-off among these two groups may give us further insight 
i into the behaviour of aggregate government spending as well as reflecting 
the attitude of the government towards the role of the state in the 
development of the country. j
3.2.1 : Current Expenditure ,
■ As Table (3.5) demonstrates, current expenditures formed well above 
, three quarters of aggregate government expenditures during the period 
1954-1966. : However, a significant change in the share of current 
expenditures took place over the said period. It declined from 83.0 
per cent during 1954-61 to 78.5 per cent during 1962-66. This’change 
might be explained by the fact that in the latter period the first 
development plan was launched, therefore emphasis was placed on capital 
expenditures. ' The share of current expenditures was again declining 
during 1973r79,^-. due mainly, apparently to the same reason because 
during this period two development plans were taking place.
The pattern of growth of current expenditures in absolute terms 
followed a path similar to that of aggregate government expenditures.
As figure (3.4)shows, up to 1966 a modest increase observed with an 
average annual rate of growth of 7.6 per cent. However, as of 1966/67 
current expenditures increased in absolute terms from JD 28.2 million in 
¡1966 to JD 65.2 million in 1969, coupled with an average annual rate of
t , ‘ „. ' • * ■
'growth of 33 per cent. Moreover, as of 1970 an extraordinary increase 
took place ranging from JD 60.7 millionjin 1970 to a record high of
291.5 million in 1979, an average annual rate of growth of 21 per cent 
during the period after 1967. Table 3.4.
This considerable increase in current expenditures particularly 
during the mid 1970's may be accounted for by three different reasons.
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Table 3,5. 
Current and Capital Expenditures, Rate of Growth 
share in Aggregate Government Exp., 1954-1979.
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source : Table ( 5 ).
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Firstly, the 1967 war and its aftermath particularly the civil strife 
during the early 1970's called upon the government to face up to the 
consequences, particularly the vast number of refugees which was 
estimated at 60,000 homeless people. This situation created extraordinary 
pressures on the government to provide housing, food and of course was 
followed by increased spending in areas like education, health and social 
welfare, as will be discussed shortly.
Secondly, this period in particular was marked by an unprecedented
inflationary pressure which eventually led to an increase in government
current expenditures to maintain the real level of its expenditures.
This is clear when per capita current expenditures in current and constant
prices are considered, figure(3.5), in which obviously a vast gap appeared
as of 1972 between expenditures in current prices and real terms. The
inflationary pressures in turn led to increased demands for higher
salaries by government employees. In 1974, for example, basic salaries
of government employees were increased by about JD 5-10 per month and
in the following year by 10 per cent across the board, with even higher
raises for certain professional grades: the cost of living adjustments
ranged from 5-20 per cent of basic salary in 1974 and somewhat less in
1975; however, these adjustments did not compensate .fully for the 
8inflationary trend .
Thirdly, this considerable increase may also be explained by the
increase in government subsidies in the same period. Before 1974, almost
all government current expenditures were mainly spent on goods and
services with a very minor percentage on transfers and subsidies which
could hardly be worth mentioning. However, the sharp rise in world
prices, particularly during 1974-1975 onwards, created a new situation
in which the government started subsidizing certain food items 8
8 International Monetary Fund, Jofdan - Recent Economic Developments 
Doc. SM/78/34. February 6, 1978. p.21.
115
110
1C5
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
10I
F ig - (3 -5  ) Per Capita Current &  Capital Exp. 
( errent &  constat 1972 prices •)
per capita current G ov - Exp 
( current prices- )
• pcr capita current Gov-Exp  
( constant p rices)
Per capita capital Exp- 
(current prices)
per cap ita  capital Exp  
( constant p rices)
Ypar
Source :Appindx Table ( 7  ) .
102
particularly wheat, meat and sugar, and implicitly petroleum products 
by holding their prices down. Unfortunately, published data as to 
the exact amount of government subsidies is not available, however, 
taking into account the fact that government transfers have always been 
minimal, a rough estimate was attempted by deducting government 
consumption expenditures on goods and services from that of current 
expenditures.
Table (3.6)
Government current expenditures on goods 
and services and subsidies, 1974-1979. 
(in million of JD's)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Current Expenditures 103.6 125.7 185.9 195.6 211.1 291.5
Exp. on goods & services 97.7 110.1 130.3 156.6 180.7 215.0
Subsidies 5.9 15.6 55.6 39.0 30.4 76.5
Source : (i) Appendix Table ( 6 )
(ii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin, vol. 16, No.3, March 1980.
Clearly, government subsidies as measured above have increased 
markedly during this period both in absolute and relative terms. Vfhile 
they accounted for only 5.7 per cent of current expenditures in 1974, their 
share increased considerably to 26 per cent in 1979, though fluctuated 
during the same period either because of a fluctuating demand or that 
of international prices. Such subsidies were politically motivated 
because evidently they were for politically sensitive products which 
affects the mass of the population particularly the low and middle classes. 
However, by the end of the period these subsidies were reduced significantly, 
partly due to a fall in world prices and partly through government 
measures introduced recently aimed at increasing gradually domestic prices.
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To recapitulate, the level of current expenditures particularly 
during the post-war period was mainly determined by socio-political 
factors. Both population changes and the civil-strife during 1969-70 
played their part. Also, the inflationary pressures and their 
consequences were a major determinant in the allocation of government 
expenditure to current and capital categories.
3.2.2 Capital Expenditures
By virtue of the trade-off between current and capital expenditures, 
the pattern of growth of the former is bound to be reflected in that of 
the latter. However, unlike current expenditures, capital expenditures 
showed an irregular pattern of growth throughout the period under 
examination.
During the period 1954-66, capital expenditure in (current prices) 
absolute terms showed a modest rise from only JD 3.2 million in 1954 
to about JD 11.2 million in 1966 with an average annual rate of growth of
13.6 per cent. However, during the after war period, namely during 
1967-79, they increased considerably with an average annual rate of growth 
of 31.3 per cent as well as increasing their share in aggregate government 
expenditures to 41.2 per cent in 1979. Table 3.5.
\
When the ratio of capital expenditure to G.N.P. ;is taken into account 
on a per capita basis to account for population growth, one could find 
that the ratio's pattern of growth is quite irregular, ranging from as 
low as 3.8 per in 1961 to a high of about 24 per cent in 1979 as is 
demonstrated in Figure36 below. Moreover, when the data is expressed in 
real terms the pattern of growth remains the same as that of the money 
terms except for the period 1972-79 in which inflationary pressures are 
clearly affecting capital expenditures.
This irregularity in capital expenditures appears to be in contrast 
with the literature on economic development which suggests that in the
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early stages of economic development the facilities for private capital
formation are limited as is the entreprenaural skills. The lack of
infrastructural base calls for more capital expenditures by the public
sectors since for many reasons, discussed earlier in chapter two, the
private sector shy away from investing in such projects. However,
Musgrave & Musgrave contended that, as these basic facilities are built
up and capital markets are developed, the path is cleared for capital
formation of the manufacturing type to go into place and for industrial
9development in the private sector to occur . This suggests that in 
a later stage of economic development the capital expenditure mix 
between private and public sector changes and public expenditures tend 
to decline. However, this does not generally explain the irregularity 
in capital expenditures, Musgrave & Musgrave themselves cast doubts 
on why this happens, in their words, "On balance, it is again difficult to 
forecast what the trend should be, and chances are that periods of 
rising and of declining shares may alternate"^?
Others have tried to explain the irregularity in capital expenditure 
by resorting to the business cycle, in the sense that in periods of high 
unemployment growing pressure for capital spending arises. When such 
spending occurs it tends to reduce the volume of investment spending 
required later . This might be the case in a developed economy, 
however, by contrast we have argued (chapter two, p.5) that the nature 
of unemployment in developing countries is different from that of a 
developed economy. Therefore, the well-known phenomenon of "bunched 
investment" on which Peacock & Wiseman based their argument may not 
be applicable in the case of a developing economy. 910
9 R.A. Musgrave and P.B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 
2nd ed. (Tokyo : McGraw-Hill kogakusha Ltd, 1976), p.191.
10 Ibid, p.lAl
11 A.T. Peacock and J. Wiseman, op. cit., p.77.
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Nurkse on the other hand, had linked the growth of capital
expenditures to the population growth and particularly to maintaining
13the supply of capital per head of the labour force
However, such theoretical explanations seems to hinge on the long­
term process and fails to provide a plausible explanation to the short­
term period let alone the year-by year fluctuations.
As has been explained, the variation in the public spending on the 
aggregate level are determined to a large extent by the flow of foreign 
resources. This in fact should be more so in the case of capital 
expenditures, particularly when the foreign loans and economic and 
technical assistance are taken into consideration. This is because, at 
least, these categories are meant to be for capital expenditures. This 
high association between the flow of foreign aid and capital expenditures 
was first experienced in 1964 when the first Five Year Development plan 
has to be abandoned for the fact that the plan's projection of the flow 
of foreign resources proved unrealistic shortly after the start of its 
implementation (see chapter one, p.17).
Moreover, since the government's allocation of total revenue runs 
from current to capital expenditure, it follows then that in times of a 
decline in foreign receipts the first thing to be affected is capital 
expenditures. The marked increase in governments' subsidies during 
the period 1974-79 may very well have had its effects on the fluctuations 
in capital spending. The circumstances arose during the 1970's i.e. 
inflationary pressures, increased salaries of public sector employees, 
overall increase in current expenditures, as well as the rising government 12
12 Nurske distinguishes in this respect between two kinds of investments, 
namely extensive and intensive investment. While intensive investment 
means an increase in capital per head and hence in productivity, 
extensive investment in the course of population growth serves 
merely to maintain the supply of capital per head of the labour force. 
See Ragner Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped 
Countries, (New York : Oxford U. Press, 1970) p.48.
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subsidies were collectively affecting capital spending.
Having discussed the growth and determinants of government expenditures 
by economic use, our attention will now be turned to analyse the data on 
a functional basis which eventually reflect, among other things, the 
government's commitment to development.
3.3 Functional Distribution of Government Expenditures
The classification of government expenditures by function, apart 
from illuminating further the government policy in terms of its priority 
commitment among the various functions, is necessary in order to provide 
further understanding of the effects of the resource allocation among 
these functions on the overall government expenditures. In this section, 
therefore, government expenditures are classified in the following 
categories :
(1) Economic Services : This covers public expenditures in the main 
sectors of the economy such as, Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, 
Transport and Aviation, National Planning Council and other 
infrastructural expenditure.
(2) Defence expenditure : This item covers only the Ministry of Defence.
(3) Social Services s This category covers expenditures in Education, 
Health, Ministry of Reconstruction and Development (responsible for 
the welfare of the refugees), and other social affairs.
(4) General Public Services : This covers Public Administration, Security 
and Internal Affairs and those of the Ministry of International 
Affairs and Culture and Information.
3.3.1 Economic Services
As was alluded to earlier, economic services which is composed 
mainly of capital expenditures gains more importance during the socio­
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political stability. This is to an extent reflected in figure (3.7) 
which shows that during the period under consideration, economic 
services fluctuated considerably, but with an ever increasing trend. 
However, while their increase was modest during the period 1954-1972, 
nevertheless they eventually became the most important category of 
all among other components of public spending. While they increase in 
absolute terms from only JD 4.1 million in 1954 to JD 31.3 million in 
1971, yet reached a staggering figure of JD 284.6 million by 1979.
Moreover, this represents an impressive percentage of total expenditures 
of 57.4 per cent, in 1979 while it was only 25.1 per cent in 1954 
(Table 10 appendix). Again this is not what one could expect according 
to what the economic literature tells us in such circumstances in 
developing countries. Presumably, at least in the early stages of 
economic development, economic services, particularly infrastructural 
investments, should take priority. However, in the case of Jordan 
during the early stages of development, priority was given to defence 
expenditures as will shortly be discussed, owing to the special 
circumstances in which Jordan was.
However, due to the fact that most of the economic services are 
financed from the development budget or in the form of capital expenditure, 
their fluctuations relative to total expenditure are again constrained 
by the availability of revenues particularly foreign aid and loans.
The increasing trend during the period 1972-79 is mainly due to the 
launching of the Three Year Development Plan 1973-75 followed by the 
Five Year Development Plan 1976-80. Clearly, top priority during 
this period was given to capital expenditures. This is obvious if one 
takes into account the economic services relative to G.N.P. As 
Figure 3.8 demonstrates, economic services as a percentage of G.N.P. 
fluctuated considerably during the period 1954-1966 and remained around
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10 per cent of G.N.P. However, dropping relatively during 1967-72, 
they gained momentum after 1972 to reach around 31 per cent of G.N.P. 
during the period 1977-79. (see also Table 11 appendix). The 
rising share of the economic services during this period was mainly 
due to the relaxation of the revenue constraint, the rising level of 
foreign revenues and decreasing expenditures on defence.
3.3.2 Defence Expenditure
As was mentioned before, obviously defence expenditure is . 
considered the most important category in government expenditures. As 
is depicted in figure 3.8, up to 1971 defence expenditure, in absolute 
terms, formed the most important single item in government spending. 
Although it formed about 45.4 per cent of total government spending 
in 1954, however, it dropped to about 37 per cent in 1966. After the 
1967 understandably defence spending increased and again reached 50 per 
cent of government spending on the aggregate level. By 1972, and the 
starting period for development effort defence expenditure showed a 
declining trend to reach its lowest level ever of 23 per cent of total 
expenditure by 1979 (Figure 3.7 and Table 8 Appendix).
Uhen defence spending relative to G.NP. is considered, although it 
dropped relatively from 21 per cent in 1968 to 13.4 per cent in 1979, 
however, even the latter figure is still considered considerably high.
In normal times, in other countries, defence expenditure does not exceed 
5 per cent of G.N.P. It could be argued though that owing to the 
political and military upheavals in the area this level of defence 
spending is justified. However, data for the period 1965-1971 which 
contains normal as well as abnormal periods in terms of military unrest 
in the Middle East, shows that apart from Israel, Jordan spent more than 
any of the other six countries in the area. For example, 1966 
Jordan's defence expenditure relative to G.NP. was 21.1 per cent while
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that of Egypt 11.1 per cent, Iran 3.6 per cent, Israel 12.2 per cent,
Iraq 10.5 per cent, Saudi Arabia 12.1 per cent and Syria 11.1 per cent 
Table 3. 7. By 1971 while Israel has increased its defence expenditures 
share in G.N.P. to about 24 per cent, still Jordan was ranked third 
after Egypt and Israel.
Moreover, clearly there is a strong trade-off between defence
spending and expenditure on economic services. As is obvious in
»
fig. 3.8, a strong association between the two items appear. Whenever 
defence expenditures decreased this eventually released resourc es for 
economic services.
It should be noted however, that these figures are only current 
expenditures. Capital defence expenditures are not reflected here, 
obviously if this is added defence spending relative to G.N.P. would 
most certainly be higher. Even though when defence spending relative 
to current and total expenditures are considered it still forms a very 
high ratio. As table 3..8 reveals, defence expenditure as a ratio to 
current expenditures formed over 55 per cent during 1970-73, however, 
it dropped to 39.4 per cent by 1979. While relative to total expenditure 
dropped from 41 per cent in 1970 to 23.2 per cent in 1979. Obviously,
defence spending has a great impact on the levels of.current and total
i
expenditure and therefore its fluctuations must be reflected in similar 
fluctuations in the latter magnitudes.
It is therefore very important for Jordan that if military tensions 
in the area could be eased up, its military commitment would decline 
releasing more funds for economic development.
3.3.3 Social Services
As has been explained, social services are bound to be affected by 
the permanent effects such as the population growth and the degree of 
urbanization. Therefore, one would expect spending on education and
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Table 3..7. Defence Expenditure as Percentage of 
G.N.P. For Some Countries in the Middle 
East. (Per cent)
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Egypt 8.6 11.1 12.7 12.5 13.0 19.6 21.7
Iran 4.4 3.6 5.5 5.6 6.0 7.1 8.5
Israel 11.7 12.2 13.8 15.4 24.1 26.5 23.9
Iraq 10.2 10.5 10.3 9.1 9.6 9.4 6.5
Jordan 16.9 21.1 21.0 17.6 16.9 17.7 17.3
Saudi Arabia 8.6 12.1 11.9 8.9 8.8 9.4 8.9
Syria 8.4 11.1 11.9 12.1 11.6 12.1 9.8
Source ; (i) International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance, (London: 1973), pp. 71-72.
(ii) Appendix Table ( 7 ).
Table 3. 8. Defence Expenditures as per cent of Current and 
Total Expenditures in Jordan (selected years)
(Per cent)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
(1) As per cent 
of Current 
Exp.
56.0 55.6 55.8 33.4 42.9 38.4 50.2
\
42.2 41.9 39.4
(2) As per cent 
of Total 
Exp.
41.0 40.6 37.1 35.2 30.3 23.6 35.6 24.4 26.6 23.2
Source : Tables ( t ) and ( Û )
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health to be affected positively by population growth. It is also 
to be expected in this respect that social services would grow up as 
fast as that of national income.
Although expenditures on social services had increased over time 
in absolute terms, yet their share in total government expenditure has 
not shown a considerable change. Moreover, their growth rates have 
not been steady but the fluctuations were narrow. The examination of the 
data reveals that their growth rates were sluggish during the period 
1954-1966, however there has been a relative change particularly during 
the period 1970-1979. While government spending on social services had 
increased from less than JD 1.5 million in 1954 to JD 5.6 million in 
1966, it reached an unprecedented figure of JD 56.39 million in 1979.
However, as has been argued before, the government must feel 
obliged in periods of high inflationary pressures to increase spending 
on social services in monetary terms simply to keep their real value 
stable. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that particularly 
during the period 1972-1979, during which considerable inflationary 
pressures exerted their influences on government spending in general, 
to be more so in the case of social services. While expenditure on
social services in current prices during the said period grew with an
I
average annual rate of 26 per cent, yet in real terms they showed only 
a 14.2 per cent annual average rate of growth.
When these expenditures are taken as a percentage of G.N.P. they 
fluctuated narrowly between 2.8-6.6 per cent during the whole period 
under consideration, as indicated in figure 3.9. Coupled with their 
low share in total government expenditures, this would suggest that this 
category was relatively given low priority on the part of the government 
with top priority given to defence expenditure, until this was changed 
in favour of more spending on economic services as was discussed earlier.
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When the composition of social services is taken into account, 
clearly the education expenditure takes the largest share, accounting 
for more than 65 per cent. This was largely due to the population growth 
pattern as well as the emigration from the West to the East Bank after 
1967. Also, the increased urbanization, as discussed earlier, clearly 
exerted more pressures on the government to provide more educational 
facilities.
3.3.4 General Public Services
There is no clear theoretical explanation to explain the behaviour 
of the expenditures on general public services during economic development. 
However, one would expect an increased spending on internal security with 
the expanding urban centres.
The share of this category in total expenditures as is demonstrated 
in figure 3.8, has not changed over time although spending has increased 
in absolute terms. While expenditures in absolute terms have risen 
from about JD 2.0 million in 1954 to JD 40.0 million in 1979 their share 
in total government expenditures remained almost unchanged standing at 
4.0 per cent. Likewise, their share in GNP had changed slightly after 
1967 particularly during the period 1972-79 which again could be 
attributed to the rising prices more than anything else, as is depicted 
in figure 3.9.
As far as the composition of this category is concerned, understandably 
expenditures on security and internal affairs formed the largest share 
standing around 70 per cent of total general public expenditures. However, 
in spite of the fact that it continued rising considerably in absolute 
terms after 1967, nevertheless its share in total general public services 
fluctuated but with a declining tendancy. (Table 3. 9).
116
IO
(Uu•H>M
(UW
O
3
PM
<0M /-s<U CO C M <U (OO <u
O X I <D
IO 4J■U Oc <u
<U I—I
C <UO CO
§*'OCJ
On
CO
a>rH•ÛcdH
Vf y-s rH y-s U0 y—sOs rH o U0 o Vf or*s uo • CM vO oos • as • rH • rHrH CO uo vO *3* as v_yCM Nm/ rH w co
o /-S VO y-s vO y-s00 m os rH CM ops ps • rH • as oos • uo • • rHrH vO uo co Os s-yrH V»/ rH s-y CS
as /-N fs y-s vO y—sr*> rH vO rH >3* CO ops • o • vf oos • vO • co •rH uo rH U0 s-yrH s*y rH w CM
co /-s o y-s co y-sVO as vO rH co or^ . vf • vO • rH oos • vO • CO • rHrH rH m CO o s—yrH w s/ CM
vr y-s co y—s hs y-s
UO co vO vO *3* rH ops o • vO • fs oas • vO • co • rHrH o U0 rs Vf pv. syl»-■i. rH s»y sy rH
rH /-s os y-s o y—srv. rH CM as o Qrv o • rH • CM 5as • rH • co • rH
rH 00 VO U0 co CO s«ys—/ vy rH
y—s vf y-s 00 y—ss co 00 rH oo as vO Qps co » rs • rH Öas • ps • CM • rHrH vO uo Vf rH sys-/ vy rH
CM y—s rs y-s OS y—sCM CM vO r^ . Vf OS oPs 00 • CM • o oas • p-* • CS • rHrH uo U0 vf Vf o s—yv^ s-y rH
vO y-s vf y-s o y-srH o o co o Vf ops rH • U0 « vO oas • as • rH • rH
rH uo m CO Vf 00 syv^ v-y
o Os y-s as y—so vf VO CO Vf ops rH • CO • Vf oes • o • as • rHrH uo vO co co 00 syV«/ S-/
rH y-s PS y-s 00 y—sas as m vO U0 uo osO VO • • rH oas • • CM • rHrH U0 co *3* 00 syvy s/
as y-s CS y-s rH y-s
00 co UO Q U0 Vf oSO CM • o • CM oOS • 00 • rH •rH vf uo co vf P*v sys»y s—y
co y-s 00 y—s rH y—sp^ 00 CO CM rs rH ovO co • co • rs oa» • U0 • Vf • rHrH vf vO CM CO VO sys/ w
VO rH y-s CO Vf y—sVO 00 rH vO CM Vf Qi Vf • o • UO CVf • o • as • rHm CM rs rH es CO syas sy sy
rH /
¡>> rHU R) <0•H G  UM M Mi rH3 <D Cd eu cdO U  UH 4J<D C C  <M <u oCO cd M o i H
a>oM
oCO
Ta
bl
e 
( /
o .
117
3'.4 Concluding remarks
The analysis carried out in this chapter on the pattern of growth of 
government expenditure revealed that the period under examination, namely, 
1954-19*1? could practically be divided into two sub-periods as far as 
the pattern of growth of government spending is concerned. These are 
the pre-war (1954-1966) period and the post-war (1967-1979) period, each 
of which was characterized by special circumstances thereby being reflected 
on the pattern of growth of government spending. More specifically, in 
the pre-war period government expenditure showed their normal pattern of 
growth rising steadily but slowly,- however, with a reasonable rate of 
growth higher than that of national income. Moreover, the permanent 
effects, particularly prices and population growth, seem to have no 
apparent effect on government spending. Actually, this is so because 
this period was characterized by reasonable price stability not exceeding 
2-3 per cent, which naturally allowed remarkable real growth rates for 
all economic indicators.
On the other hand, the post-war period was quite different due 
basically to an ever changing situation. The 1967 war clearly had its 
effects on government spending, both directly and indirectly. Understand- 
ably, the war resulted in an increased government spending on defence 
and war related expenditures which gave rise to an increased aggregate 
government expenditure particularly on the current account. Furthermore, 
the sudden increase in population due to emigration from the West Bank 
to the East Bank of Jordan clearly placed heavy pressures on the government 
to step up its relief expenditure, health, education and other social 
services. More importantly, this period was characterised by heavy 
inflationary pressures especially after 1972. This has been, may be, 
one of the most important effects during the said period to affect the 
levels and pattern of growth of government spending and clearly obvious
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when the data is reflected in real terms.
Other empirical tests have shown that the size of the foreign 
trade sector as measured by the import ratio has a significant effect 
on government spending. Also, the past levels of government expenditure 
were shown to exert their effects on the current year levels of 
government expenditure although there seemed to be little theoretical 
explanation, if any, to why this should be so.
Most importantly is the fact that the heavy dependence by Jordan 
on foreign aid has its direct impact on the levels of government spending. 
This is obvious particularly when the capital expenditures, which are 
mostly financed from this source, are taken into consideration. Therefore, 
the revenue constraint exerted by the availability of foreign resources 
must be considered, among other things, the most important factor 
determining the level as well as the behaviour of government expenditures.
These factors were also reflected when government spending was 
disaggregated into current and capital expenditure. However, while the 
period 1954-1966 was characterized by the fact that more priority was 
being given to current expenditures, the post-war period showed different 
emphasis being placed on development or capital expenditures. More 
importantly, the inflationary pressures alluded to above seem to have 
created new phenomena in the sense that, for the first time, since 1972 
government subsidies for some politically sensitive products showed a 
considerable increase.
Moreover, although the share of defence spending relative to 
either total government expenditure or G.N.F. have been declining over 
time, it nevertheless is still considered high by most standards. In 
normal times defence spending should not be more than 5 per cent of G.N.P. 
However, in the case of Jordan the military as well as the geo-political 
situation in which Jordan operates placed heavy pressures on the
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authorities for an increased military commitment. It is therefore 
not surprising to find that this factor has a great effect on the 
functional distribution of government spending. By virtue of the trade­
off between expenditures on defence and economic services, it was 
clear that whenever government expenditures on the former are increased 
the latter was the first thing to be affected. It follows then that 
the development effort of the country is hampered by the level of 
defence spending.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS OF DIRECT TAXES IN JORDAN
Under the present Jordanian tax law, there exists two forms of 
direct taxes, namely, taxes on income and profits, and property taxes.
The former includes personal income taxes and business profits tax or 
mainly company tax, while the latter includes urban land and building 
tax and rural (irrigated land) land and building tax. Although company 
taxation comes under the income tax law, it seems more appropriate to 
consider it under separate heading due mainly to the nature of the tax 
base as well as the rates and other concessions applicable.
Therefore, in section one.the structure of direct taxes is presented. 
Section two presents an evaluation of the effects of direct taxation 
in line with the objectives of the tax system. This is followed in 
section three by a statistical testing of the responsiveness of direct 
taxes, i.e. a measurement of the elasticity of direct taxes. Section 
four considers arguments concerning the applicability of selected other , 
direct taxes in Jordan.
4.1 The Structure of Direct Taxes
i
4.1.1 Personal Income Tax
Income tax law was first introduced to Jordan (East Bank) in a 
primitive form in the 1933 law, which imposed income tax on wages and 
salaries. This law was based on the Indian income tax law which was 
based on British income tax law at the time. In 1945,law No. 26 
was introduced in which the base of the tax was widened to include any 
income or profit from any work, craft, business, profession or 
vocation in the East Bank of Jordan.
On the other hand, income tax law was first introduced to West
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Bank in 1941 which was then repealed by law No. 13 of 1947. However, 
after the unification of the East and West Bank, income tax law No. 50 
of 1951 was introduced to replace all income tax legislation in the two 
Banks before. This law was in force for four years until it was 
repealed by law No. 12 of 1954, which mainly excluded income of Jordanians 
from overseas from tax as well as reducing the progressiveness of the 
tax rates. However, in 1964 the first "modern" income tax law was 
introduced, known as Income Tax Law No. 25 of 1964 which is still in 
force. Our analysis is therefore confined to the 1964 law.
Before proceeding any further, let us define the income concept 
we are talking about. Economists define income as the amount an 
individual can spend during a particular period of time and still have 
the same net assets (in money terms) at the end of the period as 
at the beginning. To put it differently, one can say that income is 
the amount of individual's consumption outlay plus the increase (or
minus the decrease) in his net worth during a particular period of
-• 1time .
Jordan's income tax law applies the global income concept, that 
is, all income from different sources is pooled in a single total for 
each taxpayer and subject to a single progressive rate. In addition, 
a surcharge of 10 per cent of the income tax, known as the Social 
Services tax, is levied and collected subsequently with the income tax 
by the income tax department.
The 1964 law covers all usual sources of income, however, article 
5(1) states that:
"Subject to the provisions of this law, income tax shall be
payable at the rate or rates specified hereinafter, on the income derived
1. See J.R. Hicks, Value and Capital : An Inquiry into some Fundamental 
Principals of Economic Theory (Oxford University Press, 1939), 
pp. 171-181; Henry C. Simon, Personal Income Taxation : The Definition 
of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy (University of Chicago Press, 
1938), Chap. 2; and Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance 
A study in Public Economy (McGraw-Hill Co., 1959), pp. 161-73
122
or earned by any person in the Kingdom" .
This means that Jordanian residents are not taxed on income arising
outside the country. This limitation on the income tax base runs counter to
the.ability-to-pay principle. This results in fact in that Jordanians
working abroad, particularly those in the neighbouring Oil-producing
countries, completely escape Jordanian tax on their incomes.
As for investment income, capital gains, dividends and income from
agricultural income are not taxed (Article 8(1,m) r), 2). In spite of
the fact that the law subjects interests and discounts to income tax
article (8.1.C), recently interests received on loan certificates issued
3by the public shareholding companies were exempted .
The tax base is also modified by the existance of a number of 
family and other allowances, the nature and development of which are given 
below.
Table (4.1)
Changes in Personal, Family, Educational and Dependant 
Allowances in JD's
Allowances Up to 1975 As of March, 1975 As of 1976
Resident Allowance 100 200 200
Family Allowance 1
Wife 100 150 150
1st Child 25 50 50
2nd Child 20 50 50
3rd Child 15 50 50
4th Child 10 50 50
Employment 15% Subject to max. 20% Sub. to max. of 50% Public
Allowance of JD 200 JD 300 Employees 
25% Private
Employees
Educational 
A1lowance 200 400 400
Dependant 50 50-100 50-100Allowance
Source : Income Tax Law No. 25 of 1964, As amended.
2. Government of Jordan, Income Tax Law No. 25 of 1964. Official Gazette, 
No. 1800 of 17.10.64 and amendments..
3. (see next page)
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In general, the Jordanian tax system starts from the premis 
that a wife is dependent on her husband. Thus, according to article 
5, para. 6, the husband is responsible for submitting a return on 
their joint income and is liable for their joint tax. Any income of his 
wife's is aggregated with his, and in recognition of these obligations 
he is given an allowance of JD 100, which was increased since 1975 to 
JD 150. In addition to this, the first four children are given an 
allowance of JD 70 which was further increased to JD 200 as of 1975.
Apart from these family allowances, the tax payer is granted a resident 
allowance of JD 200, Table 4.1 above.
Over and above, the taxpayer is given an employment allowance origin­
ally set at 15% of gross employment income subject to a maximum of 
JD 200. Subsequently, this was increased to 20% subject to a 
maximum of JD 300 in 1975. However, the most important change that 
took place concerning the allowances was the extension of the employment 
allowance to 50% of gross earned income of public sector employees, and
425% for the private sector employees•.
This change practically exempted all but the highly paid public 
sector employees. To give an example, let us assume a couple with 
four children earning, say JD 100 a month. Their tax liability 
according to whether the man is a public or private sector employee 
will be as illustrated on next page.
This example shows that a public sector employee will pay 
JD 12.5 income tax, while a private sector employee will pay JD 30.5 
on the same annual income. If we go further and assume that both 
have a son at university, then each will have a deduction of JD 400.
3. Government of Jordan, "Provisional Law No. 4 of 1979". Official 
Gazette, No. 2833, page 28, January 1st, 1979.
I , If4. Government of Jordan, Provisional Law No. 23, of 1976. Official 
Gazette, No. 2613, p.571, March 16, 1976.
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Annual Income 
minus,
(1) Resident & Family 
Allowance
(2) Employment Allowance 
Total Allowances
Taxable Income 
Income Tax
Public Sector 
Employee 
JD
Private Sector 
Employee 
JD
100 x 12 = 1200 100 x 12 = 1200
350 350
(50%) 600
950
250
250 x 5% - 12.5
(25%) 300
650
550
400 x 5% - 20 
150 x 7% = 10.5
30.5
This will result in that, the public sector employee will pay no tax at 
all, while the private sector employee will pay tax on JD 150 only at 
the 5% tax rate i.e., his tax liability will be JD 7.5 only.
The argument for discriminating in favour of public sector employees 
has been that, their standard of living has been declining due to the 
fact that their salaries have been, more or less, stagnant over the 
past ten years, whereas those in the private sector witnessed steady 
increases over the same period more than or equal to the rate of inflation.
In addition, the withholding of the tax is much better enforced in the\I
public sector; equal treatment therefore requires some concessions to 
the public sector employees.
As for the tax rates, article 24 of the law sets out the schedule 
according to which the tax upon the chargeable income of any person 
shall be charged. The marginal and effective tax rates are presented 
in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1 below.
It is apparent that both the marginal and the effective tax rates 
rise more steeply in the first seven brackets due to their relatively 
narrow bands (JD 400) than in the last four ones. While the marginal
Ta
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Table 4.2 The Income Tax Rates in the 
1964 Law*
Chargeable Income Tax(at lower band)
Marginal Tax 
Rate %
Effective Tax 
Rate %
(at lower band)
0 - 400 - 5 -
401 - 800 20 7 5
801 - 1200 48 10 6
1201 - 1600 88 15 7.3
1601 - 2000 148 20 9.3
2001 - 2400 228 25 11.4
2401 - 2800 328 30 13.7
2801 - 4000 448 35 16.0
4001 - 6000 868 40 21.7
6001 - 8000 1668 45 27.8
8001 and over 2568 50 32.1
* plus 10% Social Service Tax 
Source : Income Tax Law No. 25, 1964
Fig. (4.1) Marginal and Effective
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tax rate for the first seven brackets ranges between 5-30%, the effective 
tax rate by contrast reaches 13.7% at an income level of JD 2800, 
however, for the last three brackets the marginal tax rate increases to 
50% while the effective tax rate reaches a maximum of 32.1% at income 
level of JD 8000. Of course, the larger the taxable income the more 
is the effective tax rate.
A noticeable feature of the income tax rate schedule is that the 
rate applicable to the top income bracket does not exceed 50 per cent.
Professions and trade are also subject to income tax at the same 
rates as mentioned in Article 24. The taxable income is defined as 
net profit and the acceptable operating expenses are determined by the 
tax law Article 9-13.
4.1.2 Company Taxation
Before embarking on an appraisal of the present system of company 
taxation, it is necessary to briefly describe the legal status of 
companies due to the fact that certain provisions of the company tax 
differs according to the legal status of companies as well as a 
difference in the tax rates applicable.
Companies are disaggregated into two main groups^:i
\A. Ordinary "controlled" companies: These are personal companies 
i.e. the personal factor is more important than the financial one. This 
group is further divided into two kinds according to the legal liability 
of the partners or shareholders which are limited to 20 or less;
(1) Ordinary "public” company : in which all partners are mutually 
and collectively responsible to the liabilities against the company and 
(2) Ordinary ’limited1* company : in which there are two kinds of 
partners, some are collectively and mutually responsible and others
5. Government of Jordan, Companies Law No. 12 of 1964. Official 
Gazette, No. 1757, May 1964
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with limited responsibility as to his participation in the companies 
capital.
B. Shareholding Companies : These are financial companies, i.e. the 
financial factor is more important. Again they are further divided 
into two forms:
(1) Public Shareholding Companies (Ltd) : Shares of which
are open to the public, and the shareholders have limited liability in 
proportion to their shares (Article 39 (2,a).
(2) Private Shareholding Companies : shares of which are not open 
to the public, with also limited liability in proportion to the shares. 
Article 39 states that once the number of shareholders exceeded 20 the 
company must be transferred into a shareholding company.
Although the tax on companies’ profits has always been dealt with 
under income tax, different tax rates have been applied and an assessment 
of the taxable income has always been based on published accounts and 
legal books. Taxable income is defined as net profit, i.e. after 
deducting the legally accepted operating expenses as defined by the 
law, particularly articles 9-13, the rest is considered as taxable income.
Article 25(1), states that "the tax upon the chargeable income of 
any company shall be charged at the rate of (450) 'four hundred and 
fifty fils on every Dinar of chargeable income, and such tax shall be 
final, and may not be refunded or set-off under any of the provisions 
of the law"**.
In addition, Article 8(l)r), stipulates : "There shall be exempt
6. Originally comapnies were taxed at a flat rate of 25% of chargeable 
income. This rate was modified first by increasing it to (35%) 
(Provisional Law No. 29 of 1969, Official Gazette, No. 2195 p.976, 
Sept. 7, 1979 to be effective as of Jan. 1st 1970.) Further, the 
rate was increased to (45%) (Provisional Law No. 63, 1976. Official 
Gazette No. 2613, p.298, Dec. 31, 1976, to be effective as of 
Jan. 1977.
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from tax, income from dividends distributed by a company which paid the 
tax according to Article 25(1) of this law, ...."^
However, a new amendment to the law was introduced in 1979, in 
which two important changes took place; On the one hand it singled 
out the shareholding companies to be covered by the flat rate while 
ordinary companies' profits were left out to be subject to the progressive 
rate schedule. On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, it 
introduced for the first time a differential tax rate structure among 
the shareholding companies. The law distinguished between three types 
of companies according to the fields of activity, then subjected each
g
group to a different flat rate as follows :
(a) Commercial banks; Financial companies; Insurance companies;
Foreign Exchange Companies (Sarafeen), are subject to a flat 
rate of 45 per cent.
(b) Public Industrial shareholding companies, are subject to a tax 
rate of 38.5 per cent, and,
(c) Other public and private shareholding companies, are subject to 
a tax rate of 40 per cent.
Clearly the law was intended to encourage the public shareholding 
companies in the industrial sector, as the economic development strategyi
aimed at changing the economic structure in favour of the industrial 
sector vis-a-vis the services sector. On the other hand, the legislation 
discriminated against the first group of companies obviously as a 
disincentive so as to discourage the creation of new companies. In 
fact, during 1979 the Central Bank reaffirmed this by halting granting 
any new licences to potential bank openings while encouraging existing
. 9banks to open new branches outside the Amman area .
7. Ibid
8. Provisional Law No. 4 1979. Official Gazette, No.(3833), p. (28)
Jan 1st, 1979.
9. Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, 1979.
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Since the 1964 law was enacted, company taxation in Jordan has been 
based on the imputation system, i.e. the tax on dividends is paid by 
the company at the flat rate applicable. The essence of the imputation 
system is that, once the shareholder received his tax free dividends he 
is considered to have already paid income tax at the rate applicable to 
the particular form of company in which he has shares. The law considers 
this tax paid by the company final and cannot be refunded or set-off 
against any tax from other sources of income. This is a bias against 
small shareholders whose income usually does not exceed the first two 
or three brackets of the progressive tax rate schedule, and has the law 
allowed the tax to be refunded, he eventually would be refunded. This 
would be the case, if the law permits the dividend to be grossed up with 
other sources of income and taxed within the proper bracket, then the tax 
withheld by the company would be credited to the taxpayer against his 
tax liability from other sources of income. On the other hand, the 
shareholder whose income falls in the top bracket would pay more tax if 
a set-off of the tax withheld is allowed in the law.
Currently, the set-off of the tax withheld by the company is a 
feature of the British tax system, however, payments of refunds wherever 
applicable are conditioned by the company's payment of the advanced
i
corporation tax (A.C.T.), which is part of the Corporate tax bill as 
well as, in fact, a prepayment of income tax at the basic rate on 
dividends which is deducted at the source and paid to the Revenue when 
dividends are distributed*^. It is worth noting in this context that 
the Jordanian Income Tax Law of 1954 allowed the company tax withheld 
to be set-off and refunded, following the British tax system on which 
it was basically modeled, thus benefiting the small shareholders**. 10
10. J.A. Kay and M.A. King, The British Tax System (London ; Oxford
Univ. Press, 1980) p.183
11. Government of Jordan, The Official Gazette, No. 695 (Amman, 1959) p.13.
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Undoubtedly, the purpose of exempting company dividends is to
avoid double taxation. Some argue that since the corporation pays tax
on its earnings, the stockholders should not be subject to an
additional tax on the same earnings when they are distributed to him 
12as dividends . More specifically, Kaldor regards "the profits
accruing to a joint-stock company ... as the income of proprietor
13to be taxed just like any other form of property income" . Therefore, 
the corporate taxation is just a form of taxation at the source, 
in other words the corporation is being taxed in place of the individuals 
who own it. In a system of proportional taxation this rationale 
could be defended, however in a system of non-proportional taxation such 
rationale is no longer defensible, due to the different tax rates as 
well as the size of individual incomes*^.
Others argue that corporations have a legal existence of their 
own quite apart from that of the stockholders*^. This distinct-entity 
doctrine is often used to the advantage of the corporation, as for 
example, in the case of limited liability. It would be logical to be 
used against the corporation as well.
Let us now turn to the allowances and concessions given to the
companies. Aid to companies to help capital investment may take a
\
variety of forms of tax allowances and other concessions. One form 
of such concessions is the granting of liberal provisions for loss 
carry forward in order to reduce the risks of companies entering the 
market. 12345
12. Richard Goode, The Corporation Income Tax (New York : John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc., 195l) p.25.
13. Nicolas Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax (London : George Allen and Unwin, 
1955) p.41
14. Vito Tanzi and Joseph Aschheim, "Saving, Investment, and Taxation in 
Underdeveloped Countries", Kyklos, vol. 18 (1965) pp. 205-225.
15. Ibid, p.205.
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The Jordanian income tax law allows a loss to be set-off against 
the total income from other sources during the same year, article (11,1). 
However, where the amounts of loss cannot be set-off completely against 
income from other sources in the same year, the amount of loss which 
cannot be set-off shall be carried forward and set-off against half the 
chargeable income in the next six subsequent years.
The legislation's qualification of loss carry forward against half 
of the taxable income may comprise a disincentive for undertaking capital- 
intensive projects which involve relatively high start up costs. This 
might hamper the strategy of economic development which favours such 
projects in the process of Jordan's industrialization, particularly in 
the import-substituting industries. Generally, capital intensive 
industries may be attractive in developing countries even in those 
experiencing acute shortage of capital. Advantages claimed for such 
capital intensive orientation could be summarized in the following
(a) Capital may be a substitute for skilied-labour which is a bottle­
neck in developing countries,
(b) The quantity of goods produced by labour using simple methods 
may be inferior.
(c) The time taken to perform a given amount of work may be less in 
capital intensive industries, and
(d) The high statutory wage levels and industrial trade union actions, 
where they exist, may lead to increased costs in labour intensive 
industries.
Moreover, article 9 of the law permits taxpayers who carry on 
business to deduct, among other expenditures, the depreciation of the 
cost of fixed assets, computed at prescribed straight-line rates which 16
16. Nizar Jetha, "Company Taxation in East Africa", in Milton Taylor,
ed., Taxation for African Economic Development (London : Hutchinson 
Educational Ltd., 1970) pp. 284-287.
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vary by type of asset. These rates range from 1.5% to 6.5 per cent 
annually for buildings; and from 2% to 25% for machinery and equipment - 
in manufacturing most machines are depreciated at 7-10%. Any 
depreciation not claimed by the taxpayer, because of insufficient income 
in a given year, may be carried forward indefinitely to offset future 
income (Article 9 (1,2).
It is argued that a more realistic approach would be a change from 
the present straight-line form to an accelerated form of depreciation 
allowances. This takes the form of allowing the firm to write-off the 
cost of the capital investment in a short period. It is assumed that 
businessmen recognize an advantage in receiving income in the near future 
as compared with the same amount of income in the most distant future. 
Basically, accelerated depreciation allowances postpones some tax 
liabilities into the future. This may reduce the risk and uncertainty 
as the businessmen usually set a short "pay-off period", usually shorter 
than the assets' physical or economic life, but at the same time it 
should be acknowledged that such a measure may prove to be a revenue 
loser especially in the short run.
4.1.3 Taxes on Property
Property taxation in Jordan is levied on real estate property 
transfers. An improved property taxation could constitute a major 
step forward in providing for a more equitable tax burden distribution 
as well as an important source of revenue. Reviewed below are the 
urban land and building tax and the Rural land and building tax.
4.1.3.1 Urban Land and Building Tax
The tax was first imposed by the 1925 law, which was then replaced 
by law No. 60 of 1951, with minor changes. This was further replaced 
by law No. 42 of 1963 with only changing the rate of the tax on buildings 
(increased from 8 to 10%) and on lands (decreased from 8 to 5%).
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The law was then amended by law No. 9 of 1967, on both of which our 
discussions is based.
The tax is an annual levy on lands and buildings located within 
municipal area. The land is assessed on its estimated annual capital 
value which is revised every five years. Buildings, on the other hand, 
are assessed on their net annual rental value which is determined by 
deducting 20% from gross annual rent as an estimate of depreciation.
The tax rates are 10 per cent on land; and 24 per cent on the net annual 
rental value of buildings; of which 3 per cent for education, '9 per 
cent for the sewage services and a 17 per cent basic rate. The tax 
is collected by the Central Government, however only 10 per cent of its 
revenues is credited to the budget accounts and the remainder is 
credited to the municipalition account and a special account of the 
Ministry of Education.
Notwithstanding the fact that Jordan has witnessed a construction
boom during the 1970's, yet revenues from the tax has been declining
over time. For example, the number of building permits issued increased
2from 2408 in 1975, with an area of 419 thousand m to reach 3000 with
2 17an area of (1.095) thousand m in 1979 , the tax revenues has dropped
to JD 85 thousand in 1975 and further to only JD 57 thousand in 1977 
(Table 4.4)
Perhaps the reason behind the drastic drop in this tax revenue 
could be attributed to two main reasons. On the one hand, despite the 
fact that the law requires revaluation of annual rental value every five 
years, the last revaluation of actual or imputed rental values took 
place in 1967. On the other hand, there is a great deal of delinquency 17
17. Bassam Saket, et al. "The Economy of Jordan Over the 1970's and 
1979 : A Bird's Eye View", (Amman; Royal Scientific Society,
June 1980) p.12. See also, Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin, vol. 16, No. 9 Sept. 1980, Table 33.
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encouraged by the low penalties that are in effect 10% of the tax for
the first year, rising to 50% after five years. Usually delinquent
taxes are not collected until the property is sold, or when a tax
clearance certificate is needed for one reason or another. Moreover,
there are numerous problems for administration when new assessment is
18done because an estimated 10% of taxpayers appeal against it , which 
takes a long period of time to be settled.
4.1.3.2 The Rural Land and Building Tax
The urban land and building tax has a counterpart applying to 
irrigated lands and industrial buildings, i.e. the rural land tax, 
which was first introduced by law No. 30 of 1955 as amended by law No. 15 
of 1963. For land, progressive specific rates are levied according 
to the agricultural commodity under production or the quality of land, 
ranging from 1500 fils (JD 1.5) per dunum of lands planted with 
bananas to 70 fils per dunum of second-class irrigated land. Industrial 
buildings are taxed at a 5% flat rate of its net annual rent.
However, revenues from this tax are negligible given the fact 
that the Minister of Finance is granted authority to exempt taxpayers
suffering from poor crops or any other financial difficulties.
\\ 18
18. Estimates by an I.M.F. mission to Jordan, May 15, 1977
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4.2. The Effects of Direct Taxes
It was only relatively recently that the main objectives of the
Jordanian tax policy were spelled out clearly. Such objectives are
not different from those to be found in any other tax system. The
19main objectives were described as the following :
(1) The Redistribution of personal income through the absorption of 
part of the surplus income of the well-to-do to be spent to the 
benefit of other groups.
(2) Increasing, to the largest extent possible, the domestic revenues 
of the country to cover an increasing government expenditure
due to the development of projects and services, and
(3) Encouraging private sector investments in industrial and 
agricultural projects, by ensuring a reasonable rate of return 
to such investments through granting concessions and special 
allowances.
In line with these objectives, the evaluation of the effects of 
direct taxes will be considered. Three effects will be considered in 
turn, the importance of the revenue aspect of direct taxes; an 
evaluation of the investment incentives and the redistribution of 
income effect. ,
i
4.2.1 The Revenue Importance of Direct Taxes
As was discussed in Chapter three, government expenditures
witnessed a considerable increase particularly during the 1970's,
both in current and capital categories which are again summarized
in Table (4.3). However, government domestic revenues did not grow
as fast as that of government expenditures. In spite of the fact
that domestic revenues increased from JD 25.5 million in 1967 to 19
19. Government of Jordan, Department of General Budget : Public
Fiscal Policy of the Government. (Amman ; Department of General 
Budget, 1972) p.6.
: Appendix Tables ( *4 , •! )
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to JD 181.9 million in 1979 (Table 4.3), yet they still made up only
41.4 per cent of total government revenues in 1979, with the rest
i.e. 58.6 per cent covered by foreign revenues. It is clearly
demonstrated that Jordan's foreign revenues not only cover capital
expenditures but also part of its current expenditures. Not in any
single year did domestic revenue cover all current expenditure.
Although the deficiency of the tax system in administering direct
taxes may have been a short-coming of the fiscal system, yet the
political power of the different pressure groups may have been one of
20the main obstacles to tax administration . Moreover, the availability 
of foreign resources may as well be considered a reason in the sense 
that it created a built-in inflexibility in the tax system and led to 
the relaxation of tax effort on the part of the government.
While tax revenues accounted for 70 per cent of domestic revenues 
on the average, direct taxes made up only 8 per cent of domestic 
revenues during the period 1967-1977. However, as of 1974 their 
share in domestic revenues increased slightly to an average of 10 
per cent (Table 4.4). Among direct taxes, income tax provided the 
bulk of the revenues, while taxes on properties contributed not more
than 0.1 per cent of total domestic revenues. An I.M.F. mission estimated
i
payments of land and building tax in Amman which has the largest number
of taxpayers of an average JD 10 per tax payer a year and remarked that
this is possibly one of the lowest amounts in the world for countries that 
21levy a similar tax . On the other hand, when total government 
revenues are taken into account the contribution of direct taxes is even 201
20. The most evident example of this is the introduction of a 
capital gains tax in 1973 which was subsequently abolished 
following an outcry of landowners at whom the tax was originally 
aimed, to lessen land speculation and to divert such resources 
to more productive avenues, this will shortly be discussed in. 
some detail.
21. International Monetary Fund mission's report "Fiscal Survey in 
Jordan" unpublished report, 1977.
(i) 
Ministry of Finance : Annual Reports, various Issues.
(ii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, vol. 16, No.7, July 1980
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Table (4.4) 
Domestic Revenues by Major Components*, (1955-1979)
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less impressive. For example, in 1955-60 direct taxes contributed 
about 6.6 per cent to total revenues with an average annual growth 
rate of 3.5 per cent (Tables 4.5 and 4.6). While they maintained a 
relatively growing rate of growth over the period up to 1973, i.e.
7.7 and 11.2 per cent in 1961-66 and 1967-73 respectively, their share 
in total government revenues was stagnant. It was only during the 
period 1974-1979 when they contributed about 5 per cent of total 
government revenues.
i
Furthermore, another indicative measure of the low level of 
direct taxes contribution is their ratios to G.N.P. For example, 
while the ratio of tax revenues to G.N.P. in Jordan in a five year 
period 1972-1976 averaged 14.9 per cent, that of other developing countries 
averaged 16.3 per cent during the same period (Table 4.7). Similarly 
the ratio of direct taxes to G.N.P., during the same period, was 2.18 
per cent, far less than that of the average of developing countries 
of 5.15 per cent. While income tax as a percentage of G.N.P. in 
Jordan was less than 2 per cent, it was around 5 per cent in developing 
countries. However, even though such comparisons are of some importance 
in indicating the tax effort in comparison with other developing 
countries, yet the figures should be taken with caution due mainly to 
the different definitions and statistical practices followed in 
developing countries. An example of such differences could be found 
in the fact that some developing countries include stamp duties in 
direct taxes others, as is the case in Jordan, consider it under 
another heading, i.e. non-tax revenues which may partially explain 
the increased relative importance of this item in Jordan as opposed to 
other developing countries.
^However, the above analysis reveals beyond doubt that the 
contribution of direct taxes to total government revenues is far less
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Table (4.5) Relative Importance of Main Components 
of Government Revenues, 1955-1979 
(per cent)
Source 1955-1960 1961-1966 1967-1973 1974-1979
A. Domestic Revenues 39.2 47.8 41.9 46.7
1 - Indirect Taxes 20.9 30.1 25.8 30.7
2 - Direct Taxes 3.5 4.4 3.5 5.1
3 - Non-Tax Revenues 14.8 13.3 12.6 10.6
B. Foreign Revenues 60.7 52.1 58.1 53.3
Total Government 
Revenues ' 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source : Appendix Table ( lZ* )
Table (4.6) Annual Rates of Growth of Government 
Revenues by Different Components, 1955-1979 
(per cent)l )
Source 1955-1960 1961-1966 1967-1973 1974-1979
A. Domestic Revenues 18.4 13.4 10.9 26.1
1 - Indirect Taxes 9.4 9.8 10.2 27.0
2 - Direct Taxes 6.6 7.7 11.2 37.9
3 - Non-Tax Revenues 11.1 9.6 10.3 27.9
B. Foreign Revenues -2.8 -1.9 25.9 58.6
Total Government 
Revenues 6.7 2.5 18.3 30.0
Source : Appendix Table ( Ü  )•
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Chan is to be expected. In spite of the fact that total domestic 
revenues increased over time both in absolute and relative importance 
in total government revenues, the main increases came through indirect 
taxes followed by the non-tax revenues, while direct taxes remained, 
more or less, stagnant (Figure 4.2). Although the proportion of 
direct taxes in the government revenues remained fairly low, it was 
perhaps a result of a sharp increase in foreign revenues rather than 
a decrease in the rate of growth of direct taxes.
It is apparent that the business profit tax contributed the bulk 
of income tax revenues. The share of the business profits in income 
tax increased from 77.4 per cent in 1972 to 89.3 per cent in 1978 and 
dropped to 81.0 per cent in 1979, (Table 4.8). This increase was 
not only an automatic one in the sense that it accompanied the growth 
of income, but also a result of a growth in the base of the tax. On 
the one hand, the number of shareholding companies increased considerably 
from 169 in 1968 to a record high of 792 in 1979 (Table 4.9). On the 
other hand, business profits tax other than shareholding companies, 
which includes self-employed, proprietors, traders and ordinary 
companies increased considerably as well from 14060 in 1968 to 67742 
in 1979 of which ordinary companies were 4342. »
However, in spite of this obvious increase in the base of the tax, 
yet the vast majority of traders, professions and the like are still 
not covered. Their assessment poses a problem to the tax officials as 
they rarely keep audited books. The large number of traders scattered
all over the country is a stumbling block to efficient tax administration.
22The Tax Department has four major offices over the country which are 2
22. These are the main offices supplemented by another 12 small offices 
in small towns. However, it is perhaps worth noting here that 
the Amman Office takes over 90% of the work and the rest is 
covered by other offices.
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Income Tax by Major Components, 1972-1979 
(in millions of JD's)
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Table (4.9). 
Numbers of Tax Units by Major Group, 1968-
1A6
responsible for the 67742 tax units subject to the business profit tax 
in 1979. The number is only a small percentage of those actually 
undertaking trading or business. It is worth noting that the Tax 
Department reaches only the developed portion such as the retailers and 
wholesalers, as well as companies.
The above analysis shows clearly that direct taxes have failed to 
contribute significantly to total government revenues, which indicate 
that such taxes failed to fulfil the revenue objectives.^ One could 
look for several reasons to why this was the case. Firstly, the 
problems of the income tax administration should be carefully considered. 
In spite of the actual increase in the base of the tax, i.e. the number 
of taxpayers increased in 1979 to 251794, the department's staffing has 
been stagnant during the past five years. The result of this was the
accumulation of the cases to be assessed. For example, total number
of assessments was 104015 in 1979, a 41% of the total number of 
taxpayers, however, it should be taken into account that about 93 thousand 
of the latter represents government employees who contributed about 
5 per cent of the total tax collections in 1979, and even less i.e.
3.3 per cent in 1980 while forming about 37 per cent of total taxpayers. 
Moreover, out of the 44255 assessed cases in the private sector employees 
section, 17971 or 40.6 per cent cases were found not liable to tax.
The number of objections and appeals are relatively high and amounted 
to 7279 and 1516 cases respectively in 1979, however, 70% of the latter, 
i.e. (1516) were settled in the income tax appeal court.
Students of public finance nowadays tend to ignore the importance 
of tax administration. In Jordan, as may well be the case in most 
developing countries, no research has been undertaken on the ways and 
means of improving the tax administration. Although certain changes 
in the income tax structure as well as instructions, which by now out
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of date, are probably the principal way in which income tax compliance
and enforcement may be improved in Jordan, there is still much that
may and perhaps should be done to improve the administrative machinery.
For example, in order to enhance the compliance in the self-employed
and other private sector establishments, new instructions are needed
particularly concerning the auditing offices to submit a copy of their
report on the accounts of those establishments to the tax department..
More importantly, new instructions compelling such businesses with
certain paid-up capital to furnish legal accounts to the income tax
department. Certainly this would not be possible without being made
clear in the law, coupled with some covering penalties in cases of
fraud or hiding such accounts. It is perhaps ironic to demand a
better enforcement and compliance from the income tax department while
at the same time it is given no special attention as to its needs for
manpower resources, and in fact it is often provided with relatively
smaller resources in comparison with other governmental departments.
The ratio of the Income Tax Department expenditures to tax collection was
231.738 and 1.384 per cent in 1977 and 1978 respectively . It is 
generally accepted that a 3 per cent ratio is an acceptable one, 
therefore it could be argued that there is room for an increased
i
expenditure if the administrative machinery is to be improved. On 
the other hand, the productivity of the existing personnel could be 
improved. This could be achieved through on-the-job training 
programmes, conferences, seminars, etc. Evidently there is a price 
for this in the short run, but training and improved skills are the 
best guarantees in the long run. In addition, since an efficient 
tax administration will only function well where a high degree of 
taxpayer knowledge of the law is available, it follows then that 23
23. Income Tax Department, Unpublished reports, 1977 and 1978.
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educational programmes, publicity and publication of taxpayers guides
etc., are necessary, particularly in Jordan where it is even difficult
to obtain a copy of the income tax law. Of course, this should be
complemented, simultaneously by restructuring the income tax law so
that it is more amendable to compliance and enforcement. For
example a large number of out-dated instructions should be done
away with as well as new instructions that are relevant to the current
economic and social development should be introduced.
The high possibility of tax evasion should also be considered.
It is only to be expected that evidence of income tax evasion, since
it is an illegal activity, is difficult to obtain. Ministries of
Finance, which, of course, have more evidence of evasion than any other
governmental department, are frequently restricted from releasing
information by Acts of official secrecy. However, the Director of
Income Tax Department in Jordan was very frank in declaring the "...
widespread of the tax evasion phenomena and, abstaining from giving
2 Aenough information or giving false information and wrong accounts"
He gave an example of the evidence on the degree of tax evasion, the
number of reopened cases in accordance with article 54 of the Income
tax law as well as 'the astonishing facts which were discovered through
the application of article 37 of the law and the unexpected check on 
25taxpayers" . He concluded from the evidence he was able to put his 
hands on, that "it could be said that tax evasion is the basic rule ... 
and giving correct information is the exception", and maintained that 
there are "closed areas" for the income tax and high incomes that the 245
24. .Income Tax Department, Unpublished internal report on the 1979 
fiscal year, p.18.
25. Ibid. Artical No. 37 of the income tax law gives the Director 
of the Income Tax Department or any other assessing officer to 
whom responsibility was officially delegated, to check the records 
of any taxpayer on the premises as well as withholding such records 
if necessary. Article 37, para. 1,2,3, page 60.
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tax cannot reach"
Clearly this was the only frank account on the degree of tax 
evasion in Jordan, however, no-one could expect it to be put as bluntly 
as it was put by the Director of the Income Tax Department. One 
could read through the above statement on the characteristics of 
evasion. Primarily, complete tax evasion results from the high degree 
of incorrect information declared to the tax department. Because of 
this, evasion is more pronounced on the part of self-employed taxpayers, 
professions, etc. than it is for salary and wage earners. On the other 
hand, one could safely argue that the existence of pressure groups, 
political power centres etc. is a major handicap to the proper 
implementation of the income tax. This clearly suggests that tax 
evasion could possibly be a major explanation behind the low performance 
of income tax as well as property taxation.
Furthermore, one could speculate on other reasons for the low 
performance of direct taxes, particularly the income tax in so far as 
the structure of the economy itself is concerned. In the 1950's and 
1960's the agricultural sector was the major sectior in the economy 
contributed around 20 per cent of G.D.P. (see Chapter one) however, 
it was and still is excluded from income taxation^ On the other hand, 
Jordan's dépendance on foreign trade particularly imports may have 
given rise to relatively higher indirect taxes and by contrast lower 
direct taxation. The emergence of the industrial sector and the 
investment incentives it was granted in the form of tax holidays, as 
will shortly be discussed, could be another factor. In addition, the 
extent to which tax concessions and allowances as described in section 
one as well as the total exclusion of capital gains from taxation 
have aggravated the problem, particularly if one acknowledges the fact 26
26. Ibid.
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that land speculation was the major source of investment during the 
seventies.
Finally, it should be noted that certain loopholes in the income tax
law itself contributed to the above reasons, particularly the powers
conferred on the tax assessor in the process of income tax law
implementation, see for example article 53 of the law. Moreover, the
fact that the law have put a ceiling of 50 per cent on the upper limit of
the income tax schedule reveals that the law has given the upper income
levels a clear advantage, while in other countries the upper limit of
27income tax was far more than the 50 per cent level. .
The above discussion clearly demonstrates that direct taxation in 
Jordan has failed to fulfil the revenue objective which perhaps was the 
main objective among others, due to the fact that Jordan depends largely 
on foreign resources rather than on its domestic revenues, a picture 
which for a long time has been in the forefront of economic discussion. 
However, this should not obscure the fact that some progress has been 
taking place during the past three years. If such progress keeps pace 
with the developments in the economy, coupled with administrative 
capacity improvements and modification of the law to accommodate the 
changing economic structure, then and only then can one look for a 
better role for direct taxation in Jordan, particularly the income tax 
system. 27
27. The upper limits of the marginal tax rates in several*countries were, 
Syria 70%, Lebanon 42%, Iraq 70%, Egypt 95%, Britain 60%, France 70%, 
Germany (Federal Republic) 90%, Japan, 85%. See U.N. Taxes and 
Fiscal Policy in Developing Nations. U.N. Publication Office, 1975 
p.204; see also Kay & King, op. cit.
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4.2.2 Evaluation of Investment Incentives
Up to 1972, three laws concerning the encouragement of investment
28were passed with limited effect and applicability . However, with 
the promulgation of the Three Year Development plan 197.3-1975, 
business enterprises were granted investment incentives on wide-range 
basis under the Encouragement of Investment Law No. 53 of 1972, which 
was later modified by law No. 60 of 1973 and provisional law No. 16, 
of 1977 both of which introduced some changes concerning the 
implementation of the law provisions. Therefore, due to the fact the 
very minor investments have taken place up to 1972 under the previous 
laws, i.e. those which were established to benefit from the incentives, 
our analysis is concentrated on the evaluation of the effects of 
the 1972 law alluded to above.
The law has very many generous features including preferential measures,
incentives, facilities and guarantees to which Jordanians, Arab and
foreign investors alike have access. A project engaged in industry,
tourism, housing, or land reclamation is eligible for tax exemptions
29provided the fulfilment of the following conditions :
(a) It is identified with the goals of general plan of economic
»
development.
(b) Contributes to the increase of national production.
(c) Its gross value added Should constitute not less than ZOZ of its 
cost. 289
28. These are (1) The Law of Encouragement and Direction of Industry
. No. 27, 1955; (2) Encouragement of Foreign Investment Law No. 28,
1955, and (3) Provisional Law of Investment Encouragement No. 17 1967). 
All three laws provided mainly tax holidays of (Income Tax and 
Social Service Tax) for three years, and half-profits for another 
two years along with exemption of fixed assets of industrial projects 
from Custom duties and other indirect levies for short periods. All 
contained similar provisions with minor changes.
29. Ministry of National Economy "Encouragement of Investment Law No. 53 
of 1972" In, Investment conditions and Opportunities in Jordan.
(Amman, Nov. 1972).
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(d) Contribute to the improvement of the trade balance or the balance 
of payments.
(e) Be approved by the Government authority generally the Council of 
Ministers.
The law distinguished between two forms of projects :
(a) An "Economic Project" which meets the conditions above.
(b) An "Approved Economic Project" which in addition to the above 
conditions should meet the following conditions as well:
(1) In the case of an industrial project, the value of its 
machinery, tools and equipment should not be less than 
JD 5000.
(2) In the case of a tourism project, its cost should be not 
less than JD 15000 excluding the cost of land.
(3) A housing or land reclamation projects* cost should be 
not less than JD 25000, excluding the cost of land.
Within this framework, the tax incentives^ vary according to the 
classification of the project. An approved economic project is exempt 
from income taxes (including the Social Service tax) for a period of 
six years, and from all customs duties on fixed assets imported within 
the first three years of its approval, or, if imported for expansion 
subject to the condition that such imported fixed assets shall not be 
less than 25% of the total value of the fixed assets of the original 
project. The period of income and property tax exemptions is extended 
to nine years if the project fulfils one of the following two conditions: 
(a) It is a public shareholding company, and/or (b) Is implemented 
outside the Capital Governorate (Amman). In contrast, the economic 30
30. The Law provides also other non-tax incentives, such as state land 
for approved economic projects undertaken outside the Amman 
Governorate, as well as guarantees to the transferability of funds 
abroad. Ibid., p.72-73.
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project exemption from all or part of the above taxes is subject to the 
approval of the Council of Ministers, however, it is automatically 
granted the import duty exemption. It is therefore clear that, in 
addition to the general investment promotion, the law seeks to promote 
regional development and wider distribution of capital ownership.
Since the introduction of the 1972 law, apart from scattered data 
on the number of projects and their capital there has not been any 
attempt to evaluate the incentives provided by the law and the likely 
impact on the investment outcome. However, in 1979 the Economics 
Department of the Royal Scientific Society carried out the only survey 
to that effect. Our analysis here draws heavily on the data provided 
by the said survey.
The number of projects that benefited from the law and their 
investments are presented in Table (4.10). The evidence indicates 
that the utilization of incentives has increased dramatically in the 
last three years, i.e. 1976-1978, with an increase in the value of 
investments in 1976 in as much as the accumulated total of the previous 
four years, and continued rising since then to reach a total of JD 113 
million for the period 1972-1979 for the completed projects. The 
number of completed projects increased from only 8iin 1972 to a total 
of 360 projects during the whole period, along with 187 projects under 
construction.
Although one of the objectives of the Encouragement of Investment
Law was to enhance the inflow of foreign capital, available data indicates
that foreign investment formed only 5.5 per cent of the total investment
during the period 1972-78 as well as 7.9 per cent from other Arab 
31countries . This clearly indicates that the incentives have attracted 31
31. Ahmad Al-Ahmad, Investment Promotion In Jordan. (Amman : Royal 
Scientific Society). (Forthcoming), Table (1.3), p.62.
Table (4.10) Investment Projects Under the Encouragement of 
Investment Law, 1972-1979 
(In number of projects and millions of JD's)
Year Approved Economic Projects Economic Projects TotalCompleted
Projects
Completed 
No. Value
Under
Construction
No. No. Value
Under
Construction
No. No. Value
1972 6 1.860 6 2 0.534 2 8 2.394
1973 27 6.115 19 12 0.361 5 39 6.476
1974 27 4.720 20 14 0.195 6 31 4.915
1975 25 4.499 12 17 0.717 12 42 5.216
1976 33 12.295 27 56 5.964 27 89 18.259
1977 25 13.713 26 27 2.670 20 52 16.383
1978 24 25.553 2 38 5.033 3 62 30.586
1979* 11 23.860 - 26 5.195 - 37 28.785
To tal 178 92.435 112 182 20.669 75 360 113.104
Source : Dr. A. Al-Ahmad, Investment Promotion in Jordan", 
Unpublished. (Amman : Royal Scientific Society), 
pp. 53-56. 4
I
* Represents five months only January — May, 1971
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only a small amount of foreign capital. This appears to be consistent
with results obtained in other developing countries. For example,
in a survey of comparable investment incentives offered in developing
countries, it has been found that these incentives tend to have little,
32if any, effect on foreign capital inflow. .
Moreover, when the geographical distribution of investments is 
taken into consideration, little success, if any, could be noticed.
The criteria for regional development was intended to allocate 
investments to regions other than the capital Amman. However, as 
Table (4.11) demonstrates, 62.4 per cent of total investments of 
completed projects was in Amman, and if the 24.2 per cent of Zarka and 
Russifa is added, it leaves nothing but less than 14 per cent to the 
rest of the country, of which only 1.9 per cent went to the northern 
part of the country which contained the second largest populated area.
On the other hand, the value added criteria was apparently 
imposed to ensure a minimum labour content in the projects, in order 
to increase the number of employed. The implemented projects appear 
to have provided a total of 27 thousand jobs over the period 1972-78,
Table (4.12), a relatively reasonable contribution when compared with 
the overall objective concerning employment setrout in the Three Yeari
33Development Plan of about 70 thousand jobs . However, with the 
Jordanian economy not only maintaining full employment but even 
suffers from an acute labour shortage, it is questionable whether this 
criteria is valid any more.
As to the effect on the trade balance, available evidence reveals 
that while the ratio of imports by the investment projects to total 32
32. See Grant L. Reuben et al., Private Foreign Investment in Development 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973) pp.120-134.
33. National Planning Council, The Three Development Plan, 1973-75.
(Amman : 1972) p.20.
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Table (4.11) Percentage Distribution of Investments by 
Geographical locations, 1972-78 
(Percentages)
Year Amman Zarka & Russaifa Balqq South
Irbid & 
North
1972 57.6 . 25.6 15.6 - 1.0
1973 69.6 23.4 7.1 - -
1974 32.9 26.3 28.5 9.0 3.2
1975 43.8 29.3 17.5 0.8 8.6
1976 70.9 12.2 11.8 2.8 2.4
1977 65.0 28.5 3.1 3.1 0.2
1978 66.1 30.4 — 3.6
Source : Dr. A. Al-Ahmad,"Investment Promotion in Jordan"
Unpublished. (Amman : Royal Scientific Society), 
pp. 53-56.
\
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imports of the country averaged 3.3 per cent during 1972-78, the ratio
of exports to total exports, during the same period, averaged 6 per 
34cent . However, the values in absolute terms give a completely 
different picture whereby imports by far exceeded exports by more than 
three times.
The amounts of revenues foregone by the Government as a result of 
the tax exemptions cannot be precisely determined. As Table (4.12)
Table (4.12) Import Duties Exemptions and Employment 
Provided by Projects benefited from the Law, 1972-78 
(value in mn of JD's)
Approved Economic Projects Economic Projects
Year Import Duties No.of Employees Import duties No.of Employees
Value Z No. Z of total value Z No. Z
1972 0.107 47.9 261 32.5 0.116 52.1 543 67.5
1973 2.425 95.1 510 43.2 0.125 4.9 669 56.7
1974 3.120 94.7 935 53.9 0.175 5.3 798 46.0
1975 2.331 86.3 1712 62.6 0.369 13.7 1025 37.4
1976 4.786 70.3 2609 61.9 2.019 29.7 1609 38.1
1977 8.414 82.1 5468 67.9 1.830 17.9 2584 32.1
1978 8.726 89.3 5675 67.7 1.046 10.7 2700 32.3
Total 29.909 84.1 17170 - 5.680 ' 15.9 9928 -
Source : Dr. A. Al-Ahmad, op. cit., Tables 17, 22.
demonstrates, import duties foregone by the government amounted to JD 35.6 
million during the period under consideration with the largest increases 
taking place in 1977 and 1978. There is no available data as to the 
revenues foregone in the form of income taxes and property taxes.
However, a rough calculation indicates a potential revenue loss of up to 34
34. Ahmad Al-Ahmad, op. cit. pp.101-106.
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JD 2.3 million in income taxes in 1978 as well as JD 0.7 million in 
36property taxes , about 2 - 2.5% of tax revenue. The revenue loss 
is expected to grow sharply in the future because of the recent 
upsurge in investment as well as the fact that a new development plan 
is to be launched in 1981.
Notwithstanding the fact that a clear-cut conclusion is not likely
to be possible without a cost benefit analysis, coupled with the fact
that no data exist as to the impact of direct taxes alone, however,
the above argument suggests that the tax incentives in general terms
have not been effective in attracting additional investments; they
are also costly in terms of revenue foregone. However, judging from
surveys done in other developing countries, Reuber suggests that such
schemes are "... although they may be of some help, especially in
promoting investment by small firms and by firms with relatively
limited experience in L.D.C's, the impact of many of these programmes
37seems to be marginal at best"
In view of the above argument, one is tempted to suggest a 
considerable limitation on tax exemptions. Certainly Jordan could 
limit the period of tax exemption to three years in line with that 
available in Syria. Instead more emphasis is needed on favourable business 
climate, liberal exchange regime and sound labour practices - factors 
for which Jordan has good record. As for the regional development, 
given the fact the existing tax preferentials had virtually little, 
if any, effect, the potential revenues could provide better infra­
structural services in parts of the country outside the capital city 
(Amman), and perhaps could ensure a more reasonable distribution of investments. 3567
35. Assuming a yield of 20% rate of return that would have been 
taxed at 38.5 per cent rate of shareholding companies and at an 
average 20 per cent for other business.
36. By assumption.
37. Grant L. Reuber, et al., op. cit., p.120.
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4.2.3 Income and Wealth Redistribution Effect
It is generally accepted that the main purpose of the fiscal 
system, particularly in the early stages of economic development is to 
raise adequate revenues to finance government expenditures. It is 
therefore, not surprising to see that the redistributive aspect of 
direct taxation is being given second or third priority. However, the 
redistribution of income and wealth in developing countries has recently 
become a matter of major concern which reflects increased awareness of 
the economic, social and political costs of income inequality. We 
may not need statistical evidence to show the ineffectiveness of direct 
taxes in Jordan as means of income redistribution. The fact that 
direct taxes have failed to fulfil the revenue aspect, may in itself be 
an indicator to how much effect on income distribution such taxes have 
had. Clearly, the land and property owners bore no tax burden of any 
significance, and relatively the corporate sector, particularly the 
shareholding corporations were subject to the highest tax burden.
Although progressive tax rates have been used, the imposition of 
taxes appears to have no significant effect as to the redistribution of 
income. It is true that the application of progressive tax rates may 
be viewed as means of income redistribution. \ Yet it is equally true 
that unless certain conditions are met, progressive tax rates themselves 
are not enough to fulfil this function. The progressive tax rates 
should be fully applied to be effective.
It may be true that the considerable exemptions given to the public 
and private employees on earned income have had some effect on alleviating 
the tax burden on this segment of the society, however, to claim that 
by itself it has led to considerably lessening the degree of inequality
t
in Jordan is far from reality for two main reasons. On the one hand, it 
was only recently that such a measure was taken i.e. as recent as 1976.
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On the other hand, both the self-employed as well as the property 
owners bore no significant tax burden. More importantly, for such 
measures to be effective in an overall effect in narrowing the inequality 
gap between the rich and the poor must be accompanied by measures of 
applying the progressive tax rates to other groups particularly the 
self-employed, private companies and the like.
It is well in mind that the driving factor behind the government's 
discretionary changes, namely increasing the tax allowances, was the 
inflationary pressures which started in 1972. The aim was to eliminate 
or at least reduce unintended, and undesirable, redistribution affects 
in the general price level. Clearly, if a taxpayer's real income 
remains unchanged, an increase in nominal income results in either/or 
an increase in the taxpayer's tax liability as well as introducing 
people who have not been subject to tax into the tax net. This phenomena 
linking inflation and taxation is frequently referred to as the "fiscal 
drag". A report by a Committee of Enquiry into inflation and taxation 
in Australia recently concluded that "the interaction between inflation 
and an unchanged personal income tax rate schedule generates a 
redistribution of the tax burden through (a) dependants' and other 
fixed concessional deductions and (b) the progressive rate schedule.
i
Later on, it noted that this interaction "results in a different
distribution from that which is intended or was legislated and the
low income large family taxpayer categories are likely to be the groups
38most adversely affected"
The government has realized the possible effects of "fiscal drag" 
on income distribution and resorted to discretionary changes to minimize 
such an undesired effect instead of embarking upon a scheme of 38
38. As cited in O.E.C.D., "The Adjustment of Personal Imcome Tax Systems 
for Inflation". A Report by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs,
Paris, 1976, p.20.
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indexation. However, it should be noted that such discretionary 
changes came in two occasions separated by 4-5 years in each time.
If these changes are to materialize in preventing some or all the 
distributional effects they should be introduced either annually, if 
that is practical at all or at least be very frequent, say every two 
to three years at the most. Of course, this depends to a large extent 
on the administrative difficulties it imposes as well as perhaps the 
degree of lessening the effects of inflation the government is 
considering.
Another factor which is believed to have had some impact on income 
distribution in Jordan is the exemption of income accruing to residents 
from abroad, which is apart from the enormous revenue loss violates the 
equity criteria. There is no available data as yet concerning the 
distribution of Jordanians working abroad by income class. However, 
availabile evidence suggests that most Jordanians working abroad are 
highly skilled people, as the results of the Multipurpose Household 
Survey of 1977 showed, Table (4.13) below.
Table (4.13) Occupational Distribution of Jordanians
Working Abroad
l %
Engineers 2.3
Doctors 1.1
Chemists 0.9
Medical nurses 0.9
Accountants 3.8
Teachers 10.8
Administrators 2.9
Tailors 1.5
Blacksmiths and metal workers 3.9
Workers with mechanical skills 14.5
Construction workers 2.4
Drivers 1.9
Other occupations 47.8
Dent, of Statistics. The Multipurpose 
Household Survey, (Amman, 1976)
100.00
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As the Table above reveals about 50 per cent of the immigrants 
are among the middle and upper-income classes. In actual fact there 
has been some speculation recently that remittances from Jordanians 
working abroad are about to create a new class of land and estate 
owners new to the Jordanian scene. This was a stress to the fact that 
a large fraction of remittances is being invested in land speculation 
transactions.
Remittances from abroad not only adds to the ability-to-pay but is
considered a great source of income in the Jordanian case, particularly
when it is recognized that income from remittances is estimated at
JD 2 billion annually of which only JD 180 million is being remitted
39through the banking system , i.e. about 21% of G.N.P. in 1979.
There has been arguments about the feasibility of taxing income 
acruing to residents from abroad for some time. On the international 
level, this was first advocated by Bhagwati in 1972 on moral grounds, and 
the implications discussed by Bhagwati and Delfare in 1973. However, 
more recently the issue was given a more comprehensive economic, 
political and social evaluation^.
In the Jordanian case, opponents of including such income in the 
chargeable income are concerned with the possibility of the countryi
losing potential remittances, or considerable parts thereof, let alone the 
administrative difficulties that may jeopardise the compliance to the 
tax.
It is undoubtedly true that such a scheme entails a vast number of
39. Central Bank of Jordan, nInflationary Pressures and the Mobilization 
of Domestic Resources", An unpublished report prepared for the 
Jordan Development Conference, May 1976. See also, C.B.J. Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin, vol. 16, No. 5, May 1980 and C.B.J. Annual 
Report, 1979, p.82.
AO. See Koichi Hamada, "Taxing the Brain Drain", in J. Bhagwati (ed.)
The New International Order, The M.I.T. Bicentennial Studies (1977), 
p.125.
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administrative difficulties like any other new system. However, the
application of the system itself may give way over time to how to solve
arising problems. On the other hand, although it is difficult to
quantify in advance the potential loss of remittances if such a scheme is
to be introduced, yet one could safely argue that this possibility could
be markedly minimized if initially a flat rate equal to the first tax
bracket of 5% is levied, of course coupled with measures for allowing
appropriate credit to foreign taxes paid abroad. Certainly such a
proposal, if introduced, would boost the tax revenues as well as maximizing
the effect on income redistribution.
Data on the size distribution of income in Jordan is very scarce.
In fact, it was only in 1973 when the Economics Department of the R.S.S.
carried out the only survey on income distribution in Jordan. This
makes it extremely difficult to precisely substantiate the exact impact
direct taxes have had on income distribution, even in a very rough
indirect manner. However, the results of that survey showed that the
distribution of individual comprehensive income was more unequal in the
urban areas than in rural areas. While 70% of the population received
only 39% of income in the former, they received about 43% of income in 
41rural area . Comparing the results with othe^ developing countries
42showed that income distribution was more unequal in Jordan than that of 
Pakistan in 1970-71, with a Gini coefficient of 0.4253 in the former 
against 0.3645 in the latter. This is compared with a Gini coeff. of 
0.4647 in India and 0.5037 for Malaysia. But a developed country 
such as Korea has had a far less Gini coeff. of 0.3381 in 1971 which 
indicates a much better distribution of income than that which is to be 412
41. For details see Ghazi Assaf", The Size Distribution of Income in 
Jordan in 1973. (Amman : Royal Scientific Society, 1979).
42. Taking into consideration the percentage share of income by ordinal 
groups in urban households as the data available on other countries 
permits with the closest period of time possible.
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found in Jordan, Table 4.14.
Table (4.14) Percentage Share of Income in Urban 
Household in some Developed and Developing 
Countries
% of
Population
Malaysia
(1970)
India
67-68
Jordan
1973
Pakistan
70-71
Sri Lanka 
69-70
Korea
71
0-10 1.5 2.0 1.93 3.2 2.4 3.4
10-20 2.8 3.2 3.77 4.5 3.7 4.7
20.30 3.7 4.2 4.80 5.3 4.6 5.7
30-40 4.6 5.0 5.79 6.1 5.6 6.6
40-50 5.6 6.1 6.21 7.1 6.7 7.4
50-60 7.0 7.3 7.45 8.2 7.9 8.6
60-70 8.6 8.9 8.56 9.7 9.6 9.8
TV. 70-80 11.1 11.2 10.47 11.5 12.0 11.6
80-90 15.1 15.0 14.01 14.7 15.8 14.5
90-100 40.0 37.1 36.97 29.7 31.7 27.7
Gini Coef] 0.5037 
1__________
0.4647 0.4253 0.3645 0.4100 0.3381
Source : (i) Shail Jain, Size Distribution of Income : A 
Compilation of Data’* (Washington D.C. : World 
Bank Publications, 1975).
(ii) Ghazi Assaf, "The Size Distribution of Income 
in Jordan in 1973", op. cit.
Although any comparison of this kind should be taken with caution
\
due to the degree of data reliability in the various countries as 
well as the methods adopted, it nevertheless gives an idea, however 
crude, about the degree of income distribution in Jordan in relation to 
that of other countries.
By and large, one cannot say but that there is still a very 
significant and essential role of direct taxes within the fiscal 
system in Jordan to play in the area of income distribution. Perhaps 
it is worth noting again here that a better enforcement of income tax 
rates could prove to be crucial in this respect, as well as a more 
rigorous way of indexing income tax to inflation. This could possibly 
be done through the adaptation of an automatic indexing scheme.
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4.3 The Responsiveness of Direct Taxes
In evaluating a given tax structure, the responsiveness of tax 
revenue to change an income has often been singled out as a vital 
criteria. This response of taxes is usually measured by the tax 
elasticity and the built-in flexibility of the tax (some times termed 
tax bouyancy), the former measuring the automatic growth of revenue 
of a given tax in response to income while the latter includes the effect 
of discretionary changes, i.e. changes in the legal structure, tax 
rates and tax base, as well as improvements in tax administration or 
efficiency. The differentiation stems from the fact that the growth 
of the tax revenue may come from such discretionary changes rather than
.  _• 42an automatic one
In estimating the income elasticity of a given tax two main 
problems are usually singled out, (a) The mathematical formulation by 
which to estimate the elasticity of the tax revenue with respect to 
income, and (b) Isolating the discretionary measures concerning the 
tax rate and tax base and other administrative improvements.
As far as the first problem is concerned, the elasticity estimates, 
in general, are obtained through the application of a power function 
of the form, »
i
Tt - a Ytb (1)
where, Tfc is the tax yield and is national income or any income 
variant.
This equation could be transformed into a double logarithmic form 42
42. This element has been treated in a number of studies, see for 
example Raja J. Chelliah, "Trends in Taxation in Developing 
Countries", op. cit. pp.254-331; Alan R. Prest, "The Sensitivity 
of the Yield of Personal Income Tax in the United Kingdom", The 
Economic Journal, vol. LXXII, (1962) pp. 576-596; G.S. Sahota, 
Indian Tax Structure and Economic Development, (London, 1961); 
and J. Levin, *'The Effects of Economic Development on the Base 
of a Sales Tax : A Case Study of Columbia", I.M.F. Staff Papers, 
Vol. XV (1968), pp.30-101.
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given by,
Log T = log a + b log Y (2)
Equation two above contains an important assumption that the income
elasticity of the tax, given by the coefficient (b) is constant over
a range of income considered. Recently however, this constant income
elasticity has been subject to some criticism^.
The difficulty of isolating discretionary changes of tax rates or
tax base have been widely discussed in literature and several methods
of estimation have been developed. In general two methods have been
44frequently discussed and considered here in turn . The first method 
used figures of actual tax receipts and data on the monetary value of 
the legal tax base and the corresponding tax rates. Figures of actual 
tax receipts are then divided by indices of base and rate changes, 
yielding a series of net discretionary changes. This method is 
particularly suitable where data on legal tax bases and tax rates are 
available. Unfortunately such data is not available on Jordanian 
taxes as was alluded to before in this chapter.
Prest,^ on the other hand, in his estimation of the sensitivity 
of personal income tax yield in the U.K., used ,an alternative method ofI
separating the effects of the discretionary changes. His method 435
43. See for example N.M. Singer "Estimating State Income - Tax 
Revenues : A New Approach", The Review of Economics and Statistics,
Nov. 1970, who advocates a non-constant income elasticity or more 
specifically a declining one; also see M.J. Wasylenke, "An Estimation 
of Elasticity of the New York State Personal Income Tax", Occasional 
Paper No. 13 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Metropolitan Studies Program, Syracuse
University, March 1974); a n d-------------  , "Estimating the Elasticity
of State Personal Income Taxes", National Tax Journal, March 1975.
44. C.Y. Mansfield,."Elasticity and Bouyancy of a Tax System : A Method 
Applied to Paraguay", I.M.F. Staff Papers, vol. 21, No.2, July 1972.
45. A.R. Prest, "The Sensitivity of the Yield of Personal Income Tax 
in the United Kingdom", op. cit.,
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involves two subsequent steps. First, a preliminary series of adjusted 
tax yields is prepared by subtracting from the actual yield for each 
year the estimated amount attributed to the discretionary changes in 
that year. This "adjusted" series is then further refined by the 
application of the formula discussed below to form the "final" series that 
excludes the continuing impact of each discretionary change on future 
years, so that the elasticity of a given tax structure in the base year 
may be estimated.
46The Prest formula may be explained symbolically as follows :
(a) T^, T^, .... T^, T^ are actual tax yields for a series of years.
(b) D^, T>2 * •••• measures the effects of a discretionary change 
in the t ^  year on the tt 1^ revenue return.
(c) T^j indicates the j**1 year's actual tax yield adjusted to the tax 
structure that existed in year i.
If i - 1 is the base year, the series T ^ ,  T ^ »  T ^  •••♦ T^t ...T 
represents what the tax would have been if the tax structure had 
remained as in year one with all discretionary changes moved from the 
years following year one. This theory could therefore be developed as
lfollows : '
T
1 1
i H
t-*
T
1 2
■  T
2
T13 m T 23
T14 m T 34
T T.J-l.J x J-2.J-1T.J-1
T
T
23
3
x
T
T
12
2
46. C.Y. Mansfield, op. cit., p.429
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However, this method could not be applied in the case of Jordan 
as well, due to reasons already stated before. Instead, ah alternative, 
but a more approximate, method was used. The data was divided, in the 
case of income tax, first into three chronological periods; (i) 1954-1963 
which were characterized by no tax rate changes, (ii) 1954-1970, which 
although there were no significant changes yet it captured the introduction 
of the 1964 law; and (iii) 1954-1979 which captures, among other things, 
the effects of changes in the administrative machine, the growth of the 
tax base and changes in the allowances and concessions as described in 
section one. The same chronological periods classification were then 
applied to property taxes . . . .
The model which will be used to measure the elasticity relationship 
is the simple least squares regression equation of the double-logarithmic 
form of the form,
Log T.t - a + 8 log Yt
where, T^ is the yield of income tax, and,
Y is G.D.P. at factor cost current prices.
\
The results are given in the following equations,
(i) 1954-1963
Log T._ ■ -5.14 + 1.09 Log G.D.P.it
(13.3)
2R ■ 0.96 DW ■ 2.60 No of observations * 10
and figures in parenthesis are t-values.
The income elasticity of the income tax during this period is 
1.09. When the period was extended to cover 1954-1970, during which 
the 1964 law was enacted, yet now changes in tax rates have taken place,
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the results are given by the following :
Log Tit - -6.13 + 1.33 log GDP -
(14.26)
2R ” 0.93 DW = 1.47 No of observations ■ 17
The tax elasticity during this period is (1.33). This indicates 
that the addition of the seven year period had increased the tax 
elasticity by (0.24), which could be attributed to the autonomous 
growth rather than to discretionary changes. However, taking the 
whole period into account, 1954-1979, i.e. adding another nine-years 
during which most of the changes in the tax rate and tax base have taken 
place, the results are given by the regression equation,
Log T.t - -7.48 + 1.63 log GDP^
(13.13)
2R ” 0.97 DW ■ 1.55 No of observations - 24
Clearly the tax elasticity has increased to 1.63. One could 
conclude from this change in the elasticity that, the introduction of 
the last period i.e. 1971-1979 during which discretionary changes have 
taken place has its impact in increasing the tax elasticity, which 
might be considered to have come mainly due to discretionary changes in
t
addition to the autonomous growth of the tax.
However, one should be absolutely clear about the fact that this 
kind of analysis leaves us no way nearer verifying each of the effects 
of tax rate and tax base changes to reach to the proper tax elasticity 
estimation. Yet the continuous improvement in the tax elasticity may 
indicate an improvement in tax effort particularly during the 1970's. 
This is, of course, a proxy method and in no way could be considered a 
substitute for the proper isolation of tax base and tax rate change's 
effect on the tax elasticity.
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However, another common technique for estimating the income 
elasticity of income tax when exogenous changes occur in such a functional 
relationship is to introduce a dummy variable for each exogenous change. 
Three dummy variables were then introduced to cater for the discretionary 
changes along with variables for income and prices. This method could 
only be applied for the period 1967-79 for two main reasons. On the 
one hand, inflationary pressures as was mentioned in several instances in 
this study, started only during this period particularly since 1972. On 
the other hand, prior to *1967 there has been no price index which was 
only introduced since then.
Accordingly, a linear relationship was fitted with the inclusion of 
three dummy variables reflecting changes in rates and taxable income base 
during 1975, 1976 and 1979 respectively. The type of equation fitted may 
be written as:
h
T. « a + by +cAP + E d.D.l 3 . , i ii=l
This equation was also transformed into double-log and semi-log 
forms. The simple linear form, as written above, gave the best fit to 
the data, and the results are given in the following.
T. = - 3.97 + 0.041 Y - 0.06 AP + 2.81 D, -.0.77 D. - 0.87 D.
l  1  | 2  3
(21.03) (-1.34) (3.28) (-0.91) (-0.78)
R2 - 0.99 . DW - 2.37 DF = 7
where,
T. * income taxl
Y = GDP at market prices
AP = Change in the consumer price index
°i(i“l»2,3) Dummy variables for changes in tax rates and tax base during the years 1975, 1976 and 
1979 respectively, and
figures in parentheses represent t-values
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From the above equation.clearly the only significant variables 
were found to be Y and D^. Therefore, at first we dropped the ¿p 
variable and no significant change took place, then all variables 
which were not statistically significant were dropped and only significant 
ones were retained, the results are given in the following equation,
T. =■ - 4.09 + 0.038 Y + 2.63 D,l 1
(29.29) (3.18)
R2 = 0.99 DW = 2.37 DF » 8
and the variables are as explained above.
The results in the above equation show that the two variables 
explained most of the variations in income tax, and both were significant 
at the 1% level of confidence. The DW-statistic associated with the 
equation ruled out the existence of autocorrelation. In order to 
estimate the income elasticity of income tax without the discretionary 
changes, we calculate the T. from the above equation and then this was 
re-run against Y. The results are :
T. - -3.84 + 0.0378 Yl
(30.04)
R2 - 0.98 DW = 2.15 DF - 11%
\
Here it is clear that Y was highly significant at the 1% level 
and there was no autocorrelation. Utilizing equation (2) page (74) 
we calculated the elasticity which was found to be (1.51). This result 
confirmed our previous results and certainly this is a good sign.
In what follows we intend to argue for the introduction of a 
capital gains tax, also arguments for or against considering death 
duties are presented.
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4.4 A Case for Some Other Selected Direct Taxes
Our concern in this section is to briefly embark upon an appraisal 
of the arguments and the potential applicability of two main direct 
taxes, namely a capital gains tax and death duties, the absence of which 
may probably have contributed to a more unequitable distribution of the 
tax burden in Jordan.
4.4.1 Taxation of Capital Gains
It is generally accepted that capital gains form a proper source of 
taxation in developing countries. A capital gains tax is one that is 
levied on the appreciation of capital assets and is commonly imposed 
only when the increase in value is realized through sales or exchange^, 
i.e. capital gains taxation on the basis of realization and not on the 
basis of accrual^.
Capital gains in developing countries are mainly from land speculation, 
sale or exchange of real estate, rather than from securities as is the 
case in developed countries. Speculation booms in real estate values 
have occurred in recent periods both in developed and developing countries.
This may have induced the argument that the resulting transfer of resources
. 49is a considerable deterrent to economic growth
In developing countries, the increased speculation in property could
be explained by the existence of a number of fators, the most important
of which are the following:
(i) The lack of developed capital markets, let alone there existence 
in most developing countries;
47. Juanita D. Amatong, "Taxation of Capital Gains in Developing countries", 
I.M.F. Staff Papers, vol. XV, No.2, (July 1968) pp. 344-384. 48*
48. In spite of the fact that generally the tax is commonly imposed on 
the realization of the gains, however it is worth noting that this 
area is still subject to academic debate as to whether the basis 
of the tax should be on the realization or accrual of the increase 
in the value of capital assets.
49. See John W. Lowe, "Land Speculation, Does it have a Real Economic 
Consequence?", Finance and Development, vol. 12, 3, 1975, p.30.
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(ii) A means for hedging against inflation;
(iii) The considerable growth of urban centres;
(iv) The concentration of wealth, in these countries, in the form 
of real estate;
(v) The widespread use of bearer shares, which makes it difficult 
to enforce a tax on capital gains arising from securities'^*
The above features which are considered a stimulus for real estate 
speculation are widely at work in the Jordanian economy. During the 
1970's, the demand for land as a value-accumulating capital increased 
drastically. This demand is governed by three main motives: First, 
the lack of a capital market, which was only recently established in 
early 1978, made investment possibilities limited, therefore the 
capital was often geared towards the purchase of land. Secondly, the 
inflationary pressures which started in 1972, coupled with excessive 
liquidity in the economy owing to the large amounts of remittances 
by Jordanians working abroad, made investment in land not only the 
best way to secure the value of currency but to also make the best 
possible return in a very short period, due to the spiralling prices 
of land generally at a much faster rate than other prices. In view of 
the absence of a capital market, the expectancy, of a land price 
increase was of the same nature as the expectancy, in developed countries, 
for an increase in stock value. Even after three years of having a 
capital market in Amman, land speculation has not subsided and is 
still considered the best way for investment.
It is argued however, that the appreciation of capital assets 
during an inflationary period is merely a paper gain therefore, illusory. 
Because inflation raises the nominal value of assets without a 
corresponding increase in real values, some economists oppose a tax 50
50. Juanita D. Amatong, op. cit., p.346.
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on capital gains under inflationary conditions .
However, capital gains taxation in developing countries may generally
be justified both on equity and economic grounds. The equity reason
for taxing capital gains must take into consideration the taxpayer's
ability-to-pay and the benefits he receives from the government. Capital
gains increases the taxpayer's ability to pay to the extent that it
makes him better off. However, it is to be recognised that the ability-
to-pay principal does little to indicate the appropriate magnitude of 
52the tax . On the other hand, it is argued that the upper bracket 
taxpayers may probably feel that, under the progressive income tax, 
they are paying proportionately more in comparison to the benefits they 
receive. However, it is equally argued, apart from the effect of 
inflation, capital gains come about as a result of the general economic 
development which is largely created, inter alia, by government spending 
therefore, benefiting those taxpayers both directly and indirectly.
By and large, taxing capital gains on equity grounds, as means of 
income and wealth redistribution, is fully justified particularly if taken 
from the point of view of the ability-to-pay principle. Certainly there 
is no justification in taxing earned income and leaving aside unearned
income in the form of capital gains. The United Kingdom Royal1
Commission on Taxation noted that "capital gains increase a person's 
taxable capacity by increasing his power to spend or save, and since 
capital gains are not distributed among the different members of the 
taxpaying community in fair proportion to their taxable incomes but 
are concentrated in the hands of property owners (and particularly 
the owners of equity shares) their exclusion from the scope of taxation 
constitutes a Serious discrimination in favour of a particular class 512
51. Ibid., p.356.
52. Henery C. Wallich, "Taxation of Capital Gains in the Light of 
Recent Economic Development", The National Tax Journal, vol. XVII 
No. 2, (June 1965), pp. 135-150.
175
of taxpayers".
The effects of capital gains on economic development are particularly 
pronounced on the supply of saving and the composition of investment.
On the one hand, it is argued that a capital gains tax reduces savings 
more than an income tax of the same yield because of the nature of the 
former, i.e. being a non-recurrent tax, it is likely to be paid out of 
capital. However, one may equally argue that if this is true it would 
affect private savings, yet the overall savings rate may not necessarily 
be affected because it would be merely a transformation of private 
savings to government savings.
Moreover, it is argued that capital gains are not likely to be depend 
ed upon to finance consumption expenditures and those who receive
54capital gains are not likely to increase their consumption substantially 
It is suggested that preferential treatment of capital gains affects 
the composition of investment in that a capital gains tax at a low rate 
induces the transfer of resources from those which yield income tax at 
higher rates to those which yield capital gains. Also, lower tax rates 
on capital gains than on ordinary income favour the retention of profits 
in the corporate sector rather than re-investing them, therefore reducing 
the availability of funds for new investments^? '
In addition to the above argument, it is acknowledged that several 
problems may be envisaged when a capital gains tax is imposed. Briefly, 
such problems could be summarized in the following:
(i) The Lock-in Effect : This effect has been subject to a great deal 
of controversy. This effect is associated with the rate of a tax 
on capital gains. It is held by a number of economists that a 534
53. The Royal Commission on Taxation of Profits and Income, Final 
Report, (London, 1955), p.365.
54. For more details see Wallic, op. cit., p.142.
55. Ragner Nurske, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped 
Countries. (New York : Oxford Univ. Press, 1953), pp.4-31.
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capital gains tax may inhibit the sale of capital assets which have 
appreciated in value"*^. Accordingly, this may well result in a 
reservation of the price of assets and a reduction in the flow of 
funds as was argued earlier. However, it is not yet clear how 
strong this effect is, and in case that it is strong, how much is 
its effect on the economy.
Hinrich, argues implicitly that the lock-in effect is strong, 
by concluding that a cut in tax rates would increase revenues'*^. 
However, in the. United States the lock-in effect of the capital 
gains tax has been attacked^.
(ii) The administration difficulties of the capital gains tax has been 
emphasized. To administer a capital gains tax properly, records 
of property held; the length of the period during which they are 
being held; original costs, etc. are required.
(iii) There are a range of difficulties in detecting capital gains other 
than those due to land.
However, in spite of the fact that such difficulties may prove to 
be in existence in the case of Jordan particularly to those relevant to 
property other than land. Yet in view of the fact that no real estate 
transaction, sales or transfer, is considered yalid without registration 
in the Lands and Survey Department's records, one is bound to argue that 
administering such a tax may not entail serious problems. Moreover, 
due to the fact that rechannelling of investments from real estate 
speculation into more socially productive investments is particularly 
needed in this phase of development, it is my strong belief that a 
capital gains tax will prove to be highly productive, provided the 567*
56. Amatong, op. cit., p.360
57. See Harley H. Hinrich, "An Empirical Measure of Investments
Responsiveness to Differentials in Capital Gains Tax Rates Among 
Income GEoups," National Tax Journal, Sept. 1963.
58 Ibid, p.361.
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existence of a political well as to its introduction.
It should be noted in this context that early in 1973 the government
of Jordan was convinced that the right economic environment exists for
a capital gains tax, particularly as an instrument for tapping
speculative gains from real estate. Therefore, a capital gains tax
of a rate of 20% on gains resulting from the acquisition or sale of
58lands, buildings, and shares of shareholding companies was imposed .
In spite of the fact that this rate of the tax was probably not high
enough because those who receive such gains may well be in the upper
bracket on the income tax schedule, however, it was considered a
positive move on the part of the government. However, due most
probably, to the political pressure groups the law did not last long
59and was repealed in 1974
There is no doubt in my mind that, the conditions that led to the 
consideration of the tax in 1973, were further accentuated by the 
developments in the economy that took place since then, and given further 
support for the need of a capital gains tax.
4.4.2 Death Duties
Literature dealing with the financial theory often distinguishes 
between two main forms of death taxation. These forms are an estateI
tax and an inheritance tax. The estate tax may be regarded as "the 
testator's last tax", and the inheritance tax be regarded as "the 
first tax on the inheritor^. According to the first view point, 
the rates for a death duty should depend on the total size of the 
inheritance, i.e. the tax base comprises all the assets minus the 
liabilities of the deceased person at the time of his death. According
58. Government of Jordan, Provisional Law No. 53 of 1973. Official 
Gazette, No. 2450, P.213, Oct. 8, 1973.
59. Official Gazette, No. 2488, p.708 60
60. Leif Johansen, Public Economics, (Amsterdam : North-Holland 
Publishing Co., 1965), p.205.
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to the second point of view, an inheritance tax is levied on the property 
received by the beneficiaries.
The justification of death duties relies heavily on equity criteria 
in the sense that property gained through inheritance denies the 
members of the society the right of equal opportunity; the non-taxation 
of such inheritance leads to a concentration of wealth and increases the 
ability to pay of the beneficiaries. On the same grounds, presumably 
death duties work to break the concentration of wealth as well as 
reaching some of the income not reached by the income tax, therefore 
considered an equitable tax.
Although death duties may not be regarded as an important source 
of revenue, their application is fundamental to the redistribution of 
income. The relative importance of revenues from death duties in 
developed countries as a percentage of GNP has been very low. For 
example, the ratio was in 1969 as follows, United Kingdom 0.82;
Belgium 0.34; France 0.20; Germany 0.07; Italy 0.22; and the U.S.
0.4861 62.
Moreover, any system of death taxation encounters basic obstacles,
which are not easily overcome in a logical and feasible fashion. Such
62problems or obstacles could be summarized by the following :
\
(i) The tax must apply to a base which does not involve a market 
transaction. Consequently, no automatic valuation is possible;
a deliberate administrative valuation of property must be made, as 
with property tax, a task which is very difficult to achieve 
particularly with complex estates.
(ii) The transfer of property is not limited to death occasion; the existence
61. M.A. Rogers, "The Taxation of Personal Wealth in the United Kingdom:
An Appraisal of the Argument for Extending the Tax Base of the 
Present System". Unpublished M.Sc. Dissertation, U.C.N.W., 1974.
62. John F. Due, Government Finance : An Economic Analysis, (Homewood,
111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1959), pp. 360-362.
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of a death tax may stimulate the making of gift before death, 
hence a gift tax has to be simultaneously applied.
(iii) The peoples anticipation of death and death tax effects may 
stimulate the adjustment of property holdings, which will 
greatly determine the final tax liability.
(iv) Another disadvantage of inheritance tax is that payment of tax 
has to be deferred until the heirs have been ascertained and the 
estate is available for distribution.
However, taking into account the above arguments, the Five Year
63Plan recommended that the government introduce a death tax, more 
specifically an inheritance tax. Yet in view of the absence of any 
detailed discussion of the form of tax, it is assumed that its intro­
duction is still an open question.
Among other Middle Eastern countries, the Sudan introduced an 
64estate tax in 1974 with a differential or progressive tax rates in 
accord with the degree of consanguinity. Special tax rates were 
applied to the first group of heirs, i.e. children, wives, and parents 
of the deceased. For the second class of heirs the tax rates are 
doubled. In Saudi Arabia estate tax is imposed in accordance with the 
provisions of the Koran. Syria and Morocco apply progressive inheritance 
taxes, differentiated according to the degree of consanquinity and the 
size of the benefit. In all these countries the revenues generated from 
death duties were minimal^.
Notwithstanding the fact that there is precedent for the introduction 
of a death tax in Arab and Muslem countries, coupled with the fact that 
a death tax has an advantage in terms of equity, yet it would be more advisable 
that scarce administrative efforts should be used for potentially more
63. National Planning Council, The Five Year Development Plan, 1976-1980. 
(Amman: 1976) p.
64. Ahmad Salamah, "Financing Economic Development with Particular 
Reference to Taxation „in' Sudan", Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. U.C.N.W.,1976
65. For more details see Ahmad Imam." »Le droit de succession dans la religion 
islamique" Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, vol 30 (1976),
pp. 367-79.
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lucrative sources.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
^The analysis of direct taxes advanced in this chapter revealed that,
direct taxes have failed to achieve any of its macro-objectives as part
of the objectives of the fiscal system in general. This was probably
a result of two main factors. Some deficiencies in the legislation
itself on the one hand, and more importantly administration weaknesses
aggravated by political pressures and the characteristics of the economy.^ 
//
The income tax law grants the taxpayer, particularly those on the 
top bracket, generous allowances coupled with a limitation on the income 
tax base to cover income only generated within the country. The 
administration is so far unable to reach, in a proper way, a wide range 
of taxpayers particularly traders, professions and self-employed. This 
situation may be a result of both the reasons alluded to above, as 
well as problems from within the department aggravated by the failure 
on the party of the government to back it up either morally or 
physically in terms of developing its staff capabilities, equipment, and 
more incentives to recruit highly capable people.
On the other hand, it was clear that the bulk of the growth in 
income tax, particularly during the seventies, came from the growing 
corporate sector, having in mind that the law exempted all but a small 
number of government employees. The former sector is still seen to be 
of great potential for income taxation. However, if a better utilization 
in its taxable capacity is to be fruitful, then a number of issues as 
discussed in the text have to be confronted such as, introducing a new 
differential rate; tax on dividend be set-off and refundable; 
set-off of loss carry foward against half chargeable income in the first 
six subsequent years should be reconsidered etc.
Most important of all is that of property taxation, which probably 
needs more attention in the administration of the taxes and proper 
implementation of the law. This could prove to be extremely important
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if direct taxes are to be an instrument of fiscal policy, and if they are 
to achieve any of the prescribed objectives of the fiscal system. Measures 
of better administration, preventing the delinquency of the tax, and 
restricting, to the largest extent possible, of the number of the appeal 
cases, as well as revision of the rental and capital values of lands and 
buildings more frequently, all are points in hand.
Finally, twe more direct taxes argument about which were presented, 
i.e. capital gains tax and death duties, should be given a priority 
in terms of their introduction. It is strongly aknowledged that failure 
to introduce these taxes may hamper the achieving of some of the tax 
system's objectives, particularly the redistribution objective. It 
is hoped that the arguments for and against these two taxes could provide 
a background for more fruitful discussion in favour of their introduction.
In Chapter five our attention is given to an anlysis of the indirect 
taxes in Jordan, by which a more complete assessment of the tax system 
of Jordan and its consequences will be presented.
\
\
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CHAPTER FIVE
INDIRECT TAXES : STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT
An indirect tax is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as one
which is "not levied directly upon the person on whom it ultimately
falls, but charged in some other way, especially upon the production or
importation of articles of use or consumption, the price of which is
thereby augmented to the consumer, who thus pays the tax in the form of
increased price". Such a definition combines some aspects of indirect
taxes, that is, the administrative; the base of the tax; shifting and
incidence of the tax. Accordingly, one way of distinguishing indirect
from direct taxes, is through reference to the fact that the former is
not directly levied upon the person who ultimately bears the tax through
its imposition on goods and services produced domestically or imported.
Another way of distinction between the two forms of taxes is by reference
to shifting and incidence of the tax. It has often been suggested, as
it is obvious in the above definition, that indirect taxes are shifted'
forward to the consumers from the corporations through price adjustments
while on the other hand, direct taxes are imposed on persons or households
and are not easily shifted. However, more recently there has been reason
to suggest that corporate profit tax, which is a direct tax on corporations
can be shifted forward to consumers as much as any indirect tax*-.
Accordingly, it could be argued that so far there has been some ambiguities
as to definition, nevertheless the distinction is still widely used
based on simple criteria of administration and perhaps political.
1. See B.C. Mehta, "Short-Run Incidence of Corporate Income Tax in India", 
The Indian Economic Journal, vol. 26, July 1978; Martin Krzyzanik and 
Richard A. Musgrave, The Shifting of the Corporation Income Tax ; An 
Empirical Study of its Short Run Effect upon the Rate of Return, The 
John Hopkins Press, 1963; Karl W. Roskamp, "The Shifting of Taxes on 
Business Income : The case of West German Corporations", National Tax 
Journal, vol. XVIII, No. 3, Sept. 1965, pp.247-254; Gurcharam S. Lumas, 
"The Shifting of the Corporation Income Tax in India", Economia 
Internazionale, vol. 22, 1969, pp. 283-291.
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significance, if nothing else.
By and large, indirect taxes may be categorized into sub-groups of
2interest on the following features :
(a) One product vs. many products : levies on one product such as 
tobacco; alcohol, betting etc. are often levied at very high rates 
compared with other taxes on broad ranges of goods.
(b) Ad Valorem vs. Specific taxes : the tax may be graded as to the 
value or the number of units of purchase or sale.
(c) Single-stage vs. multi-stage taxes : a tax may be levied at the 
manufacturing, wholesale or retail stages of production or at several 
stages of production and distribution process, and
(d) Gross value vs. net value : at whatever stage the tax may be levied, 
some deduction may be allowed from the value which is taxed or not. „
This much said, the present chapter analyses indirect taxes by 
focussing on .their structure and development. Areas of possible reforms 
are singled out. In section one, taxes levied on international trade, 
namely, import and export duties, are dealt with. This is followed in 
section two with a further look into the excise system dealing whenever 
possible with excises on the product level with an examination of the 
basis for expanding the excise system. Section three focuses on otheri
\
taxes on service and transactions, singling out the two most important 
taxes, i.e. the land and building sales tax and that on automobile 
registration and licencing, examining both of them in some detail.
Section four completes the analysis by computing the elasticities of 
indirect taxes and their results analysed.
2. Douglas Dosser, "Indirect Taxation and Economic Development", in 
in Milton Taylor (ed.), Taxation for African Economic Development, 
(London : Hutchinson Educational, 1970).
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5.1 Taxes on International Trade
In the present section* taxes levied on international transactions 
are discussed. Both customs duties with their supplements and export 
taxes are presented in turn.
5.1.1 Taxes on Imports
5.1.1.1 The Structure of Customs Duties
Customs duties are considered among the oldest forms of taxation
imposed upon the importation of goods. As observed by Hinrichs,
"... Simple direct taxes, such as the poll tax, are the pioneer forms
of taxation, but customs typically came to play a major role in tax
3structure as development progressed from the most primitive years ". 
Developing countries came to rely significantly on customs duties to 
finance development programmes or more specifically generating higher 
revenues, because essentially these countries started from depending on 
agricultural production and fulfilling their consumption needs through
*
imports particularly in the early development phases.^ Even when developing 
economies get under way in the process of development they are bound to. 
have open economies not only to meet their consumption needs, but also 
for capital and intermediate goods necessary for development in later 
stages. '
<:ustoms duties have several advantages. The most obvious one, is that 
they are considered administratively easier to implement than other forms 
of taxation because it is easy to spot imports on ports of entry, 
and therefore provide the much needed sums of revenues for development 
financing. Although it is recognised that a better enforcement needs 
relatively more trained personnel, yet it is generally held that they have 
the added advantage that their cost/revenue ratio is relatively small in 
comparison with other taxes.
3. H. Hinrichs, A General Theory of Tax Structure Change During Economic 
Development, (Cambridge : Harvard Law School, 1966).
185
In designing tariff structures, developed countries very often find
themselves constrained by international agreements on trade and therefore
may be vulnerable to retaliation. As for small developing countries, they
seem to have the added advantage in that respect of having a small economy
as most recently defined by Steedman as "one whose relative importance
in world trade is sufficiently small that the economic actions of its
capitalists and its government will have no effect on the relative prices
4at which commodities are exchanged on the world market". To that extent, 
small economies with equally small share of world trade are more able to 
avoid retaliation to their tariff policies.
Moreover, custom duties are considered a valuable tool in restricting 
imports of consumer goods, particularly those which are considered 
"luxuries", as well as capital goods which deemed to be unnecessary, at 
the time, for the development efforts."* In that context, to the extent 
that the duties are successful in restricting imports of consumer goods, 
they may positively affect the saving/GNP ratio in the economy. However, 
this may be qualified in the sense that the less the people find other 
alternative spending channels, either in the form of domestically produced 
goods or other forms of spending, i.e. expensive overseas holidays, the 
more the effect on the saving/GNP ratio.
Furthermore, it is held that customs duties are less likely to interfere 
with incentives in the economy in comparison with other domestic taxes.
More importantly, the government could influence the form of investments 
in the economy through the variation of rates on imported capital goods.
This is particularly important when a choice between capital intensive vs. 
labour intensive technology is necessary to cater for labour market situations. 
While it is recognised that direct intervention in the planning process to 45
4. I. Steedman, Trade Amongst Growing Economics (London : The Macmillan 
Press Ltd, 1980), p.35.
5. J.F. Due, Indirect Taxation in Developing Economies. (London : The 
John Hopkins Press, 1970.
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bring about the desired c.apital development is considered easier to 
implement, however, even then customs duties could be a useful tool to 
facilitate the planning process and to achieving the planned goals.
In addition to the fulfilment of revenue objectives, which are 
by far the most important in most cases, governments could cater for 
the equity criteria through the application of differential rates among 
necessities vis-a-vis luxury consumption mainly consumed by the upper 
income groups, in essence affecting the income distribution to a more 
equitable one.
However, this is by no means to suggest that custom duties are 
always and everywhere advantageous. They have a number of objections, 
depending on the particular design and structure of rates and implementation 
in each country and unless they are properly designed and compatible with 
the economic aims and priorities, they may as well result in several 
unwanted implications in the economy in contrast with the overall 
development strategy.
Having highlighted the advantages of customs duties in general, 
our attention is given below to the particular structure in Jordan.
1. Customs Duties (Regular Tariff)
The introduction of the tariff system in Jordan dates back to 1926 
when the first customs and excise law was introduced. Up to 1957, several 
minor changes took place and were mainly due to a changing political 
situation (see chapter one), thus affecting the geographical applicability 
of the law particularly during the early fifties. However, by 1962 a new 
tariff schedule was introduced, which is still in force, along with 
occasional changes to meet the changing development situation in the country. 
Therefore, currently the basic enabling statute for customs tariff is 
contained in the Customs and Excise Law No. 1 of 1962, as amended in 
various occasions, most recently published in November 1980._
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/yJordan's tariff policy is basically guided by the revenue objective 
and to a lesser extent by equity and development considerations.^ In 
general, import duties are higher on consumer goods and consumer durables, 
more moderate on intermediate and capital goods. Average nominal 
import duties^ on 17 major product groups corresponding to relevant 
Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN) chapters are given in Table (5.1).
These figures roughly indicate the import duty structure and its range.
These average product group duties show a range between 11% for 
agricultural products to 113% on beverages and tobacco in the consumer 
goods category in 1975 which was obviously increased relatively to 117% 
for the latter in 1979. As for the intermediate goods, it ranges from 
about 8% on mineral products to about 27% on articles of stone, glass 
and material products. While for capital goods, the range varied 
from a low of 6% for railway, aircraft and ships to 52.4% for transport 
motor vehicles and 20% for machinery, equipment and tools. Changes in 
some of the rates particularly for chemicals and footwear took place in 
1976. Therefore, the average nominal duty decreased from 19.9% and 
81.7% in 1975 to 17.9% and 50.0% respectively in 1979. On the other 
hand those on textiles and textile articles were moderately increased for 
protection of local industry purposes and resulted in a relative increase 
in the average duty from 40.9% in 1975 to 43.1% in 1979.
However, the above ranges of average duties are qualified by heavy 
exemptions. Such exemptions broadly include: (a) imports of machinery 
and equipment either for the main industries such as phosphate, cement, potasch;
and Jordanian air lines, or for the industrial sector in general to meet
✓
the provisions of the Encouragement of Investment Law. (b) Import of 6
6. It should be noted that each group represents an aggregate of products 
from the corresponding BTN chapters, and on the other hand the values 
of the average nominal duty represent the basic charged i.e. regular 
tariff, plus other surcharges before exemptions.
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Government departments and the military establishment, (c) Imports 
of scientific, religous and charitable institutions as well as those 
of the diplomatic corps, (d) Equipment and agricultural machinery.
(e) Imports of the Civil and Military consumer Associations.
Jordan's tariff system was primarily based on specific duty rates 
during the 1950's. This was compatible with the administrative 
machinery and the level of economic development in general at the time. 
Specific rates were preferred mainly for their ease of application 
and to avoid the valuation problem, not to mention the fact that 
evading the tax by understating the value of imports was less likely. 
However, by the early sixties with the country entering a new era of 
economic development and planning and particularly with the introduction 
of the 1962 tariff schedule, the limitations of the specific duties 
were recognized. On the one hand, the range of imports diversified 
both in character and prices. Specific duty discriminated against 
cheaper brands of imports by applying the same rates irrespective of 
the price of the goods involved and in turn this may not be compatible, 
with the equity criteria and made the tariff system more regressive.
On the other hand, the revenue of import duties did not take into account 
the change in prices and this makes the revenue inelastic, i.e. no 
matter how the price changes the revenue is- not affected. This fact 
was even more recognised in periods of inflationary pressures in the 
early seventies.
The above reasons led to the dominance of Ad valorem duties in 1962 
tariff rates. However, specific rates were retained for certain items 
such as tea, cereals, beverages, tobacco and some petroleum products. 
Moreover, in the case of motor vehicles specific duties were retained in 
combination with ad valorem duties, i.e. a certain amount per weight plus 
an a<i valorem percentage of the value of the vehicle related to its 
engine capacity and model. However, more recently the government
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recognized the complexity of motor vehicle taxation and the whole
system was changed by retaining the ad valorem duty with some modifications.
2. Other Supplements to Customs? Tariff
On top of the regular tariff, Jordan, like some other developing 
countries apply other supplementary surcharges on imports. These 
surcharges represent a substantial percentage of the value of imports 
and very often imposed without exemption. On top of these surcharges 
are the so called Unified Additional Taxes on imports introduced by Law 
No. 25 of 1966 and Regulation No. 80 of 1966. Essentially these are 
ad valorem supplements to the tariff dually providing substantial revenues. 
Perhaps the reason behind the imposition of such surcharges in their 
separate character is politically motivated rather than economical or 
logical reasons. This is because originally these surcharges were 
earmarked for certain interests and projects to which little opposition 
from the public could be expected in contrast to that if they were added 
directly to the tariff rates. However, lately the earmarking has been 
gradually waived out and the revenue geared directly to the government 
budget. These surcharges represent a total of 11% of the value of
imports subject to tariff according to Regulation No. 82 of 1979, and
\
\
constitute the following:
5.5% Additional Unified Fees 
0.5% Social Services Tax.
5.0% Credited to other Departments as follows:
2.0% For Municipalities
2.5% For The University of Jordan
0.5% For Hussien Sports City.
Apart from the above, Law No. 28 of 1969 imposed an additional tax 
on imports, namely,
a 2.0% of the value of imports (c.i.f.) exempted from Customs tariff.
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1.0% of the value of imports (c.i.f.) subject to Customs tariff.
However, a number of imported commodities are subject to differential 
taxes instead of the above 3.0%. Such goods include (a) a 20.0% of the 
value of tariff on alcoholic drinks, (b) a specific surcharge of 
800 fils/ton of cement; 500 and 250 fils per tyre of large and small 
motor vehicles respectively, and (c) 10% of the value of tariff on a 
range of 19 products such as tobacco, and household appliances^.
Over and above, the law also imposes an import licence fee of 
4.0% of the value of all imports in accordance with import Regulation 
No. 78 of 1976, excluding a number of items, particularly those imported
g
by Government Departments . This fee is payable when the import order 
is placed and was originally intended as a protection measure and an 
instrument of balance of payments policy.
5.1.1.2 Revenue Significance of Import Duties
Import duties represent the single most important item in the 
Jordanian tax system. In absolute terms, revenues maintained an ever, 
rising trend over the period under consideration. Between 1955 and 1966, 
revenue increased from about JD 4.0 million to JD 10.1 million, however, 
their share in total indirect taxes has been declining over time. For 
example, while they represent 83% of indirect taxes in 1955 this rate 
dropped to 59% in 1967. As of 1967, however, import duty revenues 
picked up again both in absolute as well as relative terms and reached 
an unprecedented figure of JD 86 million in 1979, or about 73% of total 
indirect taxes, Table (5.2). When total domestic revenues are considered, 
import duties still formed over 40% on average, and during the last four 
years i.e. 1976-1979 that ratio even reached over 50%. Their ratio to 78
7. For more details see Ministry of Finance/Customs. Customs Tariff 
Schedule. (Amman : Nov. 1980).
8. A list of the exempted imports and institutions is to be found in 
Regulation No. 76 of 1976, Official Gazette, No. 2654, 1976.
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GDP in turn followed the same trend declining steadily before 1967 to 
reach a low of 5.5%, yet during the period 1967-1979 their share in 
GDP increased gradually to form about 13% in 1979.
The nominal rates of growth of import duties during the period 
1955-1960 was 8.5%, dropped to 7.3% during 1961-1967. However for 
that of .1968-1973 the duties grew by 10.5% on average. The last 
period however, i.e. 1974-79 marked an unprecedented rate of growth 
of about 35%. This significant rate of growth was perhaps due to two
main reasons. On the one hand, that period marked the launching
of two development plans during which both public and private expenditures 
reached a peak, and of course this expenditure increase was reflected in 
similar large scale increase in imports be it consumer goods or capital 
and intermediate goods. On the other hand, this large rate of growth 
disguised the inflationary period which accompanied the expansion of the 
economic activity during the same period.
Due to the importance of revenues from import duties as a share in 
domestic revenue, the government has always been concerned about the 
stability of its revenues particularly relevant to its bid to increase the 
level of domestic revenues both in absolute terms as well as a share
i
in total revenues. Customs revenues have been affected by three main 
factors, namely, the choice of the level of the base for imposing the 
tax, i.e. the level of protection, the changing structure of imports, and 
the level of exemptions.
So far as the first factor is concerned, as was indicated earlier 
the main basis for imposing the tax has been relying mainly on ad^  valorem 
basis, and this is desirable mainly because it reflects, among other 
things, the adjustment of the revenue automatically in line with the 
ever changing international prices which are in turn reflected in an 
increasing import bill. However, the government had to have an eye on 
those items which are subject to specific tax, particularly imports related
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Table (5.2) Relative Importance of Import Duties, 
1955 - 1979
Year
Import 
Duties in 
JD million
Percent 
of Indirect 
Taxes
Percent 
of Domestic 
Revenue
Percent 
of total 
Revenue
Percent
of
GDP
1955 3.969 83.0 16.9 7.7
1956 3.986 81.5 45.9 15.5 8.9
1957 4.743 81.3 24.7 15.4 7.1
1958 4.493 67.1 39.8 14.8 6.6
1959 5.770 68.7 43.4 16.1 7.6
1960 6.225 67.0 44.8 16.8 6.6
1961 6.007 60.3 40.9 15.5 6.1
1962 6.777 61.9 32.1 15.3 5.6
1963 8.179 66.9 42.3 19.5 6.8
1964 9.192 66.2 38.6 17.8 7.1
1965 11.842 65.7 44.4 23.4 7.9
1966 10.115 64.8 44.0 24.9 6.0
1967 9.533 59.2 37.4 13.5 5.5
1968 10.969 63.5 41.6 15.2 8.3
1979 12.397 59.8 38.2 16.2 7.9
1970 11.696 62.7 38.9 17.1 6.3
1971 10.253 51.2 28.8 13.0 5.5
1972 12.841 53.4 30.3 13.5 6.1
1973 16.401 54.8 35.6> 15.9 7.5
1974 21.833 58.7 33.5 ' 15.7 8.8
1975 28.060 58.1 34.1 14.1 10.0
1976 52.470 68.2 50.0 27.5 14.3
1977 78.192 76.6 55.9 24.4 16.3
1978 81.385 75.5 49.7 26.1 14.3
1979 86.440 72.6 47.5 19.7 12.6
Source : See Relevant Tables in the Appendix
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to alcoholic drinks and .tobacco, not only to keep up the level of
revenues generated from such items but also to maintain a protective
umbrella for local industry. Although such policy may yield the
desired revenues yet in certain instances, particularly in the area of
tobacco products, the level of protection seems to be high enough to
invite a relatively large scale smuggling as will be discussed later in
\
this chapter. By and large, it could be maintained that in relying 
on acl valorem form as a floor for customs revenues the government seems 
to have managed to keep the level of revenues increasing in absolute 
terms, coupled of course with the frequent increases in the specific tax 
on other imports.
On the other hand, the pace that the revenues from customs duties 
has taken over the past two decades or more seem to have been dependent 
to a considerable extent on the magnitude of taxable imports, prices and 
income elasticity of demand for imports. During the 1950's consumer
r 'goods imports represented around 80J of tptal imports and as such 
provided an ample base for a growing customs revenue. However, as of' 
the early sixties the share of consumer goods imports in total imports 
started a steady decline. For example, while it was about 76% in 1955-56
.iit dropped to 51% in 1968, Table (5.3). This was perhaps a resultant 
factor of the development phase in which Jordan started in the mid-sixties 
in launching two development programmes, therefore increasing imports of 
capital and intermediate goods relative to consumer goods. And given 
the fact that the largest part of customs duties is generated from 
imports of consumer goods, then it is reasonable to suggest that although 
the increase in total imports led to growing import duties in nominal 
terms, however caused a drop in the relative share of customs duties 
in total domestic revenues. This picture was further given support in 
the latter period 1969-1979 in which a strong relationship between the 
share of imports of consumer goods and that of customs duties took place,
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Table t(5.3) Total Imports Classified by Final Use, 1950-1975
(in Millions of JD's)
Consumer Goods Capital Goods IntermediateGoods Total
value % value % value %
1950 8.4 78 0.4 4 2.0 18 10.8
1951 12.5 80 0.5 3 2.7 17 15.7
1952 13.0 75 1.2 7 3.1 18 17.3
1955 20.6 76 2.5 10 3.9 14 27.1
1956 . 21.2 76 2.9 11 3.7 13 27.8
1958 24.7 73 4.2 12 5.1 15 34.0
1959 25.2 63 4.5 11 10.3 26 40.0
1961 27.5 66 4.4 10 9.4 24 41.9
1962 27.9 61 5.0 11 12.7 28 45.6
1963 32.9 65 3.1 6 14.9 29 50.9
1964 34.8 65 4.2 8 14.6 27 53.6
1965 34.6 62 3.9 7 17.6 31 56.1
1966 42.2 62 5.7 8 20.3 30 68.2
1967 29.6 54 5.4 \ 9 * 20.0 36 55.0
1968 29.4 51 4.8 8 23.3 41 57.5
1969 36.6 54 7.5 11 33.6 35 67.7
1970 36.2 55 5.4 8 24.3 36 65.9
1971 44.4 58 10.9 15 21.3 26 76.6
1972 60.8 63 10.2 11 24.3 25 95.3
1973 85.3 78 5.9 5 17.5 16 108.7
1974 97.7 62 23.3 15 35.4 22 156.4«
1975 135.0 67 23.0 11 45.0 22 203.0
Source : (i) Department of Statistics, Flow of Goods in 
The Jordanian Economy, Amman (April 1970)
(ii) National Planning Council, The Five Year 
Development Plan, 1976-1980.
(iii) Department of Statistics, Unpublished data.
in the sense that the revival of consumer imports resulted in similar steady 
%
increase in customs duties.
/However, during the last decade the government was able to increase 
its revenue from customs duties by imposing a wide range of additional 
taxes to supplement the former. This is evident if one looks at the 
relative importance of import licencing revenues and that of the additional 
tax, both of which represent.' over 18% of the total import duties in 1979 
or about JD 15 million.
Nevertheless, although such efforts may result in an increase in the
level of revenues in the short run, yet the overriding objective should
be the creation of an income elastic duty system that provides an
automatic increase in the revenues from import duties in the long run.
9Taking into consideration the present drive for import substitution , 
the revenue from customs duties is bound to take a declining course due 
to the erosion in the base of the tax, basically consumer goods imports 
as well as the sizable exemptions for purp’oses of investment promotion.
It is therefore rather obvious that a new course of policy for the medium 
and long-term future development might be needed, if greater revenues
as well as a progressive distribution of the tax burden of indirect taxes
\
are to be achieved. This objective could possibly be achieved through 
facing the problem dually on two main fronts, that is, keeping up the 
current level of customs duties by reducing to the greatest extent possible 
the unnecessary exemptions on the one hand, and a policy of greater 
reliance on other internal indirect taxes to substitute the erosion of 
customs duties over time on the other hand.
5.1.1.3 Protection, Regulation and Resource Allocation
If the ratio of customs duties revenues to total imports is taken to 9
9. The government is embarking on an ambitious industrialization programme 
within the framework of the new Five Year Development Plan for the 
period 1981-1985.
197
^represent the overall average level of tariff ., then one would
conclude that the general level of tariffs in Jordan is low compared 
to many LDCs^. However, the overall average tariffs level may not 
accurately represent the level of protection in Jordan for two main 
reasons: First, during the late fifties and mid-sixties Jordan placed 
a greater emphasis on imports quantitative restrictions than that on 
tariff. This emphasis was mainly based on classifying goods into 
four main categories, namely in (a) those which competed with locally 
produced goods; (b) goods which are not competitive with domestic 
production, for which no domestic production exists; (c) complementary 
products, that is, goods of which there was local production, however, 
not enough to satisfy domestic needs, and (d) raw materials and capital 
goods. The level of quantitive restrictions was therefore related to 
the domestic needs of the economy with the above classification the 
base for distinction. This implies in effect that no overall policy 
was perceived but rather ad[ hoc decision making pertaining to the 
immediate needs of the economy. Secondly, since the industrial sector 
was not yet sufficiently developed only a relatively small fraction of 
imports were competitive with domestically produced goods, as explained 
before, duties on which determine the level of tariff production. During 
the 1960's, particularly with the launching of the Five Year and Seven 
Year Development Programmes, the degree of protection granted to the 
industrial sector tended to increase. Still however, the emergence of 
a relatively strong protectionist tendency was based on import classifications 
and hence quantitative restriction rather than tariff were the basis of 
policy using to that end bureaucratic regulations by either prohibiting 
the importation of certain commodities, limiting other goods importation 
to certain countries; and subjecting others to the system of import 10
10 H. Mazur, "Economic Growth and Development in Jordan, op.cit. p.222.
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licencing. After 1967 and the resultant pressures on government 
revenues, tariff rates were increased for revenue purposes, however 
this did not result in increased protection because excises and other 
domestic taxes were simultaneously increased for the same reason, 
i.e. revenue raising purposes.
By 1972, the government authorities started voicing their
dissatisfaction with the resultant effect of the protection policy.
In fact, the governments preoccupation with the development of the
industrial sector has led to gearing its protective policy, which was
frequently coupled with internal price regulations as well as monopoly
control of the market resulted in creating internal frictions and resource
misallocation among the productive sectors in the economy. It is not
surprizing in fact to see that the agricultural sector has been
declining over time in terms of its overall contribution to GDP as
well as the level of employment it provides. Not only government policy 
' / ■
resulted in more and more capital and human resources being geared to the 
industrial sector, but in view of its internal regulatory policy which 
accompanied the industrial protection led to a wide range of inefficiency 
in the industrial sector on the one hand, and made new investments in theti
agricultural sector reluctant. As alluded to earlier, this situation 
was recognized by 1973 and was clearly stated in the Plans preamble which 
stated that "Prices of some locally manufactured products are higher than 
those of similar imported ones because some of the existing domestic 
industries have enjoyed excessive protection advantages and privileges.
Hence, these industries have ignored the need for improving the quality 
of their products or even reducing production costs; Moreover, failure 
to adopt clearly defined principles and regulations governing licensing, 
protection and exemptions, ..., have all encouraged the prevalence of 
inadequacies"^. 1
11. National Planning Council. The Three Year Development Plan, 1973-1975,
p.112.
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' As a consequence of the recognition of the resultant resource 
allocation effects, Jordan's protective policy moved in the mid 1970's 
towards lower reliance on import restrictions and more reliance on 
tariffs. As we already mentioned earlier, the 1976 tariff measures 
reduced tariff rates on imports competitive with local industries 
including textiles, footwear, paints and liquid batteries.
Such a liberalization attitude towards protection is certainly 
welcomed. In order to lessen the impact on resource allocation, it 
may seem reasonable to suggest that duties on machinery and equipment 
be reduced from the current average rate of 23%. On the other hand, 
duties on motor vehicles used for transportation could follow suit.
It is apparent that duties on consumer goods are highest amongst others, 
attention should be given to this area in order not to attract a more than 
proportional investment in consumer industries. This may have a long­
term effect on the composition of the industrial sector itself as well as 
- /
on the economy at large. A coordination and harmonization policy 
between customs duties, and excise and other indirect taxes is likely to 
be a must if more distortions are to be avoided.
5.1.2 Taxes on Exports
5.1.2.1. General Arguments for Export Taxes
™ “ 11 i — -  a- ,
In view of the need for raising adequate revenues to finance economic 
development, coupled with the fact that their economies are not yet 
prepared for more sophisticated methods of resource redirection through 
income and broadly based taxes, many developing countries resorted to 
imposing export taxes.
The most outstanding reason for the imposition of export taxes is 
simple expediency, however, several arguments based on ability-to-pay and 
revenue productiveness could be advanced. Moreover, obvious administrative 
simplicity as well as flexibility and widespread political desirability
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are points in hand.
Unlike several indirect taxes, export taxes are politically favoured
because they appear to have little direct effect on the population, a
factor which is certainly important in developing countries. However,
the effectiveness of such taxes as a source of revenue- is dependent to
a large extent on both the volume and nature of exports. Therefore, they
tend to fluctuate in a similar fashion to that of the exports themselves.
In that sense, the history of export taxes is one of discontinuous
growth. Their upsurge tend to coincide with export booms, their
12decline and disuse correspond with trade contraction . On the other 
hand, primary products and particularly agricultural products tend to 
fluctuate more than mineral products for example, depending both on local 
demand as well as weather conditions.
Notwithstanding the motivations and needs underlying the imposition 
of an export tax, it i^ alleged that the tax may inhibit the growth oft• f
the export sector as well as interfering in resource allocation. In 
developing countries embarking upon industrialization programmes with 
the aim of solving their balance of payments problems, mobilizing the export 
sector is a necessity. It would seem rather important then to keep export 
taxes at a very low level particularly in the early stages of development 
in order to lessen the possible restrictive effect of the tax on the 
growth of exports. Some countries even go further in providing subsidies 
for the export orientated industries to make them more competitive in 
foreign markets.
It is argued however, that an export tax would stimulate output
particularly in countries relying mainly on agricultural exports. This
is because, it is contended, that farmers would have to work harder to
13achieve their income aspiration. Good and others , argued in that 123
12. See J.V. Levin, The Export Economics, 1960, p.263
13. Richard Good, et al.,w Role of Export Taxes in Developing Countries". 
I.M.F. Staff Papers, vol. 14 (Nov. 1966) pp.453-501.
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respect that these possibilities cannot be dismissed, but a growing 
body of experience, statistical studies, and expert opinion indicates 
that in most areas the price elasticity of supply of primary products 
is positive and not negligible.
Unlike many other developing countries, Jordan has practically no
significant export taxes, apart from an export tax on phosphates,
ceramic tiles and cement products with a very minor export fee. The main
reasons underlying the governments abstention from imposing tax on
exports could be referred to (a) the high concentration of exports in
a small range of primary products, and (b) it was only relatively
recently that import substituting industries began to emerge, consequently
such firms need an "infancy" period, during which they concentrate on
the home market. This may lead to an easy transition into export 
14markets . This warrants a brief examination of the composition of
Jordan's exports. * t
-  /
5.1.2.2. Export Composition
As was already mentioned, Jordan relies on few exports concentrated 
in mining and agricultural products. Table (5.4) shows the contribution 
of the main groups of exports to the export total. The figures indicate 
that despite the overall rate of growth of total ^exports, they are still 
concentrated in mining and agricultural products. It was however, only 
in the last four to five years that other manufactured goods started to 
account for a significant share of total exports. Up to 1975, exports 
of mining (mainly phosphates) and agricultural products accounted for more 
than three quarters of total exports, while exports of manufactured 
goods made up around 20% of the total. During the early seventies it is 14
14. For a discussion of the impact of export concentration see N.G.
Khalaf, "Country Size and Trade Concentration", Journal of Development 
Studies, vol.ll, No.l, 1974, see also D.B. Keesing, "Outward-Looking 
Policies and Economic Development", The Economic Journal, vol. 77,
No. 306, 1967
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obvious that mining exports share had risen to more than 50% of total 
exports, at the same time manufacturing exports increased considerably.
Furthermore, the relatively high degree of commodity concentration 
in Jordan's exports was accompanied by a relatively high degree of 
geographical concentration*^. The situation led, at least partially, 
to instability in Jordan's exports either in fluctuating prices or 
that of the volume of exports. It is worth mentioning here that in 
times of low agricultural production the governments agencies, particularly 
the Ministry of Supply, steps in the market with regulatory measures either 
price controls or banning exports altogether of the much needed items.
In opening the borders of exporting agricultural products, the government 
intends to allow the farmers to make some profits to alleviate the 
pressures on internal markets. On that basis it would seem out of the 
question to impose export taxes on agricultural products due to domestic 
economic conditions.^ Moreover, even if the government imposes such a 
tax, the same conditions would make such meagre revenues unstable and, 
in fact, undesirable. By and large, perhaps the important thing that 
one can derive from the above discussion is the fact that the nature of 
concentration in Jordan's exports conditions made the introduction of any signi­
ficant export tax hard and thus could be the underlying factor behind the 
lack of initiative on the part of the government. It seems therefore, 
if such taxes are to be thought of then it would only be in the area of 
manufacturing exports. This course of action would not be consistant 
with the general development strategy of promoting outward looking 
policies to cater for balance of payment problems. In general, the 
government has been concentrating in the last decade, and certainly in 
the new Five Year Plan 1981-1985, on promoting import-substitution and 
exports, therefore any policy contradicting this direction would not be 15
15. Ziad M.Fariz, "The Role of Foreign Trade in the Economic Development 
of Jordan", op.cit., p.59.
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Table (5.A) Composition of Jordan's Exports by. Group of 
Products, 1960-1979 (in million of JD)
Year
Mining Agriculture Manufactured
Food
Other
Manufacturing
Total
vâlué % value % value % value %. value
f
z
1960 1.346 38.6 1.736 52.1 0.193 5.5 0.206 5.9 3.481 100.0
1961 1.660 39.0 2.109 49.6 0.237 5.6 0.246 5.8 4.252 100.0
1962 1.568 31.8 2.769 56.2 0.320 6.5 0.272 5.5 4.929 100.0
1963 1.537 27.8 2.778 41.3 0.580 10.7 0.618 11.2 5.522 100.0
1964 2.470 35.2 3.125 44.6 0.395 5.6 1.022 14.6 7.012 100.0
1965 2.547 32.9 3.771 48.6 0.452 5.8 0.982 12.7 7.752 100.0
1966 3.258 37.2 3.991 45.6 0.483 5.5 1.026 11.7 8.759 100.0
1967 3.512 35.0 4.368 43.7 0.557 5.6 1.547 15.7 9.984 100.0
1968 4.258 35.1 5.262 43.0 0.589 4.8 2.063 17.1 12.122 100.0
1969 4.108 34.5 5.134 43.1 0.755 6.3 1.910 16.1 11.907 100.0
1970 2.580 27.6 4.352 46.6 0.436 4.9 1.952 20.9 9.320 100.0
1971 2.733 30.9 3 »240 36.8 0.799 9.1 2.0451 23.2 8.817 100.0
1972 5.443 '43.2 ' 4.330 35.0 0.533 4.2 2.297 18.2 12.606 100.0
1973 5.496 26.0 4.508 32.2 0.266 1.8 3.340 23.0 14.010 100.0
1974 23.775 60.2 9.015 22.0 1.115 2.8 5.532 14.0 39.433 100.0
1975 21.453 53.3 9.609 23.0 0.959 2.3 8.054 20.0 40.075 100.0
1976 20.078 40.5 16.379 33.1 - - 13.-095 26.4 49.552 100.0
1977 18.880 31.3 2Q.643 34.3 - - 20.730 34.4 60.253 100.0
1978 20.691 32.3 16.336 25.5 - - 27.102 42.2 64.129 100.0
1979 27.557 33.4 21.239 25.7 - - 33.760 40.9 82.556 100.0
Source : (i) Department of Statistics, Flow of Imports in the 
Jordanian Economy, 1958-1968, (Amman : Dept of 
Statistics Press, 1970)
(ii) Department of Statistics, unpublished data
(iii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statitical 
Bulletin, vol. 16, No. 12, December, 1980
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welcomed. On that background, below, the main export tax on phosphate 
and other levies are presented.
5.1.2.3. Export Duties
Jordan levies an export tax on phosphate rock exports which only 
recently was extended to cover Mosaic and Cement products. In addition 
two minor export fees are charged.
(1) The Phosphate Export Tax
The phosphate rock industry is considered one of Jordan's key 
industries in terms of production, employment and foreign exchange 
earnings. In 1976 for example, it provided employment for 2866 persons, 
and the ratio of its exports to the country's total exports reached 
38.8%, as well as constituting about 5% of GDP^.
Inspired by the need to raise additional revenues, the government 
imposed in 1974 on exported raw phosphate a specific tax of JD 6 per 
metric ton. Over the period 1962-1972, the Jordanian selling price 
of phosphate was ranging from JD 3.75-4.06. However, the 1974 boom of 
world prices resulted in escalating the Jordanian selling price to 
JD 13.9 per metric ton. This upsurge in prices coupled with aiicontinuous increase in production and sales has led to windfall gains to 
the company, an opportunity which the government spared no time to capture 
by raising the tax on exports in January 1975 from JD 6 to JD 11 per ton. 
This increase in the tax rate provided the government with ample funds 
amounting to JD 6.91 and JD 11.02 million in 1974 and 1975 respectively, 
in addition to the company's income tax of JD 2.12 and JD 0.73 million 
during the same two years^.
16. Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, vol. 17 
No. 2, Feb. 1981.
17. For relevant data see Ministry of Finance, Annual Reports, 1974-1979; 
see also Zuhair Khalifeh, op.cit., Table VI.23, p.200.
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However, the revenue bonanza resulting mainly from the price hike
did not last long. The underlying factors could possibly be two main
reasons; On the one hand the price of phosphate in the international
market is not a stable one because the demand is linked to the agricultural
production cycle as well as general world economic conditions. Changes
in the world market did not take long to have the price hike subsided
and dropped to about JD 9.0. On the other hand, the rise in the unit-cost
18of processing was increasing considerably to reach about JD 7.0 by 1975 
These changes put the company in a difficult financial position, and 
therefore was not able to meet its 1975 and 1976 tax obligations.
In view of the above, it is recognised that such an export tax 
creates price, output and revenue effects according to the elasticity of 
supply and demand of phosphate. Such a specific export tax on Jordan's 
exports seems to be inappropriate. First, as was argued earlier, this 
form of tax rate do^s not take into consideration the changes in prices, 
hence leading to an instability in government revenues. Furthermore, 
Jordan's exports are nothing but a small fraction of the world demand.
In fact Jordan is a price taker in the world phosphate market not
capable of influencing world prices.
\
It is therefore rather obvious, that given this position in the
♦
world market the imposition of such a specific tax rate will not 
eventually lead to a high foreign exchange. The reduction in foreign
exchange earnings will be greater as the world demand became more and
, \
more price elastic; at the same time government's revenue will be 
reduced unless supply is completely inelastic. Moreover, since Jordan 
faces an extremely strong competition in the supply of phosphate in 
the world market, government revenue from this tax is likely to be 18
18. By 1975 the unit-cost of processing was 50% higher than that of the 
Morrocan phosphate which is considered the main competitor to the 
Jordanian phosphates in the world markets.
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reduced each time the tax is raised, not only in terms of the export
tax revenue itself but also due to the fact that the company cannot
afford losing its market, if it does, the consequent drop in i.
its profitability would adversely affect the governments' revenue from
19both returns on its shares as well as company profit tax , not to
mention the loss of foreign exchange earnings of the company.
Given the fact that the main characteristics of tax revenue from
exports is the variability of revenues and the destabilization of
. 2 0domestic income, Lewis advocated stabilizing export incomes by 
varying tax rates in the same direction as export prices. Taking into 
consideration that Jordan's phosphate exports faces, in general, an 
elastic foreign demand and inelastic domestic supply, it seem then 
that it would be more reasonable in order to stabilize government revenue 
and ensuring better- conditions for a profitable industry, that the 
specific export tax should be replaced by an ad valorem one with varying 
tax rates. Such a change will take into account the nature of the 
market, allowing for price and demand changes and contributing to a 
stable source of government revenue. _
(2) Other Export Taxes
In addition to the phosphate tax, it was onl? recently that the 
government has imposed an export tax on some manufactured exports such as 
marble, tiles and mosaic and cement bricks. The tax was introduced by 
Regulation No. 62 of 1976, again a specific one levied as follows:
(1) An 800 fils/square meter of marble
(2) 400 fils/square meter of ceramic tiles, and
(3) A 5 fils/kg of cement bricks 1920
19. It is worth noting here that the government owns 89% of the Jordan 
Phosphate Company's shares with the rest owned by private shareholders.
20. W.A. Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth, 1955, p.291
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However, given the fact that exports of these materials are still in 
the very early stage, the impact of the tax either in terms of revenues, 
which is still negligible, or other economic effects are yet to be seen. 
In addition to the above two export taxes proper,Jordan imposes 
general supplementary fees these include:
(a) Export Inspection fees: This is a levy imposed on the value of 
exports in an a<i valorem form of 1% according to article 9 of the 
Customs and Excise Law. However, the list of exemptions which include 
among other things for example, re-exports of foreign goods and all
the countries agricultural, animal and industrial products makes it 
negligible at best, and,
(b) Unified export tax of 1% of those exports subject to the previous 
inspection fees.
These two fees are, as said before, negligible and the wide range 
$
of exemptions negates even their existence.
\
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5.2 Jordan’s Excise Taxation
Traditionally excise taxes are imposed on domestically produced
goods. As industrial development begins, it. is natural to start
with import-substituting industries and therefore producing commodities
that previously were subject to custom duties and yielded considerable
sums of revenue. It is therefore not surprizing to see that revenue
consideration in developing countries are almost always in the forefront
of the argument for excise taxation. Selective excise taxes, if
properly designed, may be used for revenue raising purposes particularly
21to compensate the lost revenue due to import substitution. Chelliah 
suggested in this respect that this could be achieved if excises are 
confined to commodities that satisfy at least one or more of the 
following characteristics:
(1) Low price elasticity of demand
(2) High income elasticity of demand
(3) Goods absorbing scarce factors needed in the public sector, and
(4) Luxuries consumed by the well-to-do.
Accordingly, for the revenue raising objective the tax would provide 
ample revenues if imposed on widely consumed goods with such characteristics
On the other hand, excise taxes could achieve a sumptuary objective, 
that is to say, they can be used to limit consumption of commodities 
which may be considered undesirable for one reason or another. Achieving 
this, 'it could be argued, may as well redirect resources from consumption 
spending into savings and hence provide more resources for the much 
needed investments. In Jordan, as may well be the case in most developing 
countries, the rationalization of both private and public consumption 21
21. R.J. Chelliah, "Taxation of Consumption Expenditure with Special
Reference to India", In R. Bird and 0.Oldman, (eds) Readings on
Taxation in Underdeveloped Countries. (Baltimore: The John
Hopkins Press, 1967).
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has been over the years one of the major objectives sought after in 
the successive development plans.
However, unless excise taxation is properly designed and implemented 
it may have a detrimental effect on resource allocation and hence an 
adverse effect on economic development. This is because instead of 
limiting consumption of certain products, excises may lead to undesired 
substitution effects, consumers'shift consumption to cheaper alternatives. 
Moreover, it is also conceivable that a similar shift of resources from 
producing goods to the services sector may occur, particularly where 
services are not properly taxed, a shift which is very often not desired 
especially in an economy characterized by a structural imbalance towards 
the services sector such as that of Jordan's, as was alluded to in 
chapter one.
The tax is generally administratively feasible, particularly where
the system is limited to a few items, and since the tax is generally
/ .
imposed on mass consumed goods it is elastic in terms of revenues, i.e. 
a small increase in rates yields relatively large sums of revenues 
with low administrative cost. _
In spite of the obviously desired characteristics, the tax may 
not satisfy the equity criteria. For one, being imposed on goods 
with mass consumption it does not differentiate between the poor and 
the well-to-do, therefore its burden on the poor is likely to be 
significant. It may be incompatible with the ability to pay of the 
people.
5.2.1 Excisable Goods and Nature of the Tax
Perhaps the most important objectives of the excise taxes are two,
t
namely revenues and equity, the fulfilment of both of which depends to a 
large extent on a numbeir of characteristics related to the economy 
itself. More often than not, the two objectives are not compatible
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therefore a choice has to be made for either of them. For example, 
if the tax is to he imposed on luxuries a price increase may lead 
to a contraction in demand hence negatively affecting the revenue aspect 
of the tax, however, the tax is at the same time fulfilling the equity 
objective because its burden is more properly distributed and relatively 
affecting the well-to-do more than the poor. On the other hand, if 
the tax is being imposed on items of widespread use, while maintaining 
revenues, it nevertheless violates the usual standards of equity. It 
is clear therefore, that a successful excise tax is conditioned by the 
consumption pattern of commodities suitable for excise taxation that 
provide in general a more acceptable distribution of the tax burden.
Moreover, the nature of production as well as the distributional 
channels is bound to affect the imposition and implementation of the 
tax. For example, the more the production is concentrated in medium 
or large scale indpstries easily identifiable the more successful the 
tax. By contrast, the more intensive is the small scale artisans and 
retail producers and sellers the less feasible the tax may be and perhaps 
the cost of administration, even if the administration capacity is 
available, would be far more than the collection of the tax itself.
i
The goods that are almost always the main candidates for excise taxation
♦
in most countries are virtually the same, i.e. tobacco, alcoholic and petroleum 
products. These are the earliest commodities ideal for taxation for many 
reasons matching the above conditions. On the one hand, use is almost 
always widespread and their demand is price inelastic. Except for petroleum, 
their consumption does not contribute to economic development and they 
are socially considered undesirable. Particularly in countries such as 
Jordan because of religious reasons alcohplic consumption is morally
objectionable. Generally, there are few major producers which make it
(
administratively easier to administer. On the one hand, once a refining 
industry is established, motor fuel or petroleum products in general comes
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into the net of taxation. The motives for its taxation are two-fold.
Firstly, there is the revenue aspect in terms of not only raising new
revenues but also compensating for the loss of a major source of customs
duties. Secondly, and perhaps as important, it depends on the benefit
principle of taxation with the equity criteria in mind. Taxation
of motor fuel is justified on equity grounds for charging the users of
the road system. The provisions of expenditures for roads are considered
a commercial activity hence charging road users is justified on the
benefits they derive from the road system.
Concern is not only given to the nature and justification of
potential candidates for excise taxation, but also to the nature of the
tax itself. Excise tax in the vast majority of countries are specific
in nature per unit of production, which is often the souce of criticism.
Due suggests that "specific rates are the source of some complaint,
» *
particularly over thdir discrimination against cheaper brands of the 
commodities such as cigarettes, which has distorted resource allocation 
by lessening relative use. At the same time, since the cheaper brands 
are used primarily by the lower income groups, the taxes are more
regressive than otherwise. The purchaser pays no more tax on the most
\
expensive whisky than on the cheapest; thus the relative after-tax price 
differential is lower^' . In addition, the tax does not take into 
consideration price changes particularly in an inflation era.
5.2.2 Tax Rates and Related Levies in Jordan.
Jordan is not distinctive from other countries in terms of the 
excisable goods or the nature of the tax. Table (5.5) provides a
list of the commodities subject to excise and related levies and the
/
tax rates applicable. The first excise law was passed in 1928 and 
was applied to alcoholic products followed in 1929 by the inclusion of
22« J.F. Due, op.cit. p.61'.
Table (5.5) Jordan's Excisable Goods and Duties Rates 
Levied, 1979 (Value figures in fils)
Product
Tobacco Products 
Tobacco 
Cigarettes 
Tombac
Snuff
Cigarette
paper
Matches
Alcoholic Products 
Araq (100/15) 
Cognac (100/15) 
Wine 
Beer
Pure alcohol 
(100/15)
Mixed alcohol
Other liquors 
(100/15)
Denatural alcohols 
(100/15)
Petroleum Products
Benzine
Kerosine
Avitech
Avitôr
White spirit 
Propan gaz 
Mineral Oil 
Solar
Cemen t
Excise Unified Additional Total
Duties Tax Tax Other Levies
1 2 3 4 5
1.272/kg 1.272/kg
— 20/20 Cig.a 5/20 Cig? 5/20 Cig.c 30/20 Cig.
480/kg - 5/30gr. - 6.5/30gr.(packs)
1.440/kg 1.440/kg
0.5/ 1000 5/1000 5.5/1000leaves leaves leaves
100/gross
100/lt 145%d
A
i o z e 255/lt
125/lt 145 %d
0)oT—
t 319/lt
50/lt 145£d
A
107* 128/lt
40/11 U 07. i o z e • t  / 100/lt
75/lt 45Zd 107.* 116/lt
32/lt 45%d
A
107* 50/lt
175/lt 120%a IQS® 403/lt
\ 10/1t 45Zd 10Ze 16/lt
5.5/lt - 4/lt!*8 9.5/lt
— — - l/lt.f 1/lt
7/11 - - l/lt.f 8/lt
4 .6/11 - - l/lt.f 5.6/lt
7/lt - - l/lt.f 8/lt
8/kg — - l/kg.f 9 /kg
70/kg — - - 70/kg
1.5/lt / - - 1.5/lt
7200/ton 800/ton 8000/ton
(cont.)
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Table (5.5) continued.
Product ExciseDuties
1
Unified
Tax
2
Additional 
Tax 
3 .
Other
4
Total
Levies
5
Soap
Toilet 2/100 gr. 2/100 gr.
Other 20000/ton - - - 20000/ton
Toothpaste, 
Shaving cream
Tube 10/70 gr. 10/70 gr.
Other 15/tube - - - 15/tube
Detergents (net) 70000/ton - - - 70000/ton
Vegetable Oil 10/kg - - - 10/kg
Cast Iron 5000/ton - - - 5000/ton
Liquid batteries*1 various.
/
— 1
Source : Information supplied by the Customs and Excise Department 
Law No. 28 and No. 64 of 1969; Law No. 59 of 1976.
Notes r:
(a) Excluding the brand name Lulu
(b) Excluding the brand names Lulu and Sport
(c) Excluding the brand names Kamal. This is called an 
encouragement tax proceeds of which are earmarked to 
subsidize tobacco growers; 10 fils per pack of 20 is 
levied on Lulu, Kamal and Samar cigarettes.
(d) Unified tax is taken as a percentage of the excise 
duty of the respective item.
(e) 10% of excise duty on each item
(f) Earmarked for municipalities
(g) 2 fils/lt earmarked for villages
(h) The tax on liquid batteries is collected in accordance 
with the Domestic Production Fees System No. 47 of 1971. 
This takes into account the type, of the batteries.
/
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tobacco products. The rates were very small for example, Cognac 
excise tax was then 10 fils/lt; pure alcohol 50 fils/lt, and mixed 
alcohol 10 fils/lt. While that on cigarettes was 500 fils/kg; 
tobacco 250 fils/kg and tombac 250 fils/kg. Two more products were 
introduced in 1950, namely, salt and matches, but were and still are 
negligible in terms of revenues. However, by 1960 the Jordan Refinery 
Co. was established and naturally petroleum products were automatically 
subjected to excise tax by Law No. 36 of 1960. Since than a very few 
products were added to the excise list including, cast iron; liquid 
batteries; cement; vegetable oil and detergents. Furthermore, woollen 
textiles and paints were added to the list in 1971, however, by 1976 
both excises which contributed very little to revenues were withdrawn, 
so was the old duty on salt.
Clearly, Jordan's excise system is limited in coverage. The most
, • i
important items in the excise list are tobacco; petroleum products; 
and cement. Alcoholic products are not important due to religious 
reasons that prevail in most Moslem countries which in effect restrict 
its consumption. The rates applicable to each commodity are given in 
Table (5.5). It is clear that as is the case in custom duties, the
i
basic excise tax is supplemented by the unified and additional tax 
mainly on tobacco products and alcohols, as well as other taxes on 
petroleum products earmarked for municipalities and villages. The 
implications and significance of the tax rates are discussed below
, r
mainly concerning cigarettes and petroleum products which are by far the 
most important of all.
5.2.3 The Growth of the Tax
/
Although limited in coverage as was already indicated, Jordan's 
excise system is relatively productive of revenues. Up to 1960, excise 
revenues were relatively small and contributed less than 5 percent to
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total indirect taxes. However, the introduction of Petroleum 
products, vegetable oil and liquid pattaries led to sudden increase in 
total excises to 13.4 percent of indirect taxes. As table 5.6 shows, 
revenues from excises increased in absolute terms from JD 1.5 million 
in 1960 to JD 6.0 million in 1970 and continued a rising trend to 
reach a record high of JD 17.8 million in 1979, a 15 per cent of total 
indirect taxes. On the other hand, their share in total domestic 
revenues have been increasing as well to reach its highest of about 
22 percent in 1973, however this rising trend subsided since then and 
stood at 10 percent of d omestic revenues by 1979.
Clearly the revenue importance of excises is positively correlated 
with the number of commodities subject to the tax, their volume of 
consumption and to a large extent the tax rate. The number of excisable 
goods depends in turn on the level of development in general and theI
growth of the industrial sector in particular. ' The more the domestically 
produced goods, the more potential available for increasing the excise 
revenues.
However, the revenue objective is not the only onff to be taken into 
account in subjecting new products to the tax net although it is the mostI
important. Several other characteristics should be..considered, some of 
which arc already alluded to. There is the equity objective and demand 
and supply elasticities of the product on the one hand, and widespread 
usage of the product and the economic effects of the tax on the other hand. 
All such factors are to be taken into consideration in expanding the 
excise system alongside the revenue objective as it is discussed further 
in this section.
The commodities subject to the tax number about 30 items which fall 
into 10 major categories.as/shown in Table 5.7. Three major products 
contributes over 90 percent of the total excise revenues, namely,
216
Table (5.6) Relative Importance of the Excise 
Revenues 1955-1979
(values in million JD’s).
Year Excise Duty Revenues
Per cent of 
Indirect Taxes
Per cent of 
Domestic Revenues
Per cent of 
of GDP
1955 0.267 5.6 3.3 0.6
1958 0.326 4.9 '/ ' 2.9 0.4
1960 0.424 4.6 3.9 0.4
1962 1.474 13.4 7.0 0.4
1964 3.206 23.1 13.5 2.2
1965 4.027 22.4 15.1 2.4
1966 4.842 31.0 21.1 2.8
1967 4.774 29.7 18.7 3.6
1968 4.909 28.4 18.6 3.1
1969 6.471 31.3 19.8 3.5
1970 6.009 .32.3 20.0 3.4
1971 7.327 •' 36.61 20.6 3.9
1972 9.263 38.5 21.8 4.5
1973 10.117 33.8 21.9 4.6
1974 10.991 29.6 16.9 4.4
1975 12.733 26.4 15.5 4.6
1976 12.018 15.6 12.1 3.3
1977 12.534 \ 12.3 9.0 2.6
1978 14.492 13.4 8.8 2.5
1979 17.760 14.9 10.0 2.6
Source : Table (5.5)jand Appendix Tables O*-), ( lî ).
0
I
\
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Cigarettes and Tobacco products, Petroleum products and Cement. Here 
we'll take them in turn in some detail.
5.2.3.1. Cigarettes and Tobacco Products
Up to 1960 when the petroleum refinery was established tobacco 
products which include (cigarettes, tobacco, snuff, tombac) were the main 
source of excise taxes in Jordan accounting for more than 90 per cent 
of total excises. Tobacco was subject to a specific tax and the statute 
according to which the tax was imposed dates back to the 1929 law of 
producing and selling tobacco products. Since then several changes 
took place mainly concerned with regulatory aspects of the industry. By 
1963, a new Law No.51 of 1963 was passed in which the rates of the tax 
were increased on • ■
Cigarettes, from 500 fils/kg to 700 fils/kg
Tobacco, " *250 fils/kg to 500 fils/kg
✓
Tombac, " 250 fils/kg to 400 fils/kg, and
Snuff, " 150 fils/kg to 200 fils/kg.
These increases in the tax rate were reflected in an increase in
tax revenues which suddenly increased in 1964 to JD 964 thousand
i
to JD 1.7 million in 1965, Table 5.7. However, by 1969 with the rising 
need for an increase in revenues, the tax rates were increased again and 
by 1976 stood at the rates prescribed in Table 5.6.
The specific nature of the excise tax on tobacco is the source of 
some complaint, particularly over its discrimination against the cheaper 
brands of cigarettes and therefore resulting in an unequal distribution 
of the tax burden among consumers. On the other hand, and perhaps more 
important that the former is the fact that the tax is insensitive as to the 
changes in the product pri^e. This has resulted in keeping the revenue 
elasticity of the tax below unity especially during the seventies during 
which the prices of cigarettes have increased considerably while the ratio
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of the tax to the sales price of cigarettes deteriorated, and the relative
after-tax price differential is low. Due noticed that some countries,
particularly when the variation in the quality is significant, have set up
. 23several rate classes, the rate varying according to the selling price .
Taking into consideration that currently the sale price of different brands 
of cigarettes in Jordan ranges between 90-180 fils per pack of 20, then 
it seems more feasible to follow the above example adopted by other developing 
countries, hence solving the undesirable feature of the specific tax.
This could possibly be achieved by differentiating between three brands 
according to their sale price, say for example, 90-125; 145-150; and 180 
and over. Then by using a constructive unit to which the tax applies 
say 25%, 35% and 50% of retail price of each class of cigarettes. Once 
the retail prices change by a certain percentage point then the relevant 
tax rate would change accordingly.
This ad valorem tax*' rate, if considered, solves the undesirable 
feature of the specific tax. At the same time it will ensure a revenue 
stability of the tax revenue on cigarettes. This is very important if 
one takes into consideration the relative importance of tobacco excise 
to total excise revenuestwhich contributed about JD 7.9 million in 1979,I
or about 45% of total excises, a revenue source which has to be maintained 
and stabilized as well. •
Smuggling of foreign-made cigarettes into the country is a serious 
problem wfyich need to be tackled more rigorously. Higher import duties 
than those to be found in neighbouring countries particularly Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait are alleged to have increased smuggling despite the efforts of 
Customs and Excise personnel. Currently, import duties on cigarettes is 
3982 fils/kg or about 80 fils per pack of 20 cigarettes. Therefore it 
is perhaps feasible to re-examine this import-duty rate in order to 23
23. Ibid, p.71
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lessen the incentive to smuggle along with more rigorous checking and 
penalties to wholesalers and retailers,selling smuggled brands.
5.2.3.2. Excise on Motor Fuel and Other Petroleum Products
Automotive taxation aim at achieving a number of objectives. Firstly, 
achieving allocative efficiency in the use of the road system is considered 
a major objective. If such an objective is to be realized, then the 
road user charge has to approximate the marginal social costs imposed by 
each type of vehicle, which involve primarily road repair and maintenance^. 
Secondly, automotive taxation has a distributional goal to achieve* that is 
increasing the progressivity of the tax system, since the use of passenger 
cars is mainly a privilege enjoyed by the middle and upper income classes 
and therefore reflects an ability-to-pay the tax. Moreover, revenues 
generated could further the distributional effect also through allowing 
additional funds for the much needed social and economic projects 
which benefit the less privileged segment of the society. Thirdly, motor 
fuel taxation and excise on other products as well,' could achieve an 
economic objective through restricting consumption and therefore saving
a considerable sum of foreign exchange, an objective which assumes
\
particular importance in non-oil producing developing countries with 
meagre resources such as Jordan. In general, achieving these objectives 
necessitate having three tools of taxing motorists, i.e. motor fuel 
taxation; registration and licencing; and import duties. Jordan applies 
all measures, here we^briefly focus on the first, the rest however are 
considered later in this chapter.
Excise and other levies on petroleum products in Jordan are given in 
Table 5.6. t 24
24. For a useful overview dee, Charles E. Mclure, JR "Automotive Tax Reform", 
in R.A. Musgrave and Malcolm Gillis (eds), Final Report and staff papers 
of the Colombian Commission on Tax Reform (Harvard Láw School, 1970, 
pp. 692-718.
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Until the end of 1979, Benzine (Gasoline) was then taxed at 9.5
fils per litre and the pump price of the regular brand was 105 fils
per litre, therefore the tax to sale price ratio was about 9.1%. No
studies have been made on road user costs in Jordan, hence equating the
25tax the marginal cost is not possible . Alternatively, a comparative
study shows that on average the excise on regular gasoline in non-oil
26producing developing countries is 43% of the sale price . Even in the
major oil producing countries, the excise included in the retail price
on average is still 29%, compared to Jordan’s 9.5%.
It is worth stressing at this juncture that following the oil price
boom in the mid-seventies, petroleum products pricing has been one of the
most delicate and politically sensitive issues in Jordan. The successive
governments reacted by keeping the prices very low which amounted to
subsidising petroleum prices. Having this in mind, the above comparisons
indicates that Jordan’s tfaxes were then well below those of other
developing countries as well as developed countries.
More recently the enormous increase in the country's oil-bill which
for example was about 12% of total imports, and 53% as a ratio to domestic
27*exports in 1979 which even has risen to 16% and 95% respectively in 1980 ,
j
put severe pressures on the government to stop the subsidization policy 
and to drastically increase domestic prices. Accordingly, the prices 
increased considerably, R>r example, the sale price of regular brand of 
benzine wa? raised to 155 fils per litre. This policy of price increases 
was coupled with an unprecedented policy action of waiving away most of 
the excise duties on petroleum products which appear in column (1) of 256*
25. An IBRD mission estimated road user costs in Central America, however 
the study was carried out in the late sixties and certainly costs 
have increased considerably since then. For details see IBRD, "A 
study of Road User Charges in Central America", Paper No.15, 
particularly pp.63-65 tand 72-82.
26. See Katrine W. Saito, "Petroleum Taxes: How High and Why?" Finance 
& Dev., vol. 12, Dec. 1975, p.20.
27 Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, vol. 17, May 1981.
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Table 5.6, keeping only 70 fils/kg on mineral oil and 1 fils/kg of 
28propane Gaz . On the other hand, in order to have an equitable system, 
the government kept the prices of other petroleum products which are used 
mainly by low income groups relatively low such as Kerosine and diesel 
which are used for heating purposes and were very lightly taxed now 
standing at only 1 fils per litre. The practically no tax on diesel 
was also meant as providing an incentive to industries to keep their 
costs at a reasonably low level.
On the whole, the government policy as explained by the structure of 
petroleum products taxation seems to be concentrating on distributional 
aspects of the tax burden and lessening governments' subsidy rather than 
raising revenues. In fact the new measures are bound to have the 
revenues raised through taxing petroleum products cut drastically. And 
sooner rather than later the government would find it difficult not to increase 
prices further as well as* having to find other ways of raising the revenue 
lost in its late measures.
5.2.3.3. Other Excises
Apart from excise tax on cigarettes and petroleum products, the main
\
excise tax is that on cement. Revenues from the three excises made up
over 92% of the total excise revenues. The tax on cement of JD 8.0 per
ton is relatively high. If we take into consideration the domestic sale
29price, it makes over 27% of the sale price per ton . This tax to 
price ratio decreased relatively from 32% as a result of the recent price 
increase. Proponants of such a high tax rate argue that it is meant 
to be as an indirect tax on luxury housing, or at least it is justified 289
28. Government of Jordan, "System No. 18 of 1980", Issues 16.2.80
29. Up to the end of 1979 the sale price per ton was about JD 25.
As of February 21, 1980, the government increased the price per 
ton to JD 28.80. See Jordan Cement Company Ltd, Annual Report 
No. 28, 1980.
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on that basis. There is little, if any, logical basis for such a
proposition. If the government wishes to tax luxury housing, there are
\
certainly other means to do so. Specifically, the proper application of 
the urban land and building tax is of particular importance, especially 
so if frequent evaluation and strict implementation of the tax are 
seriously considered which in turn would introduce some acceptable level 
of progression in the tax system. However, from the revenue point of 
view, the tax is understandably revenue productive and contributed, 'for 
example, about 26% of the total excise revenue in 1979.
Alcoholic excise tax on the other hand, contributed less than 3% 
of total excise revenue because of religious restrictions on consumption 
in Jordan. The rest of the excisable comodities, namely, cast iron, 
detergents, vegetable oil and liquid patteries together contribute about 
5%.
•)5.2.4. The Expansion of the Excise System
In view of our analysis above, it is apparent that the issue of 
expanding the excise system is bound to arise sooner rather than later.
Any consideration for such an expansion must take inter* account several 
factors, each of which has its own bearing on the economy, not to mention 
the fact that some of these factors may prove to be.fcontradictory rather 
than complementary. In such a situation priorities have to be decided 
on in favour of achieving a particular aim through a particular fulfilment 
of certain factors. Such factors may include economic, equity and 
administrative features.
As far as the economic factors are concerned, it is rather obvious 
that as the government pursue its import-substituting policy, which is
• i
I believe entering its main thrust through the launching of the current 
Five Year Development Plaii 1981-1985, then customs revenues will be lost 
on a growing range of products far beyond cigarettes, petroleum products,
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cement and alcoholic drinks. Therefore, two issues would emerge.
Firstly, that government has to face up to its pledge of increasing the 
share of domestic revenues, therefore new needs for increasing revenues 
are arising. Secondly, taxation policy would require them to take 
into consideration lessening any resource misallocation which may arise 
from import-substitution policy, in the sense that investments are 
needed to be distributed reasonably in order not to create any 
unintended internal frictions in the economy. Here the use of excise 
taxation in coordination with custom duties could prove to be of 
considerable importance.
Equity criteria on the other hand, requires that the expansion of 
the excise system should ensure a fair distribution of the tax burden 
among the population by introducing an acceptable degree of progression 
to the tax, hence affecting in essence the well-to-do relatively more 
than the poor. Thus air important factor arises in the choice of new 
products to be introduced to the excise system.
Administrative capability is a factor not to be ignored. This is 
mainly because an expanded excise system if not carefully designed may 
create its own weaknesses, particularly because of the growing complexity 
either concerning the range of products or the number of producers in the 
field.
Taking the above into consideration, a sudden expansion of the excise
system tp cover all new established industries is neither conceived
30nor even feasible. For Due , there are a number of factors determining 
the coverage of the excise system. These factors could be summarized in 
the following:
1. The nature of domestic production, especially the range of commodities 
affected by import substitution. The smaller the number, the more 
feasible is the use of excise taxes. 30
30. John F. Due, Indirect Taxation in Developing Countries. (London:
The John Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 71-77.
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2. The nature of the production and distribution structure, particularly 
the importance of small-scale artisans and retail shops. The more 
extensive the small-scale production, the greater the advantage of 
utilizing a few excises instead of a sales tax.
3. The extent to which commodities suitable for excises are consumed in 
patterns that provide an acceptable distribution of tax.
4. The capacity of the administrative structure to deal with the 
larger number of firms encountered under a sales tax.
5. The urgency of the need for revenue, given other tax sources and 
requirement for economic development, and,
6. The dangers of unwanted import-substitution. This criterion, 
perhaps the most significant, is the one commonly neglected in planning 
tax policy.
These factors have- their implications towards the economic, equity 
and administrative criterion discussed earlier. Accordingly, it 
seems imperative to suggest that any expansion of the excise system that 
takes into account the above factors have to be gradual and more 
importantly selective in nature. It should be recognized however, that 
it might be difficult to meet all the above criteria* collectively, hence 
in the case of conflicting criteria compromises have to take place, 
based on the priorities set forth by the authorities. For example, 
suppose administrative feasibility conflicts with, say, revenue aspects, 
then it is conceivable that a relative loss of revenue may be allowed to 
be forgone to yield to administrative ease and low costs of collection.
In general terms, a gradual expansion of the excise system takes
r ,
into consideration two principal'forms in deciding the new commodities, 
that is, (a) luxury consumption goods, which may be considered as a 
good measure of taxpaying ability, and (b) Items of widespread use,
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a factor necessary to maintain a relatively high revenue yield without 
incurring high costs.
In view of our discussion above, there are a number of products 
which meet the criterion set forth and therefore could be considered 
as potential candidates to be included in the tax system. These products 
are meant to be illustrative rather than conclusive, however they were 
chosen simply because they possess all the necessary qualities that 
meets the above criteria. Briefly these are:
(1) Textiles : There is one major company, The Jordan Woollen;.and
Textile Co. Ltd, which was established in 1962. . Throughout the government
provided the company with effective protection either through high
tariffs on similar products or leaving the company to enjoy a monopolistic
grip on the market with no price controls. In addition the company
was among the earliest ones to benefit from the provisions of the
• »Encouragement of Investment Laws in exempting its imports of machinery
and raw materials from custom duties and charges. Production has been
increasing exceedingly fast which increased from 753 thousand yards in
311975 to 1180 thousand yards in 1979 . Certainly aftgr being twenty
years in the market the justification for its early protection, which is 
still in force, is loosing ground simply because it is not an "infant 
industry" any more. It is well in mind that a tax on textiles was 
earlier imposed and later waived because, as it was formally declared, 
lack of revenues. However, in the last five years conditions have 
changed and apart from anything else, production and sales proved this 
change, which warrants retaining the tax. The tax rate could be set 
in a specific nature, i.e., say 200 fils per yard. Based on the 1979
production level this would provide the government with at least 
JO 236,000. However, fo p reasons described earlier, it is preferable 31
31. Industrial Development Bank. Annual Report, 1980
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that the tax rate be set in an ad valorem form as a percentage of the 
market price per yard of material and be graduated according to the 
quality of production.
(2) Soft Drinks. A new excise which should as well be considered with
potentially higher revenue yields than many of the products already
subject to excise tax, is on soft drinks. This is a mass consumed
commodity, hence, could provide a reliable and stable source of revenue.
It is alleged that the tax may have an adverse effect on consumption
thereby would provide lesser revenues over time. This is because this
commodity is price elastic. In spite of the fact that this may be
argued for any other commodity, it nevertheless could be reasonably
32argued that considering the very low prices currently prevailing , it
appears less likely that the consumption would be affected significantly.
Moreover, it could rightly be argued that the tax would be relatively
« »
regressive, however, on- balance this disadvantage would be outweighed 
by its revenue effect. The tax could be expressed in ad valorem 
terms, say, 30% of the market price per bottle of 65 cl.
(3) Leather and related products. The Jordan Tanning Co. Ltd is the 
only producer which was'established in 1957 with government participartion. 
The company enjoyed, not only the utilization of public funds, but also 
full protection from imports of similar products as well as giving it 
monopolistic market in Jordan. Production has been considerable over
the past ten years. For example, production of sole leather and wool
increased from 47 tons in 1975 to 179 tons in 1979, while that of upper
leather increased from 1719 thousand feet to 2029 thousand feet between 
33the two years . To avoid violating equity criteria the tax could be
* ,
set according to the quality of the products with higher rate on 
fine qualities and lesser^ tax rates on others potentially consumed by 32
32. The market price of a 65 cl bottle is standing at 30 fils/bottle.
33. Jordan Tanning Co. Ltd., Annual Report, 1979
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lower income classes.
As was said earlier, these are potential candidates for excise tax, 
however they are by no means the only potential excisable goods. Plastic 
and undergarment industries should be considered, however it is 
acknowledged that their taxation poses an administrative challenge because 
of the widespread number of small producers and hence the cost of 
collecting the tax could be a handicap. Toilet paper and related products 
could also be considered. Until recently the only factory in Jordan 
was heavily protected and has had a monopoly on the market, however it 
was only relatively recently that another manufacturer was licenced and 
started production. The products are widely used and an ad valorem 
tax related to die market price of relevant products could provide reasonable 
revenues.
5.3. Other Taxes on Services and Transactions (Fees and Licences).
« l
Jordan levies a wide range of indirect taxes on services provided by 
government departments and agencies. Using the Ministry of Finance termin­
ology, these taxes come under the heading of "Fees and Licences". In 
this section, a number of these taxes were selected for discussion for 
two main reasons : On the one hand, they represent over 70% of this source 
of revenues; and secondly, they are a clear form of taxation aspects 
of which need to be discussed, such as the land and building sales tax 
and the vehicle registration and licencing taxes. Others will be 
briefly alluded to with an evaluation of their revenue significance in 
relation to the tax system. . .
5.3.1. The Land and Building Sales Tax
Although considered a registration fee 6n land and building transfer, 
it is in fact a capital t^x applied in the absence of a proper capital 
gains tax. The tax applies to land and buildings upon their sale or 
transfer. The tax was first introduced by Law No. 50 of 1953 which was
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subject to a number of amendments, most recently by Law No. 21 of 1974.
Most of these amendments were nothing more than adjusting the tax rates.
The tax is better enforced than that of the urban land and building 
tax, due mainly to the fact that any transaction of sale, transfer, exchange 
or inheritance of land and buildings are not legally valid unless registered 
with the Land Registration Department. As far as its revenues are 
concerned, it is the most revenue productive tax among the whole fees 
and licences. Its revenues increased considerably from only JD 270 
thousand in 1968 to about JD 8.0 million in 1979, or about 37% of the 
total revenues of fees and licences, Table 5.9. The rates of the tax 
has been increased from 3% in 1970 which was levied on the buyer only to 
10% at present, of which 6% payable by the buyer and 4% by the seller (Law 
No. 21, 1974 and its 1976 amendment).
Apparently, the rate of the tax is relatively high. Notwithstanding, 
the fact that the tax is*self-enforcing as a result of the registration 
procedure, yet there is a great deal of delinquency in paying the tax.
This is mainly due to the problem of under reporting of the property value 
given the absence of a capital gains tax. This may explain the underlying 
reasons behind the high ,tax rate in order to make up for the erosion
t
of the tax base.
The sales between branches of a family or between husband and wife 
are exempt, as well as property transfers of corporations and cooperatives, 
factors which contribute to the erosion of the tax base. If the tax in 
its present form is to be more revenue productive, both exemptions could 
be eliminated. The tax base could be broadened to include transfers
l
between relatives, however differential rates could then be applied in 
relation to the consequinity. .This, in efffect, would imply an 
introduction of elements cjf death duty, arguments about which were advanced 
in chapter four. However, whether a death duty in a formal manner is to 
be introduced or not, the present proposal seems to be reasonable in order
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widen the tax base on the one hand, and lessening the possibilities of
evading the tax on the other. Moreover, the second exemption of transfers
between housing corporations and cooperatives are not justified and
certainly a loophole that should be done away with.
It remains to be argued however, that if the argument for a capital
gains tax (Chapter four) is to be accepted and consequently a tax to be
imposed, then it would be rather obvious that the present tax would have
to be reconsidered. This would involve either abolishing the tax
altogether or augmenting it in the wider capital gains tax. If such a
situation arises, it could be a rather sensitive one for the government
for two reasons: Firstly, the present tax is the second most import
one in terms of revenues apart from import licencing and contributed
about JD 8.0 million in 1979, over 46% of the total revenues of the whole
gamut of fees and licencing. Hence, the government would be hesitant to
loose such an ample source of revenue. Secondly, this could be viewed
at the same time with the possibility that a newly introduced capital
gains tax may not be as revenue productive in the short-run, either due
to administrative problems; tax evasion; valuation problems or a
combination of them. Having this in mind, it would seem reasonable then
to have the present tax phased away gradually be augmenting it in the
♦
♦
wider capital gains tax which would reassure the authorities of a degree 
of revenue stability. This could perhaps be done by lowering the tax 
rate significantly taking into consideration the rates of the proposed 
capital gains tax.
• ♦
5.3.2 Automobile Registration and Licencing
In conjunction with motor fuel taxation, Jordan applies a second
ttier of taxing motorists through the application of registration and 
annual licencing fees. As Table (5.8) shows, Jordan distinguishes between 
benzine and solar powered vehicles based on the fact that the later provides 
longer distances per gallon. This distinction is in fact irrelevant
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in the case of passenger cars, because not only are there very few 
vehicles in the country but also their importation is banned. However, 
its importance stems from its imposition on all vehicles other than 
passenger cars.
There are two kinds of fees applied. Firstly, there is a 
registration tax levied upon the vehicles once and for all payable when 
the car is first registered and, secondly, there is an annual licence 
fee. The former is a graduated one based on engine capacity starting 
at JD 100 for passenger vehicles with an engine capacity of less than 
1 litre to JD 500 for those with an engine capacity of more than 3 litres.
This structure of the tax, which is relatively high, is meant to have 
the tax borne primarily by the upper income class and reflect the 
ability-to-pay, therefore contributing to the overall progressivity of 
the tax system. Although the tax is overall progressive, however two 
points should be made, .'first, such a uniform tax for all automobiles 
have some disadvantages, the most obvious is that it is regressive within 
the car-owning group because it does not take into account the age of 
the car. Second, using engine capacity as a taxable base does not
reflect the true value of the car. Therefore, the most obvious way to
i
achieve equitable taxation would be through changing the taxable base from
34engine capacity to an ad^  valorem rate graduated by car value . If an 
ad valorem tax of this form is to be used, then the officials responsible 
for collecting the tax would have to be provided with tables of standard 
values to be used in valuing cars of a given age, make and model. This
• w
may not, as it appears, introduce any significant administrative
complications simply because the importation of cars over 5 years of age
was banned recently. Alternatively however,'a compromise on administrative
34. A similar scheme was^recommended for application in Colombia, See
R.A. Musgrave & Malcolm Gillis (ed.), Fiscal Reform for Colombia: Final 
Report and staff papers of The Colombian Commission of Tax Reform. 1970 . 
(Harvard Law School, International Tax Program), especially Chap. 15 
p.692
Source : 
(i) Cov. of Jordan, 
Land Transport System No. 24 of 1971 and its amendements.
(ii) Cov. of Jordan, 
Ministry of Finance/Customs. 
Tariff Schedule, 191*0
Notes ; 
(a) In addition, 
there are JD 1.5 for a driving licence; JD 0.5 for motorcycle driving licence;
and JD 200 for taxis registration number plates plus JD for issuing number plates.
(b) JD 400 for trailers not exceeding 12 tons; and JD 800 for those exceeding 22 tons.
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Table (5.8) 
Motor Vehicle Taxation, 1979
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grounds would be to differentiate the tax on both the age of the car and 
its weight which is a better proxy than that of engine capacity.
The same rationale could be applicable to the annual licence fee, 
which is currently graduated according to engine capacity in the passenger 
cars categories with a 1:3 ratio between benzine and solar powered cars; 
and according to seating capacity for other cars and buses. By and 
large, the tax is revenue productive and contributed about JD 2.0 million 
in 1979 and has been growing steadily since the early seventies. It is 
worth noting here that the progressivity of motor vehicle taxation is 
enhanced with the newly introduced system of import duties, which increases 
from 30% of the cars value of 5 year old to 80% on that of the same 
year model for cars of engine capacity less than two litres; for those 
between 2-3 litres it increases from 70%-120%; and for cars over 3 litres 
the tax graduated from 110%-160%.
5.3.3. Other Fees and Licences
The above discussed taxes are the most important, however the rest 
are either imposed for revenue raising purposes or paying for government 
services. —
(a) Revenue stamps are becoming a significant revenue source to the 
government contributing JD 2.662 million in 1979. They were first 
introduced by law of Revenue stamps of 1952, some of them ad valorem 
and others specific. Examining the whole gamut of revenue stamps, it seems
'i
to me that a number of them are strong candidates for abolition on the 
grounds of their business obstructing nuisance aspects or their obsoleteness.
I
Those revenue stamps specifically are:
1. Stamp tax on contracts and agreements to enter into contracts.
2. Stamp tax on petition^ and written proceedings to government agencies.
3. Stamp tax on documentary evidence.
4. Stamp tax on drafts, bills of dept, bills of lading and bills of sale.
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5. Stamp tax on cheques of public corporations and agencies. Their 
abolition will result in some loss of revenues, however this could be 
more than met by considering a tax on hotel guests which is to be 
discussed shortly.
(b) In addition there is a wide range of taxes on services such as 
passport fees which have recently been examined and increased significantly 
along with reducing the period of passport validity from 5 to 3 years, a 
move which certainly resulted in a considerable increase of revenues.
Court fees need to be examined in some detail.
By and large, the above were selective fees and licences which to me 
needed to be looked at in some detail and made up collectively the major 
source of revenues. However, two points need to be made here in 
connection with "fees and licences" or in fact excises on services :
First, there seems to be some unnecessary complications in the system as 
well as overlapping in certain areas whereby a quite different tax is 
being levied on the same transaction or service; such as the stamp duties, 
additional tax and unified tax being levied separately. The unification 
of these levies could result in an ease of application? less administrative 
cost and better understanding on the part of the public. Secondly, a 
new tax which ought to be considered is one on hotel guests, a tax 
which would fall on foreign tourists, business men and well-to-do local 
residents. Considering the large increase in hotel capacity, which in 
fact was doubled during the past three years, the tax would be highly 
revenue productive and would fully make up the revenue loss of revenue • -
I
stamps.
5.3.4. Revenue Significance of Taxes on Services
Taxes on services or ^fees and licences revenues have been steadily 
increasing particularly over the past ten years. Tables.(5.9) and
(5.10) provides data on the sources of revenues as well as their relative
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Table (5.10) Revenue Significance of Total Fees and 
Licenses, 1968-1979.
(Value in million JD's)
Year
Revenues of fees 
and Licenses
As Z of 
Indirect
As % of
Domestic
Revenues
As % of 
GDP
Abs Rate of 
Growth
Taxes
1968 2.03 - 11.8 7.7 1.3
1969 2.19 8.3 10.8 6.9 1.2
1970 2.13 -2.7 11.2 7.0 1.2
1971 2.07 44.1 15.0 8.6 1.1
1972 3.69 20.2 14.9 8.6 1.5
1973 5.73 55.3 19.0 12.5 1.7
1974 6.59 15.0 17.0 10.4 2.3
1975 9.76 48. i 20.0 11.8 3.5
1976 15.83 59.2 20.4 14.7 4.3
1977 13.99 -11.6 13.4 9.8 2.9
1978 14.55 4.0 13.5 9.3** 2.6
1979 21.29 46.3 17.9 11.8 3.1
Source : Table (5.5) and Relevant Tables in the Appendix
)
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importance to other sources and GDP. The data shows that revenues from 
this source increased from only JD 2.03 million in 1968 to over JD 21 
million by 1979, an average rate of growth of about 24% over that period.
In fact it was only since the mid seventies when the government started 
looking at fees and licences potential as a major source of revenues.
For example, changes in various charges resulted in a sudden increase 
in revenues by over 55% between 1972 and 1976, and since then their 
share in total indirect taxes increased to over 20% by 1976, however, 
dropped slightly to 18% by 1979 not as a result of a decrease in their 
absolute terms but rather due to a factor growth in other sources such as 
import duties and excise taxes. Similarly, their share in total 
domestic revenues increased significantly to about 12% by 1979, and 
maintained an average of 10% of domestic revenues over the period 1968-1979 
Although they still make only about 3.1% of GDP however, the diversity of 
the charges and the width of their base make them a major potential as 
a source of revenues.
If one looks at their components, it is apparent that land and 
«
building sales tax; Revenue stamps and vehicle and passport taxation 
makes the main contributions to the overall revenues of fees and licences 
with, in fact, the first two sources making about 50% of their revenues. 
Civil aviation fees are expected to rise considerably once the new 
international airport is opened next year, other sources however need 
to be looked at in detail and specific recommendations for improvement
'i
identified, particularly so, I believe, courts and hospital fees are
• *
candidates for exploration and modification.I
5.4. The Elasticities of Indirect Taxes
r
In this section the calculations of the elasticities of indirect 
taxes are presented. Th^ tax elasticity to GDP; the tax to its base 
and the base to GDP of the main taxes were calculated. 'Analysis of
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this sort, it is believed, may permit the identification of the main 
factors affecting the magnitude of the elasticity coefficient. For 
example, the tax to base elasticity may show that part of the revenue 
growth within the control of the authorities. The elasticity of the 
base to GDP shows the growth of the tax base which is largely conditioned 
by the structure of the economy, ani in a sense outside the government's 
control. Certainly, both effects should be taken into account in 
designing taxes that are to be income elastic.
Similar to that of direct taxes, no tax rate changes could be taken 
into consideration for lack of necessary information. Elimination of 
tax rate changes concerning excise duties for example, necessitate the 
availability of data about the flow of each type of commodity and its 
different varieties as well as the changes and timing of tax rates for 
each specific product.
35However, following Lewis excise taxes were disaggregated to 
commodity level and their tax to base elasticity was computed. This 
exercise' would allow us to see the tax to base elasticity and relate it 
to the overall excise elasticity.
Empirical Results •
(1) Overall Indirect Taxes Elasticity to GDP
Indirect taxes included all taxes discussed in the chapter namely,
custom duties, excise duties, fees and licences. Data was used for the
period 1960-1979 and both a double-log and a linear form were used. The
• #
former fitted the data better and the results are given in equation (1):
35. S.R. Lewis, Jr., "Revenue Implications of Changing Industrial 
Structure J An Empirical Study", National Tax Journal, vol. 20 
No. 4, Dec. 1967.
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Log ID - -4.71 + 1.49 log GDP (1)
(25.05)
R2 = 0.97 DW = 1.66 DF - 18 
where, ID = Indirect taxes revenues
GDP = Gross domestic product of factor cost.
Figures in parenthesis represent t-value.
Apparently the elasticity coefficient is well above unity at 1.49.
2The high R of 0.97 reflect a strong correlation between indirect taxes 
and GDP and the related Durbin-Watson statistic though well below 2 mark 
yet indicate no auto-correlation problem exists. The disaggregation of 
indirect taxes to their major components may give an indication to the 
main contributor to the above elasticity coefficient.
(2) The Elasticity of Import Duties
Import duties elasticities were calculated with respect to GDP; to 
their base and the elasticity of base to GDP. The results are given 
respectively as follows:
Log MD - -5.65 + 1.58 log Y (2)
(22.65)
2 'R - 0.96 DW - 1.85 DF - 18 
where MD ■ is import duties; Y - GDP, and*
Log MD - -1.75 + 0.98 log IM (3)
(29.03)
*»
R2 - 0.97 DW - 1.66 DF - 18 
where, IM - is total imports; MD - as above, and,
Log IM - -3.87 + 1.59 log Y (4)
(22.06)
R2 * 0.96 DW - 1.82 DF - 18
f
Equation (2) above gives the income elasticity of import duty 
which is clearly well above unity and significant at the 1% level of
240
confidence as measured by the t-statistic. The high R = 96 indicates 
a strong association or effect of an increase in GDP on the import duties 
revenues. However, equation (3) which relates import duties to its
presumed base while indicating a strong relationship as given by the relevant
2 . . .R , however, the fact that the elasticity of the tax to its base is below
unity may be interpreted to mean that the tax base is not properly taxed.
This may be due to the existence of far too many exemptions; the changing
mix of imports due to import substitution or both. On the other hand,
equation (4) which relates the tax base to GDP shows that the income elasticity
of the tax base will above unity stand at 1.59; which is significant at the
1% level of confidence. There is a strong relationship between GDP and the
2tax base given by the R of 0.96. Together, the above results mean that 
if the tax base is to be properly taxed, then there is a good revenue 
potential from import duties taking into consideration the already high income 
elasticity of the tax as well as that of the tax base to income.
(3) Excise Duties Elasticities
Similar to that of import duties, excise duties elasticities to 
income; to base and the base to income (GDP) were calculated. The 
value added in the manufacturing sector was taken as a proxy to the
V
excises tax base. The results of the excise elasticities are given
*as follows:
Log ED - 7.40 + 1.68 log Y (5)
0 .61)
R2 - 0.63 DW - 1.63 DF - 18
where, ED • Excise duties; Y * GDP and • •
Log ED - 2.25 + 1.20 log IND (6)
(7.47)
R2 - 0.75 DW - 1.78 DF - 18 
where, ED ■ as abdve; IND * value added in manufacturing
241
Log IND = -4.71 + 1.47 log Y (7)
(17.52)
R2 = 0.94 DW = 1.65 DF = 18
where, the variables as above and all figures in parenthesis 
represent the relevant t-values.
It is apparent from equation (5) above that the income elasticity
of excise duties is 1.68 which is significant at the 1% level of
confidence given by the relevant t-value. The relationship between excise
duties and GDP though less than that of import duties yet still significant 
2given by an R of 0.63. The relevant DW indicates no autocorrelation
between the two variables. Equation (6) on the other hand which relates
the excise duty to its base reveals a stronger correlation demonstrated 
2by a higher R =0.75, however although the elasticity is above unity yet 
it is well below that of the duty to GDP elasticity. This may as well 
be read as an indication of the low coverage of- the tax base; the more 
the coverage the higher is the elasticity. If this is coupled with 
the high elasticity of the tax base to GDP given in equation (7) which is 
1.47 with a strong relationship, then one could conclude that the present 
system is potentially revenue productive and more so it would be the 
wider its coverage is. Moreover, to look further into the excise 
systems, the excise duties as said before were disaggregated to the product 
level taking the four main excisable products, i.e. cigarettes; petroleum 
products; cement and alcohol, the duties on which represent over 95% of 
the total excise duties. The elasticity of the excise duty of each 
product to its base, i.e. the commodity production was calculated and 
their results are given below:
)
(a) Cigarettes duty elasticity
Log CTE - -Q .4 o + 2.10 log CTP ' (8)
(14.80)
R2 « 0.92 DW - 2.47 DF = 18
where, CTE = is cigarette excise duty, CTP = cigarettes production
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Clearly the tax is highly elastic with an elasticity coefficient of 
22.10. The high R indicates a strong correlation and while the DW-statistic 
is higher than 2, it nevertheless does not indicate the existance of 
positive or negative autocorrelation. It is worth noting here that 
the impact of smuggling is not accounted for which is, in fact, very 
hard to determine. Nevertheless, the very high elasticity indicates at 
least partially a high tax effort and that the tax base is properly taxed. 
Any change of the tax rate from its specific nature to an ad valorem one, 
alongside more efforts towards combating smuggling may very well result 
in considerable increase in revenues generated from this source.
(b) Petroleum Products
Log PTE - -0.92 + 0.36 log PTP (9)
(1.63)
R2 = 0.13 DW = 2.36 DF » 18
where, PTE ■ Excise duty on Petroleum Products, '< • -t
PTP “ Petroleum Production
Unlike that of cigarettes, the elasticity of excise duty on 
petroleum products to its base is inelastic given by*the very low coefficient
i
of 0.36. This is further manifested by a poor correlation coefficient
2as the coefficient of determination (R “ 0.13) anti t-value indicates.
This poor relationship and low elasticity was something to be expected, 
because up to 1979 which the data covers, petroleum products were 
lightly taxed which amounted to a government subsidy by abstaining from 
increasing petroleum prices notwithstanding the vast increases in oil • * 
prices since 1973-74, which in turn was reflected in a sizable oil import
bill increased to about JD 85 million or about 90% of Jordan's total
>
exports.
/
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(c) Cement duty elasticity
Log CE - 5.62 + 1.001 log CP (10)
(4.83)
R2 = 0.56 DW = 1.75 DF = 18 
where, CE * Excise duty on Cement, and
CP * Cement Production ( ), t-value.
i
The elasticity of cement duty to cement production is nearly one.
2The coefficient of determination R is higher than that in the case of 
petroleum products indicating a better relationship and the DW statistic 
indicates no autocorrelation problem. Due to the fact that there is 
only one cement factory in Jordan with good potential for enforcing the 
tax, the elasticity could have been expected to be more than unitary. 
However, cement production has been dwindling due to some technical and 
manpower problems, and the prospect seems to be towards increased 
production once the new factory starts production, which given the 
elasticity will result in increased revenues.
(d) Alcohol Production
Log ALE - -10.04 +1.18 log ALP ~ (11)
' (10.26)
R2 - 0.85 DW - 1.55 DF = 18 
where, ALE * Alcohol excise duty; ALP ■ Alcohol Production
2The relatively high R at 0.85 indicates a strong correlation 
between the tax and its base. The elasticity is above unity at 1.18- 
and significant at the 1% level of confidence. The DW-statistic is * ’ 
low but indicates no autocorrelation. Despite the above unitary 
elasticity, alcohol excise is not revenue productive for reasons mentioned 
earlier, however given the small level of production the high tax rates
J
maintained the elasticities level above unity.
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4. The Income Elasticities of Fees and Licences
The elasticities of taxes on services, that is, fees and licences 
to GDP were computed the results are given below respectively.
Log F = 5.16 + 1.19 log Y (12)
(7.82)
R2 * 0.77 DW - 1.67 DF = 18
Log LI - -41.8 + 8.66 log Y (13)
(14.31)
R2 = 0.92 DW - 1.52 DF = 18 
where, F = revenues from fees
LI *■ revenues from licences, and 
Y “ GDP at factor cost 
( ) ■ t-value
As equation (12)demonstrates the income elasticity of fees revenues
is above unity and thus significant at the 1% level of confidence. A
reasonably strong relationship with GDP exists as indicated by the
2coefficient of determination R - 0.77 and the DW statistic indicates no
autocorrelation problem. Similarly licences are highly income elastic
with an elasticity of 8.66, perhaps this high elasticity reflects, among
«
other things, the high revenues of land and building tax.
5.5. Concluding Remarks
The analysis of indirect taxes in this chapter shows that they 
dominate the Jordanian tax system. Import duties in particular provided 
over 72% of the total indirect taxes and about 48% of domestic revenues 
in 1979. In general the tariff policy in Jordan, as well as the bulk 
of indirect taxes, is guided principally by the revenue objective, and 
to a lesser extent by equity and development considerations. Notwith­
standing the importance of the revenue aspects^the indirect taxes are
245
characterized by a wide scale of exemptions and exceptions which in the 
end limits the revenue productivity of the taxes as well as achieving the 
other objectives. On the other hand, for reasons mentioned in the text 
Jordan limits its export taxes to those on phosphate, mosaic and cement 
products. However, even these two limited taxes were conditioned by 
circumstances related particularly to the phosphate industry and perhaps 
that tax specifically was ill conceived and implemented, hence resulted 
in nothing except perhaps negatively affecting the performance of the 
company itself.
Excise taxes on the other hand were limited in coverage though
relatively revenue productive. However, so far as the revenue aspect
is concerned the excise system is still far from satisfactorily contributing
to the overall domestic revenues. In view of the changing economic
structure with its obvious impact on the composition of imports, it
would seem very important, both for the medium and long-term, that import
duties be coordinated with internal taxes in such a manner that allow the
achievement of the overall objectives of the tax system be it revenue,
equity or development and resource allocation. In that sense, the need
arises for the augmentation of other taxes on services and transactions
with import and excise taxes for the fulfilment of such objectives with
*
an open mind on the part of the authorities on possible areas of change 
and improvement. In that area in particular efforts should perhaps be 
made in simplifying the taxes levied through eliminating the unnecessary 
number of levies when such levies could be augmented in one or more. By 
and large, the elasticities of indirect taxes seem to be encouraging in 
the long-run, however, proposals in certain areas made in discussing 
certain aspects, if carried, could prove to have a significant impact
on the overall performance of the tax system.
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CHAPTER SIX
TAXABLE CAPACITY AND REVENUE INSTABILITY IN JORDAN 
INTRODUCTION
It was only relatively recently that the problem of assessing 
taxable capacity or tax potential has received considerable attention. 
However, it should be acknowledged from the outset that taxable 
capacity is still an elusive concept that defies precise definition 
or measurement. This concept seems to have originally been developed 
to indicate the upper limit up to which the people of a country, 
given its circumstances, could be taxed. The fact that taxation 
was seen to impose a burden on the population, stimulated the inquiry 
into the possible maximum burden that can be imposed on the people at 
any given period of time.
However, the view that taxation imposes a burden on people is 
subject to controversy on the grounds that it is public expenditures 
that divert real resources from the private to the public sector. 
Therefore, unless the pattern of use of the proceeds of taxation is 
specified, the burdensome aspect of taxation could be challenged^.I
In this sense taxation can be seen to impose a bu^cfen on the community
if the proceeds are used for say ornamental buildings and lavish
government expenditures. Yet on the other hand, if such proceeds
obviated the need for more private sectors expenditures on the essential
needs such as, say health and education, then the extra revenues
could be much more easily generated with perhaps lesser objection from
the population as to their burdensome aspect. However, one cannot
help but to think that most taxes may be shown to have some adverse
-----------------------1---------------------- -----------------------------
1. Raja Chelliah, "Tax Potential and Economic Growth in the Countries 
of the ECAFE Region", Economic Bulletin for Asia .And the Far East, 
vol. XVII, No.2, (September, 1966), p.36.
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effects on one group of people more than others.
Therefore, it would seem very hard to devise a clear-cut definition
or measurement formula for taxable capacity to be applicable to all
countries at all times. As a United Nations Study has concluded,
"there is no categorical answer to the question where the optimum level 
2of taxation lies" .
In view of the above argument, any method to be used in measuring
tax capacity or tax potential would be an approximation and hence
should be taken with caution. For one thing, taxable capacity is
influenced by a wide range of factors, some are measurable others are
not, reflecting the economic and political structure of the country.
However, given the above one could look at taxable capacity t
in two different ways. First, in an extreme case following Kaldor
and Chelliah, one may assume that taxation imposes no social and
political burden on the community and therefore, taxable capacity may
be defined as the difference between the national output and subsistance
3consumption which allows the population to maintain its labour capacity .
It is argued that any measurement of the surplus over subsistance
level of consumption is a task practically near to* impossibility, and
perhaps more so in developing countries. Chelliah himself maintained
*
that "while to equate the surplus over subsistance consumption with 
maximum taxable capacity leads us nowhere, a rough measure of the 
size of the mobilized surplus in relation to the GNP can serve as a 
basis for judging the scope for, and possibility of, additional taxation 
in the country"^.
2. United Nations "Taxes and Fiscal Policy in Under-developed Countries",
(New York, 1954), p.7. ‘ '
3. R. Chelliah, op.cit., pp.39-40
/4. Ibid., p.38.
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Secondly, given the difficulties involved in estimating the
economic surplus in the economy, a more dynamic approach of approximating
/
taxable capacity has been subject to analysis during the past ten years 
or so and usually referred to as "the tax effort or tax ratio approach". 
Here, tax capacity is defined after Bahl as "the tax ratio that would 
result if a country applied to its tax bases a set of "average" 
effective rates on those bases - these rates are computed as net regression 
coefficient ..."^. In this sense it is assumed that tax base are 
approximated by variables reflecting the main characteristics of the 
economy which affect the tax ratio. Hence the estimated tax ratio 
represents the minimum taxable capacity in the economy given its major 
characteristics. On the other hand, the same factors which are presumed 
to affect tax capacity, among other factors, determine the stability or 
instability of tax revenues.
It is therefore rather obvious that being unable to measure the 
economic surplus properly in order to get a measure of maximum tax 
capacity, the second approach, that is, what came to be referred to as 
the "effort" approach is used to approximate the minimum tax capacity 
in the economy. The second important issue to be discussed in the 
present chapter is an estimation of how unstable tax revenues are in Jordan 
and what are the main components of the tax system contributing to such 
instability.
Therefore, in section one a review of earlier studies is given.
Section two presents the model and statistical results in the case of 
Jordan and, section three discusses the revenue instability in Jordan. 5
V
5. See Roy W. Bahl, "A Regression Approach to Tax Effort and Tax 
Ratio Analysis" IMF Staff Papers, vol. 18, March 1972, p.572.
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6.1. A Review of Earlier Empirical Studies
During the last two decades or so, a considerable number of 
empirical studies on the determinants of taxable capacity have been 
carried out, most of which have concentrated on cross-country analysis 
to examine the differences of tax ratio's among countries. In this 
section a review of these studies is presented with our attention given 
mainly to their empirical results.
6.1.1. A Review
Perhaps the first investigation of the relationship between 
government revenue shares and the level of economic development was 
that of Harry Oshima. In his study, Oshima^ ranked 32 developed and 
developing countries by the proportion of government receipts to GDP at 
current prices and found a direct relationship between the share of the 
government, in the economy as measured above and the level of economic 
development as measured by per capita income. In 20 developed countries 
out of his sample of 32, revenue shares ranged from 19% in Israel to 
35% in the UK, while the less-developed countries ranged from 19% to 8%.
Similarly, Martin and Lewis^ in their study of 16 developed 
and less-developed countries found six developed countries with a ratio 
of total government revenue to GNP ranging from 24%-37%, while in ten 
less-developed countries the ratio was ranging between 8% and 22%.
However, the earliest systematic statistical analysis was perhaps
'  g
that of Williamson . In a sample of 33 countries (developed and 
developing) he found a significant positive relationship between the-tax 678*
6. Harry T. Oshima, "Share of Government in Gross National Product in
Various Countries", American Economic Review, vol XLVII, (June 1957), 
pp.381-90. ' ^
7. Alison Martin & W. Arthur Lewis, "Patterns of Public Revenue and 
Expenditure", The Manchester School, vol. XXIV, (Sept. 1956), pp.204-44.
8. J. Wiliamson, "Public Expenditure and Revenue: an International
Comparison", The Manchester School, vol. XXIX, (Jan. 1961), pp.43-56.
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ratio and per capita income. In 17 developed countries the ratio
ranged between 20% and 35%, and in the 16 developing countries the ratio
ranged between 9% and 21%.
oPlasschaert introduced a proxy variable for the "openness" 
measured by the import/GNP ratio in conjunction with per capita income 
as a proxy measure for the stage of economic development. In a sample 
of 20 developing countries, he found a significant relationship between 
the tax ratio and that of the import ratio, but not between per capita 
income and tax ratio.
U Tun Wai*^ in his study on taxation problems in developing countries
asserted the existence of a positive relationship between revenue shares
and per capita income in developing countries. Hinrichs^*, using a
regression analysis of 60 developed and developing countries, set out
to determine the existence of this relationship among developing
countries and if it existed to explain why. Using a multiple regression
analysis of both a linear and double-logarithmic forms, he found that
while there was a highly significant relationship between government 
R « yrevenue shares (—) and per capita income (—) in all 60 countries, none
existed among only developing or developed countries taken separately.\
Using import ratio as an alternative index, he found, a highly significant
R M 'relationship between (—) and (~) for all countries with per capita income 
below $150, $300, $500 and $750. However, when combined with per 
capita income its significance was reduced for the group of 40 countries 
with per capita income less than $500. However, these results were
9. Sylvain Plasschaert, Taxable Capacity in Developing Countries, IBRD 
Report No. EC-103, Washington, 1962.
10. U Tun Wai, "Taxation Problems and Policies of Under-developed Countries", 
IMF Staff Papers, vol. IX, No.3, Nov. 1962. 1
11. Harley H. Hinrichs, "Determinants of Government Revenue Shares Among 
Less-Developed Countries", Economic Journal (1965) pp. 550-556.
It is worth noting that Hinrichs sample of 60 countries was divided 
into four groups according to their level of per capita income,
Group I, under $150; II, $150-299; III,$300-749, and group IV $750 and 
over.
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criticised by Tanzi & McCuiston, who concluded that Hinrichs'
conclusions "cannot be assumed to hold for all the under-developed
countries, but only for that group of very poor countries for which the
12market economy is largely limited to the foreign trade sector . Roe
t
in 1968, testing Hinrichs' data by adding another 10 African countries
with per capita income less than $150, confirmed that with the different
M Rsets of data, the relationship between "openness" (—) and (^ ) is
Y R 13closer than the relationship between per capita income (^) and )
14However, in a study of 52 developed and developing countries Thorn 
arrived at different conclusions. He used four dependant variables to 
explain the central government revenue ratio to GNP, these are per capita 
GNP; import ratio; and two dummy variables, one for British dependencies 
of former colonies and the other for decentralization effect. His 
results showed that the addition of the import ratio, though increased 
the correlation coefficient only slightly however, the import ratio 
was not significantly different from zero. Also, the 'cultural effect' 
was found to exert significant influence on the variation in government 
revenue shares.
Weiss^ applied the same approach and used dummy variables, in
I
addition to per capita income and import ratio, reflecting factors
*
related to the political, cultural and social aspects. He introduced 
variables for urbanization, literacy rate, level of employment in the 
agricultural sector and an index for mass communication and found that 
such factors could explain the variations in the tax ratio instead of 
per capita income without substantially reducing the explained variance. 12345
12. Vito Tanzi and Clayton McCuiston, "Notes and Memoranda : Determinants 
of Government Revenue Shares Among Less-developed Countries",
Economic Journal vol. 77, June 1967, pp.403-5.
13. Alan R. Roe, "The Government - Revenue Share in Poorer African Countries 
A Comment", Economic Journal, vol. 78, 1968, pp.479-481.
14. R.S. Thorn, "The Evolution of Public Finances During Economic 
Development" The Manchester School, vol. 35, 1967, pp.46-47.
15. S.J. Weiss, "Factors Affecting the Government Revenues Share in Less 
Developed Countries", University of West Indies, Social and Economic 
Studies, vol. 18 (1969), pp. 348-64.
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He also found that the effect of the geographic position of the countries 
does affect the ratios.
In a frequently quoted article, Lotz and Morss^ used per capita
income and an ’openness' variable measured by the sum of exports
(f.o.b.) and imports (c.i.f.) as a percentage of GNP instead of the import
ratio, to explain tax ratio differences in 72 developed and developing
countries. They found that both variables were highly significant when
applied to all countries and explained about 64% of the variations.
However, when the 52 developing countries in their sample were taken
separately they found that although the two variables were significantly
related to the tax ratio, however, they did not account for a large
2part of the variance among ratios, i.e. R was reduced from 0.639 in the 
first case to only 0.197 in the second.
In a second study^, the authors introduced new variables to their 
analysis, particularly.related to the tax bases. First, a monetization 
variable was introduced using three proxy variables, i.e. money supply 
M^, M2 and M^. They found that the narrow definition of money was 
superior to the other two. Furthermore, although the degree of
r *
monetization variable was significant, it nevertheless lowered the
1
significance of per capita income. They also introduced variables 
to measure the effect of the export composition and government centraliz­
ation. Although the two variables were significant however, they did 
not increase the explanatory power of the model. They concluded that the 
government decentralization has a direct impact on tax levels and the 
trade surplus gave the best result as a proxy variable for the openness 
of the economy. 167
16. Jorgen R. Lotz and Elliott R. Morss, "Measuring 'Tax effort' in
Developing Countries", IMF Staff Papers, (Nov. 1967), pp.478-497.
/
17. Jorgen R. Lotz and^Elliott R, Morss, "A Theory of Tax Level 
Determinants for Developing Countries", Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, vol. 18, No.l, (Oct, 1969) pp.328-341.
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Bahl was one of those who perhaps contributed significantly to
18tax effort analysis. In his first article he developed a model in 
terms of three general determinants of taxable capacity, namely, the 
size of the foreign trade sector as measured by the export ratio (X^) 
both on a priori and empirical consideration based on his sample; 
the stage of economic development, as measured by per capita income; 
and finally, some measure of the sectoral composition of value added, 
measured by both the agricultural share and the mining share. He used 
a positive approach whereby the goodness of the fit would be the criterion 
for choosing bases. Accordingly variables that are not significantly 
related to the tax ratio would be excluded. However, he emphasized 
that the goodness of fit is applied only when there is a choice between 
variables that seem equally acceptable on a priori grounds. He found 
a high collinearity between the mining and agricultural share and that of 
exports, so the latter was dropped. Both the mining and agricultural 
share in GNP were significant determinants of inter-country differences 
in taxable capacity.
19In 1972 Bahl developed a new model so that taxable capacity may
be computed as a linear combination of the set of effective tax rates
\
and the assumed tax bases. He applied his. model to 49 developing
countries and concluded that although the distribution of tax effort 
indices in his model did not differ significantly from that obtained in 
earlier studies of regression analysis however, the new model does possess 
flexibility to permit a direct inter-country comparison of the intensity 
of use of various tax findings. He generally confirmed the importance 
of the sectoral composition of the economy as a determinant of the tax 
capacity. 189
18. Roy W. Bahl, "A Regression Approach to Tax Effort and Tax Ratio 
Analysis", op.cit.£ pp.570-609.
19. Roy W. Bahl, "A Representative Tax System Approach to Measuring 
Tax Effort in Developing Countries", op.cit., pp.87-121.
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Kilman Shin , in a study of 47 developed and developing nations,
introduced three new variables in addition to per capita income and the
foreign trade ratio (exports and imports) to GNP. These variables are:
the agricultural income ratio to GNP (^); the rate of change of prices 
AP . AN(— ); and the rate of growth of population (— ). He found that in the
low income countries, the variations in tax ratio may be caused by 
differences in rate of price changes, rate of growth of population, and 
the degree of industrialization. Neither the per capita GNP nor 
openness was found to be a significant factor in contrast to results 
reached when applied to both developed and developing countries. Notwith­
standing the fact that his results showed that per capita income was not 
statistically significant in the case of low income countries, yet he 
reasoned this difference among the two groups of countries might have 
been due to the introduction of other variables. Therefore he concluded
in normative manner that, "in order to increase tax ratio, we may have
21to increase, as a method, per capita income" .
By the early 1970’s the subject of measuring taxable capacity and
tax effort in developing countries seemed interesting to the UN
22 ' *institutions. UNCTAD carried out a study of 36 developing countries
i
by pooling cross section and time series data for a period of 16 years 
1950-1960. Both per capita income and the share of the agricultural 
sector in total income were found to be significant despite their high 
collinearity. However, when the model was tested on cross section data 
for particular years, the problem of collinearity seemed to be significantly 
in force and resulted in one or both of the variables being insignificant. 201
20. Kilman Shin, "International Differences in Tax Ratio", The Review 
of Economics & Statistics, vol. LI, 1969, p.215.
21. Ibid., p.217. /
22. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Objectives for 
the Mobilization of Domestic Resources - Mobilization of Resources 
for Development (mimeographed, Doc. TDIBIC.3/751 'Add. 1, February 23, 
1970).
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The openness variable remained significant. They concluded then that 
tax ratios are higher in more open economies with the relatively low 
level of agricultural income.
More recently the International Monetary Fund embarked on a number
23of studies on tax ratio analysis. In one of these studies, Chelliah 
used per capita non-export income as a proxy for the stage of economic 
development to avoid overlapping with exports; export ratio was used as 
a proxy for openness (excluding mineral exports for the same reason); 
and later added the agricultural sector ratio to GNP. Running the 
first three variables together he found that the mining share is highly 
significant, the export ratio excluding mineral exports is also significant, 
and per capita non-export income not statistically significant; and the 
total degree of explained variations in the tax ratio is 39 per cent, a 
rather low one. However, he suggested substituting the agricultural 
share to per capita income as a proxy for the stage of development.
When the model incorporating the export ratio, the agricultural, and the 
mining share was tested, he found that the mining share was highly 
significant and positively related to the tax ratio, the agricultural
share was not significant and negatively related to the tax ratio, and
\
the export ratio not a significant determinant. However, dropping the 
export ratio gave a better result and both variables were significant.
In conclusion, the mining share was a very important determinant, and more 
importantly he favoured including per capita income, though it was 
statitically not significant on a priori basis.
*
2A second study updating the first one carried out by Chelliah, et al., 
came virtually to the same conclusion and its results did not differ 234
23. Raja Chelliah, "Trends in Taxation in Developing Countries", op. cit.
24. Raja Chelliah, H.^. Bass, and M.R. Kelly, "Tax Ratios and Tax 
Effort in Developing Countries, 1969-1971", IMF Staff Papers,
1975, vol.22, No.l, pp.187-205.
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generally from those of the first study.
25Host recently Matsebula formalized a model incorporating per 
capita GNP; mining and manufacturing share; trade ratio (export and 
inport) and a number of dummy variables representing geographical location. 
The model was fitted to pooled cross-section and time series data from 
17 African countries. He found that neither the mining ratio nor the 
dummy variables were significant at the 5 per cent level. However, 
dropping these variables did not improve the fit. He concluded that
the industrial share and geographic location do not seem to influence the 
tax ratio as hypothesized. He reasoned this conclusion by: (i) The 
existence of tax concessions made available to the mining and manufacturing 
sector and (ii) the possibility of moving the economic surplus from this
sector out of the host country by multinational corporations.
26Finally, in a recent work on the Sudan, M. All using time-series 
data tried to show that conclusions derived from cross-section data do 
not necessarily hold when time series data is used. He concentrated on 
the openness hypothesis by testing it using both cross-country and time-* 
series data for the Sudan. While he found that import-ratio was not a 
significant variable based on his time-series data, nevertheless concludedi
i
that such a difference between cross-country and time series data may be
»
justified on the grounds that the share of luxury items in total imports 
in the inter-country case differs from a single country because such a 
share is determined by other factors which do not change significantly on 
year to year basis. Because of this he infers that the behaviour of the 
share of luxury imports remains fairly constant.
6.1.2. Limitations and Usefulness of Earlier Studies : A Comment.
From the above reviewed empirical studies one could gather that they 256
25. M.S. Matsebula, "Ta^'Ratios in Africa", Thé South Africati Journal of 
Economics, vol. 47, No.2, (June 1979), pp.156-165.
26. M.A.R. Ali, "Determinants of Government Revenue Shares in Developing 
Countries : A Note", Public Finance, vol. 29, No.2, 1974, p.221.
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agreed in principal that taxable capacity is related to the structure of 
the economy in developed countries and their stage of economic development. 
However, as has frequently been seen,some of these models suffered from 
specification errors, either resulting from mis-specification related to 
the choice of variables or that of the model itself. Furthermore, there 
has always been assertions on specific developing countries taxable 
capacities deduced from inter-country studies. These assertions should 
be taken cautiously when adapted to 'particular countries. This is so 
particularly because, inter-country analysis concentrated on a single 
point in time for a vast number of developing countries, among which a 
considerable number of differences take place, be it cultural, political 
social structure, income distribution and so on. The very existence of 
such differences may cast some doubts on any inferences made for particular 
countries based on inter-country analysis.
Moreover, differences in data collections and reliability and in 
some cases even classification should be given particular importance, 
because statistical practices especially among developing countries, 
where mostly no statistical standard of data classification is followed, 
may very well affect the results.
In addition, the combination of developed and developing countries 
may reduce the credibility of results, because for one reason such 
combination proved to have in many instances affected the results very 
significantly. It remains, however, to be seen whether such inter­
country models could prove valid when applied to a time series of a single 
country.
It should be acknowledged though that a number of these studies have
*tried to overcome some of these difficulties by introducing dummy variables 
Others tried pooling time series and cross-section data. However, 
although such an exercise may have some advantages, it nevertheless has 
a number of statistical disadvantages which may well affect the results,
258
some times considerably.
By and large, despite the limitations of the regression technique, 
it may be considered a good approach in explaining tax ratios, perhaps 
when it is particularly applied to a given country taking into consideration 
its economic structure and circumstances separately.
6.2. Determinants of Taxable Capacity in Jordan
Having briefly reviewed earlier studies which were carried out with 
applications both to developed and developing countries, the analysis 
is carried forward in this section and applied to the particular case of 
Jordan based on time series data. Our choice of the variables as well 
as the formulation of the model depends on the goodness of fit of the 
data and the a priori reasons wherever applicable.
6.2.1. The Variables
The variables used in this analysis, needless to say, are factors 
related to taxable capacity only or what are some times termed "non-effort" 
factors. This means that factors related to tax-effort are excluded. 
Factors which were found to be significantly related to taxable capacity, 
both on a priori basis and empirical grounds were chosen. Such factors 
are:
Y(a) Per Capita Income (GNP) (—>t: It is argued that per capita income
is one of the most important variables either as an indicator of the
/
level of development or as it is presumed to increase tax capacity 
through increasing the taxable surplus.
(b) The Degree of Monetization ( ^ t: plausible to assume that
a more monetized economy reflects a degree of comnercialization,
organization and an important "modern" sector as against the subsistence
(1
sector. Hence, on a priori basis, it is assumed that tax capacity is 
affected by that percentage of CNP passing through the market. The
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proxy measure for the degree of monetization is subject to some 
controversy. Three candidates for this purpose are considered, i.e. 
a narrow definition of money supply, e.g. coins and notes (M^); Coins 
notes and demand deposits (M^); and coins, notes, demand deposits and 
time and savings deposits (M^). For the purpose of our analysis a 
wider definition of money supply (M^) is more appropriate to reflect the 
percentage of GNP. that passes through the market.
(c) The Share of Mining and Manufacturing Sector (^) : This factor
is sometimes used instead of per capita GNP to reflect the stage of 
development alongside the agricultural sector. However, it is 
plausible to assume that the more this sector is developed, the more the 
surplus in the economy and therefore the more tax potential there is.
This is because it reflects a more developed corporate sector, easily 
identified and administratively as well as politically more easier to tax.
A(d) The Share of the Agricultural Sector (—) s As alluded to above, the 
sectoral composition of the economy reflects the degree of development.
It is argued that the more important the agricultural sector the lesser
is the tax capacity. This is because this sector is associated with 
\
the subsistence levels in developing countries; low income per capita;
.  »
low profit margins and is not amenable administratively to taxation.
AN(e) The Rate of Population Growth (— It is argued that a greater
rate of population growth necessitates more tax exemptions and hence
lower tax potential. Some argue however, that the increased population
may have positive effect on the potential through its effects on 
. * 27consumption
A 27
27. See for example Shin, op.cit., pp.213-220 who argues that the effect 
of population gi^jwth depends on the tax mix in the economy. If 
the proportion of income tax revenues is markedly small, the impact 
of population growth may be positive because of greater consumption 
expenditures and hence increased indirect tax payments.
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(f) The "Openness" of the Economy (—)fc: The degree of openness is
measured here by the import ratio to GNP. Arguments about it were 
advanced in chapter three.
Ap(g) The Rate of Change of Prices : Inflation as measured by the
rates of change of consumer price index is considered a factor affecting 
the tax capacity positively, particularly if a progressive tax rate 
structure is in force. Increases in prices shifts taxpayers into new 
income brackets for which higher tax rates are applied. It also increases 
expenditures on consumption hence increasing indirect tax collections.
(h) A Dummy variable (D^) was introduced to allow for the effect of the 
loss of the West Bank.
It is worth noting here that such factors are related to tax capacity 
rather than tax effort. Also consideration may have been given to 
measurable factors, yet it is well in mind that a wide number of 
variables may be considered such as income distribution, political stability, 
etc., such factors which are either immeasurable or data is unavailable.
• F(i) Foreign Aid Ratio (ÿ)^* This is a new variable which*has not been
tested in other models of tax tatio analysis. The choice of this
-  *
variable as a potential variable determining taxable capacity in Jordan 
lies-basically on a priori grounds. As has been alluded to elsewhere 
in this thesis, it is believed that the inflow of foreign, aid may have 
created a built-in inflexibility in the government's willingness to tax. 
Therefore, it is related in this sense to tax effort rather than to 
taxable capacity. However, it is also related, perhaps indirectly, to 
taxable capacity because of its direct effect on the level of per capita 
income on the one hand, and the growth of different sectors of the economy 
on the other hand. Foreign aid as an independant variable is measured by 
the ratio of foreign resources, i.e. budget-support, economic and technical 
assistance and foreign loans to GNP. It is worth noting that the impact
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of this variable on domestically generated savings have been subjected to
rigorous analysis in a number of studies on savings in developing countries 
and was found to have a negative effect on such savings. By and large, 
it is argued that, in the particular case of Jordan, without foreign 
aid the pace of economic development would not have been maintained and 
by implication the level of national income which was achieved would not 
have been possible to be attained. Therefore, foreign aid could prove 
to be one of the most important determinants of the taxable capacity in 
Jordan.
Our dependant variable was chosen to be the ratio of Central
TRGovernment domestic revenues to GNP, coded (— )t> Domestic revenues were
chosen rather than total government revenues, for that the latter 
included the total amount of foreign resources inflow. Therefore, since 
foreign resources are exogenous to the Central Government revenues and 
are not basically affected by the structure of the economy or as part of 
taxable capacity, they have to be deducted.
28
6.2.2. The Data
Originally the model was .tested for Jordan as a whole using data
i
for the period 1954-1979. However, in order to account for Che loss of 
the West Bank, a dummy variable was first introduced and then data for the
period 1967-79 only was used. As for the variable or change in the price
a plevel (“ ), data is only available for the latter period, i.e. 1967-79 
because the cost of living index was first calculated in 1967. However, 
it is well documented in various government publications, as discussed 
in chapter one, that Jordan enjoyed a price stability during the 1950's 28
28. A representative sample of these studies may include; Douglas Dacy, 
"Foreign Aid, Government Consumption, Saving and Growth in Less- 
Developed Countries", The Economic Journal, vol. 85 (Sept. 1975): 
548-561; H.B. Chenery and Michael Bruno, "Development Alternatives 
in an Open Economy: The Case of Israel", Thé Economic Journal, 
vol. 72 (1962): 79-103; H. Chenery & Alan Strout, "Foreign Assistance 
and Economic Development". American Economic Review, vol. 56 
(Sept. 1966): 679-733.
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and 1960*s.
6.2.3. The Model
The regression approach, despite its limitations was used. The 
model to be fitted to empirical data is of the general form:
( ™ )* Y t
(™)
(f)
e«)
V
<f)
(2)V
(M )v N'
v p/
<f>
(D)
r M F Q An ApVX, y» y, y» N. p> I A Y* Y* where
Total central government domestic revenues to GNP.
per capita GNP.
Imports ratio to GNP.
Foreign aid ratio to GNP
ratio of money supply (M^) to GNP, (—) share of Agricultural 
sector in GNP.
Rate of change in population.
Rate of change in the level of consumer prices.
The share of mining, manufacturing and quarrying in GNP.
i
Dummy variable for the loss of the West Bank.
The expected partial regression coefficients are:
• # ,  ' 3 Ä  * » 3(~y) > o and,
3(f) 3(f) 3(f) 3(f) 8(-f>
3(— )r .
'3(f) * i >
3(D) 3(f)
263
6.2.4. Statistical Results
Basically a positive relationship was postulated between per capita
GNP (Yp) and the ratio of Central Government domestic revenue to GNP.
In order to test the effec-t of Yp, ceteris paribus, per capita GNP
was taken separately using the three functional forms, namely, linear;
double-log; and semi-log. The simple linear form fitted the data best.
The result as presented in Table 6.1, shows a positive relationship
which is statistically significant at the' 1% level of confidence.
Equation one reveals that Yp, assuming everything else constant, explains
237% of the variation in the tax ratio as given by the relevant R . The 
DW statistic associated with the regression indicated no autocorrelation 
problem. Furthermore, no significant changes occurred when the 
equation was transformed into semi-log or double-log forms, however for 
comparison purposes the results of all the regressions are given in 
Appendix Table ( 16 )•
Combining the import ratio (M^) and (Yp) in a multiple regression,
(equation 2), did improve significantly the explanatory power of the 
•2model. R for example increased from 0.37 to 0.5?. However, the
«introduction of resulted in undermining the significance of Yp markedly,
«
while the import ratio was statistically significant at the 1% level of 
confidence. The double-log form gave the best fit of the data and while 
the DW statistic was well above the point 2 mark yet if indicated no
autocorrelation. Both variables explained about 59%  of the variations in
TR • — 2(— ) as given by the relevant R .
In equation 3, the introduction of the foreign aid "variable to the
model did not make any difference as to the explanatory power as explained
-2 ; by R in either of the three formulations mentioned above. However,
neither the significance of the foreign aid variable nor the sign it
assumed were compatible with our initial assumption. The foreign aid
ratio was statistically insignificant in explaining the tax ratio and took
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a positive sign against a negative one assumed. One may speculate
that such a result was influenced by a strong correlation between
foreign aid variable and per capita GNP. Moreover, the DW-statistic
indicates no autocorrelation problem.
The monetization of the economy was hypothesized to have a positive
relationship with the tax ratio. The results of introducing the
monetization factor as measured by the money supply (M^) ratio to GNP
in equation 4 did give the assumed association in the model. The money
supply variable was significant at the 5% level of confidence and the
-2double-log form gave the best fit to the data, in which the R has risen 
to 0.63. Although the introduction of the monetization variable did 
affect the significance of the import ratio variable, nevertheless the 
later remained highly significant. Moreover, their was no. impact on the foreign 
aid variable yet due perhaps to a collinearity problem the per capita 
income variable was reduced to negativity. The DW-statistic associated 
with equation 4 was inconclusive so that no decision could be made as to 
whether there is no autocorrelation.
¿ NThe introduction of the population growth variable (— ) made no 
difference either to the explanatory power of the model, whereby thei
”2 ,relevant R remained virtually the same, nor did the variable‘have any
ANsignificance. While (— ) has the expected negative sign, it nevertheless 
was found statistically insignificant as reflected by the relevant t-ratio.
Only the import-ratio and the monetization variable remained statistically 
significant. Here again the DW-statistic was inconclusive. . .
It is argued that the sectoral composition of the economy as measured 
by the ratio's to GNP of the agricultural sector and that of mining, 
manufacturing and quarrying, could be taken as a substitute to the level 
of economic development measured by per capita income as a proxy measure.
In order to test this hypothesis, the per capita variable was dropped 
from the model and both variables were introduced. Although their
266
introduction improved the explanatory power slightly, however both
variables were not statistically significant. The insignificance of
the agricultural sector may be something to be expected in the case of
Jordan because this sector is virtually untaxed, however, as far as the
industrial sector is concerned such a result may be interpreted to
indicate that this sector was under-taxed in spite of its rising share
in GNP. The Durbin-Watson statistic was inconclusive as to whether there
was a negative autocorrelation or non autocorrelation problem at all.
Retaining the per capita variable did not make any difference neither as \
to the explanatory power of the model nor to the significance of the 
variable itself. The explanation that could be advanced here is 
that either income is not properly taxed on the one hand, or a multi- 
collinearity problem is perhaps at work because some of the variables 
included form a component of the Gross National Product. One is inclined 
to think that has GNP been properly taxed, given that the agricultural 
sector is completely outside the tax net and the industrial sector is 
being offered substantial concessions, the income variable would have 
been significant.
In order to test for the possible effect of the loss of the Westi
Bank, a dummy variable was introduced, however it was found not statistically 
significant hence was dropped from the model. Another way of looking 
into this was to separate the data and take the East Bank data alone, 
which is discussed below.
From the above results it is apparent that the "openness" of the 
economy as measured by the import ratio and the monetization variable as 
measured by (M^) ratio to GNP were the only variables statistically 
significant in explaining the variations in government revenue shares.
It is appropriate therefore t6v drop those variables which are not 
statistically significant hence retaining only the above mentioned two 
variables. The results, which are given in Table 6.3, were not markedly
Ta
bl
e 
(6
.?
) 
Re
gr
es
si
on
 R
es
ul
ts
 :
 D
et
er
mi
na
nt
s 
of
 C
en
tr
al
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
To
ta
l 
Do
me
st
ic
 R
ev
en
ue
s,
 1
96
7-
79
(E
as
t 
Ba
nk
 O
nl
y)
267
a 00 60o 60 O O•H o u i-H rHIH CO »—1 cd | 1O w 1 0) •d<1) PC c 0 B0) M o •H <D <Da. oo i*. <u H »-H W COH >m
Pm H o ON 00Q r-l
<S| 00 CN¡3 <3* o\ on COP • • •iH r*4 CN
CO O C4 o*CN 'd* 00 00 00• « • •o o o o
C|5h M
NI Y %
Pm I Cm ^ 5 <1
zlz<1
£>C“NrM O0*|H S-5 r-l <r
00 CN
x> X)CN1 C" o ON CNPm|5h S-S * CO ON r- on• • • •CO r-J CN r-l
o o do CN /-Ncm m vO 00 co voEl:* CN 00 O cn 00 00
o <* H  "i oo co
0
CN /-V
»-1 w w
m /•N<f r>. O  00 CN lO m  mY P J CM r-t O  <r ON Is* CN CN• • ♦ • • • « «
O  <n o o o  o o  oS-/
1 H VO 00 in
u vO0) 4J • • • •
u  cu r-4 VO o oC 0) H O 1 vO , 1
4J
c  a>
r-N l O ' r>rO Pi H p i >• P i HC « h I HI H|
a> >h w
CD <0
COo TR Yo > V-/
60
o
M u H U
CO cd i cd
a> <D •H (Uc c 0 c
•H • H 0) ♦rli-H r-4 CO »—i
VO m ON
o r-l CN coON H ON o
* • • •
r— i CN CN
o N> m N
ON ON ON OO• • • •
o o o o
x x >v-s
< t  r - «<r cnCO 00 \ 0• • • •
Q  CN CO CN^  w V^
m  /—\ /-s r-4
00 i - t •-I o <u
O  ON CN CN >» « • • a>
o  o o  o H'w'
m
rN o
O •O  rM o• •
T 9
4-1
cdVh/
4J
e
o cdco i-i o  o co <r o
<M O o  o r-i <f •H• • • • U-i
? ? ? ? •Hc'w' 00♦H
CO
x > o o ^3fN /*-S /*s /-S
O  rH m vo m CN i-i Xi—< co r-l 00 ^  o »-1 CO• •
O  <n O CN NT O  <N •kv-/ W f-i 'w' s-/ r-<, t /-N a)^4 >• <uVO r—1
/■N /—s /—N v^
m  vo CN r-1 m rH
O  r-' o  <r • • •
<Dr—l o•
o  o o  o ^  o X ow V-/ N-/ cdH U
O O o O cdo
r^. 00 CN <t CN vo u ■U
r-l NT rM <N r-l O r-l m• • CO <d
O  ^ o  vO o n  m O  co <u aN-/ V-«' 4J • H
o M-4
c •H
a
n 0) 60
o  ON <r co a; •r4
o  rN CO r-i cn CO• • « •
c  o i-H iMs-/ ■K cd
00CN 00 ^“1 /-v ♦H• o ON •H
r*-.. • 4 « v-/
i ON o
oo ••
CO
<1)
O 4J
Pi H oHI zS«/
*r\ O
P i | H Pi H Pi Hh | h I h |
SmS v ^
(i
ii
) 
Fo
r,
 c
om
pa
ri
so
ns
 w
it
h 
th
e 
re
su
lt
s 
in
 o
th
er
 f
or
ms
 s
ee
 A
pp
en
di
x 
Ta
bl
e 
( 1
7 
).
268
different from those of other equations. Both variables were statistically
significant and the double-log form fitted the data best. The two
variables explained about 57Z of the variation in government revenue shares
- 2as indicated by the relevant R . Also, the Durbin-Watson statistic 
indicated no autocorrelation problem at work.
Running the same equations on data for the East Bank only, that is, 
for the period 1967-79 did not make much difference and the generated 
equations are given in Table (6.2) below.
However, these variables which proved to be not statistically 
significant were dropped retaining only the two significant explanatory 
variables. Before comparing the results during the two periods another 
variable was introduced to the second period to check for the effect of 
prices, however it was found statistically not significant.
Comparing the results of the two periods it is apparent that there 
was no change as to the significant explanatory variables, i.e. both 
import ratio and monetization were the only significant variables in both 
periods. However, it was noticable that fitting the data for the 1967-79 
period only gave much better results. For example, while the two 
variables e x p l a i n e d o f  the variation in government revenues on the
i
basis of the 1954-79 period, for the East Bank only the same two variables 
. explained about of the variation. Both variables were significant 
at the 1% level of confidence and no-autocorrelation problem exist.
The results of the two periods are reported below in Table 6.3.
As was said before, the results showed that a relatively large 
foreign trade sector is associated with a high tax level. This is 
perhaps so for two main reasons. On the one hand, it is administratively
easier to tax foreign trade as we have argued in chapter five, and it 
is politically more feasible on the other hand, for the government to 
tax foreign trade as against direct forms of taxes. Moreover, because 
of the administrative difficulties involved, it is plausible to find the
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Table 6.3 Regression Results : Significant Factors Determining 
Taxable Capacity During 1954-79 and 1967-79
Period Dependantvariable Intercept «Y R2 DW DF
Type of 
Regression
1954-79 3.98 0.19 0.07 0.59 2.33 23
(II)v Y' (2.60)a (1.72)b linear
1967-79 1.28 0.17 0.12 0.88 2.05 10
(4.88)a (2.78)a
1954-79 -36.02 10.25 3.49 0.59 2.29 23
(™) (2.75)a (1.71)b semi-log
1967-79 -56.44 9.35 9.09 0.86 2.03 10
(4.47)a (2.60)a
1954-79 -0.21 0.54 0.24 0.65 2.43 ' 23
Log(II) (2.77)a (2.21)b log-log
1967-79 -0.77 0.48 0.41 0.86 1.97 10
(4.51)a (2.31)b
Note : (i) Figures in parenthesis represent t-value 
a Significant at 1% level;, b Significant at the 5% level
monetization variable a significant one. This is based on the assumption
that a relevant aspect of taxable capacity is the percentage of the
population that handles money, since it is generally feasible to tax
29only persons who can pay in money .
As was indicated earlier, the tax capacity calculated represent the
minimum taxable capacity in the economy given its main characteristics.
It is also possible to calculate a tax effort index which serves as an
indicator for comparison purposes. While the expected tax ratio represent
tax capacity, the tax effort is defined as the extent to which this tax
( *Tcapacity is being used, i.e. Taxable capacity is —  and Tax effort
A
29. Lotz and Morss, op.cit., p.330
170
Accordingly, for comparison purposes with other developing countries, 
a tax effort index for Jordan was calculated utilizing a model used 
for a number of other developing countries on a cross-country basis.
Since indices for other countries were calculated on the basis of 
available data for the period 1969-71, the Jordanian data for the 
same period was used in order to ensure consistency. While it is 
recognized that the tax levels in tho$e countries may have changed' 
since then, however for comparison purposes the calculated index 
was used.
The model used for the cross-country analysis incorporates per 
capita non-export income, the percentage share of mining in GDP, and 
the percentage share of non-mineral exports in GNP as explanatory 
variables*.
Table 6.4 reports the actual tax ratios and tax effort indices 
of a sample of 13 countries. The data indicates that while Jordan was 
ranked sixth in terms of its actual tax ratio however, by way of its 
tax effort index it ranked ninth in the same group. While one may
infer from such comparison that Jordan may have made a^better effort
\
as compared to the rest'of the group of developing countries, however 
such inference must be taken with caution.
* The derived equation reads as follows:
~  = 10.05 + 0.0031 (Yp-Xp) + 0.3973 Ny + 0.0881 X^.
(7.84) (0.77) (5.55) (1.89)
- 2R =0.39 where,
T—  ■ tax ratio; Yp = Per capita income; Ny = the share of mining 
in GDP; and X^ = the export ratio excluding mineral exports.
Source: R. Chelliah, et. al., op. cit.
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Such conclusions are subject to many constraints, one of which 
is that one may question whether the determinants of tax ratios are 
the same for all countries involved and whether for example such an 
exercise takes into consideration the particular structure and 
development of each country taken separately.
However, this is in fact an indicative measure of the level of tax 
effort in each country as compared to the rest of the group.
Looking back at the results of this exercise in the particular 
case of Jordan utilizing time series data over time, the significance 
of knowing the determinants of tax ratio for Jordan may have some 
reflections on future decision making. The finding that import ratio 
was the main determinant of tax ratio in Jordan if coupled with the 
analysis in the next section may have some policy relevance. If 
Jordan is to further its orientation towards import-substitution 
industries, then the composition of the tax system may have to be 
examined in the sense that attention has to be given towards more 
reliance on internal taxes in coordination with import, duties.
i\
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Table (6.^ f) Selected Developing Countries Tax Ratio and Indices
of Tax Effort, 1969-1971
Country
i
Taxes as % of
GNP
gIndex of Tax 
Effort, 69-71
Guyana 23.9 1.059
Tunisia 21,7 1.639
Ivory Coast 19.8 1.471
Sudan 18.2 1.440
Morocco 17.8 1.224
Jordan^ 16.8 1.240
Ghana 15.8 1.154
Korea 15.4 1.181
Ecuador 13.4 1.002
Colombia 12.5 0.901
Honduras 11.3 0.800
Lebanon 11.2 0.782
Paraguay
\
\
10.9 0.867
Source : Raja J. Chelliah, H.J. Bass and M.R. Kelley,
"Tax Ratios and Tax Effort in Developing Countries, 
1969-71", IMF Staff Papers, 1975, voL. 22, Table 1.
a Ranked according to tax ratios for the period 1969-71.
b Calculated according to the equation used for other countries.
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This in fact confirms our analysis in the previous chapters on the tax 
mix. It was perhaps interesting to find that the mining, manufacturing 
and quarrying sector was not 'statistically' significant in explaining 
tax capacity, a finding which was different from that of earlier studies 
on inter-country data. This may be explained, in the particular case 
of Jordan, by the fact that it was only relatively recently that this 
sector started an upward trend as its contribution to gross domestic 
product. A new growing manufacturing sector was granted a wide range of 
tax concessions. Although it may be argued that such concessions are a
pre-condition or a necessary measure for the growth in the industrial 
sector, yet there are many instances in which the wisdom of extending such 
tax-free situation far too long could be questioned^eithernon the basis 
of efficiency within manufacturing itself, or in terms of its implications 
to the governments' revenues. These policy implications are more relevant, 
as was indicated, to the future instability of government revenues which 
is a characteristic of most developing countries. In what, follows we provide
empirical knowledge of the nature of instability of various sources of 
government revenues. _ «
6.3 Revenue Instability
The previous statistical results raised the question of revenue 
instability indirectly. Such an issue is important to policy makers 
and planners in identifying the areas of revenue disruptions due to 
revenue instability. This identification would, among other things, 
allow for policy implications to be taken into consideration in the 
provisions of government expenditures. For one thing, a steady and 
reliable provision of public expenditures is to a large extent dependant 
on an equally steady flow^of public funds.
Jordanian planners have so far been concerned about.instability in 
foreign resources. While they realized the importance of limited 
domestic resources, the implications of an equal instability in government
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domestic resources, though limited in nature, has not been addressed yet.
The structural factors discussed in this chapter alongside many 
others such as tax rates, rate structure, tax bases, tax concessions and 
so forth, result in yield fluctuation. Accordingly, it seems rather obvious 
that any measure used measuring revenue instability is of the nature of total 
derivative since it describes the summary influence on revenue yields of 
all factors.
6.3.1. Defining the Measure of Instability
There has been a number of instability measures used in literature.
30Williams et al., for example applied an index defined as the inverse of 
the standard error of the natural log of tax revenue (R) regressed on 
time (t), to a number of states in the U.S. Other measures such as the 
log variance and variance of first differences were used and found 
inadequate.^1
The measure of instability of revenues adopted here is the 
normalized coefficient of variations defined as:
I - 100 - « (1)
where, I ■ is the index of instability of the Jordanian revenues
1
over the relevant period,
S » is the standard error of the estimated trend equation 
' relating government revenue to time, and 
R * is the mean revenue over the time period.
The choice of this index over others according to Idachaba, who has 
applied it in a similar context to that of Jordan, is dictated by three 301
30. William V. Williams, et al. "The Stability, Growth and Stabilizing
Influence of State TalceV’V  National Tax Journal, vol. 26, 2, June 1973.
31. See for example Idachaba, F.S., "Export Instability in African 
International Trade", West African Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
vol. 2, No.l, 1973; See also M. Michaely, Concentration in 
International Trade. Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Co.,
(1962).
275
considerations : First, a measure of instability of revenues should 
correct for trend. Second, developing countries do not have annual 
plans, rather they have medium term plans of three or five years, as is 
the case in Jordan. They are therefore concerned with revenue instability 
problems from a medium term point of view; and finally medium term fiscal 
equilibrium, stemming from a strong and steady secular upward trend in 
certain provisions of expenditures, is the basis for concern with medium 
term revenue instability.
6.3.2. Empirical Results
The linear trend equation (2) was estimated, using data for the 
various sources of revenue accruing to the Jordanian Government over 
the period 1967-197932 3.
R. ■ a + BTJ
where,
R.J is revenue from the
• th J source, and
T ■ is the trend variable.
(2)
From equation (2) above, the standard error was taken as well as 
the mean revenue of each tax for the period under consideration. Table (6.5) 
presents the estimated indices of instability.
From Table (6.J-), the instability indices range from a low of 8.50% 
for revenue from excise duties to a high of 70.37 of revenue from post, 
telg. and telephone. Except for the index for post and telephones, the
t * V
evidence is consistent with our expectations. Normally, one does not 
expect significant changes in post; telegraphs and telephone revenues,
32. F.S. Idachaba, "Revenue Instability in Developing Countries ; The 
Ghanian Experience", Public Finance, vol.30, 1975.
33. The choice of the petiod was dictated by conceptual and practical 
reasons. Conceptually, this period excluded the interruptions of 
1967 war on the one hand, and covered the implementation of two 
successive medium-term development plans. On the practical side, 
constraints by the availability of certain data were to be faced.
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Table (6 J$ ) Estimated Indices of Instability of 
Government Revenues, 1967-1979
Sources of Revenues Instability Index 
I.%
(1) Customs Duties 49.07
(2) Excise Duties 8.50
(3) Fees 35.19
(4) Licences 33.99
(5) Additional Tax 25.15
(6) Income and Property Taxes 47.95
(7) Post; Telegraph and Telephone 70.37
(8) Interest and Profits 20.15
(9) Miscellaneous 34.10
however the results in the Jordanian case is consistent with a wide 
range and continuing changes in this area over the past ten years. 
Telephone network in particular witnessed no significant changes over a 
long period of time, however by the early seventies it was rather obvious 
that such a network in the telephone system needs complete modernization. 
To meet the considerable amount of investments necessaTy, the government 
resorted to very frequent changes in charges to meet the costs, which
i «
apparently were reflected in a high instability index. However, the 
- main noticeable high indices are those of customs duties and income tax 
revenues of 4.9.07% and 47.95% respectively. These relatively high 
indexes are viewed with some concern because together they form the 
bulk of government revenues, and a high instability in their revenues 
must surely reflect on a similar instability in the total government 
domestic revenues. So far as the import duties index is concerned, it 
could possibly be explained by the changing structure of imports which is 
closely correlated to the industrial structure. To this must be added 
the ever widening range of exemptions, be it for purposes of the 
investment encouragement law or otherwise. By contrast the low excise
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duty index of 8.50% is perhaps mainly due to two factors, that is, the 
limited coverage of the excise system of a few commodities on the one 
hand, and a low level of fluctuations in the production of those 
excisable commodities.
In order to see the average contribution of major sources of revenues 
to total revenues, these sources were regrouped in four major subcategories. 
First, the simple relative share of each sub-category were calculated by
R .  »
( J), whereby Rj is the mean of subcategory j during the period under 
R
consideration, and R is the mean of the overall revenues during the same 
period of time.
To compute the weighted contribution to instability of the four
major sub-categories (W.) > the following formula was used, i.e.
W.J
(I. R. )
J J k (1)
whereby, 1^ Rj as defined above, and
k
l  I. R. is the computed average revenue
j~l  ^  ^ instability of all sources of revenues.
'
The computed simple relative shares in total revenues and the
weighted contributions to total instability of 
for the period 1960-1979 are, in percentages:
revenues major sub-categories
Major Sub-categories Simple Relative share
Weighted relative 
contribution to 
Total Instability
(1) Income and property tax 10.7 13.6
(2) Customs and Excise Ratios 45.4 48.0
(3) Fees, Licences and Add. Tax 19.6 16.8
(4) Other Revenues 24.3 21.6
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The results above show that the simple relative share of income 
and property tax to total domestic revenue (10.7%) is less than its 
weighted relative contribution to total instability of 13.6%. This is 
probably due to the differences in taxes collected in arrears which 
contributes to the instability of income tax. It is not likely 
that property taxes have any influence because it represents only a 
very minor share in this sub-category. On the other hand, the data 
indicates that the major contributions to the overall revenue instability 
comes from customs and excise duties of about (48%). In view of the 
fact that these taxes form on the average about 45% of total domestic 
revenue, perhaps this result is to be expected. However, looking 
at the individual instability index one would expect that the main 
contributor to the overall weighted instability are customs duties due to 
reasons already alluded to above. The last two sub-categories comprising 
fees, licences, additional tax and other revenues, both contribute less 
than their average share in total domestic revenues. In fact this 
result was not something to be expected because one is inclined to 
think that such categories are in general subject to ch'anges and may possibly 
be of significance to contribute to the overall instability. All in 
all, the results are interesting in the sense that they point clearly 
to the fact that the main categories in total domestic revenues, namely 
customs and excise as well as income tax contribute most to the overall 
instability of total domestic revenues. Such empirical knowledge on 
the degrees of instability of various sources of revenue may prove useful 
to planners and policy makers for future policy planning in Jordan.
6.4 Concluding Remarks
showed that the government revenue shares
are determined mainly by the import ratio, and this was .manifested in
similar conclusions as to the source of revenue instability. These
27 9
results might have medium and long-term implications concerning the 
composition of the tax system. Taking into consideration the current 
medium-term economic strategy in which the government is embarking upon a 
wide ranging program of import-substituting industries, consideration 
should be given to its effects on the tax mix and accordingly the 
implications to the government revenue yields. Particularly important is 
the possibility of transforming the structure of imports in favour of 
capital and raw material goods, on which little taxes are levied, if 
any, against consumption goods. This in turn has its repercussion 
on the ability of government in generating more revenues or even maintaining 
their present rates of growth. The pursuit of development strategy 
and the fulfilment of its goals may need a fresh look into the tax 
system with particular emphasis on coordinating the excise system with 
customs duties on the one hand, and a more rigorous implementation of the 
laws concerning direct taxes on the other hand.
\
<
CHAPTER SEVEN
DEFICIT FINANCING AND MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS
Our analysis in the previous chapters indicated that in spite of 
large amounts of grants augmenting governments’ revenues, the overall 
growth of revenues was slower than that of public expenditures, 
particularly during the post-1967 peri'od. Total government revenues, 
that is, domestic plus foreign grants, were not enough to finance the 
increasing level of expenditure and therefore the government has had to 
use various types of borrowing to fill the gap. Our interest in this 
chapter lies in examining the significance of deficit financing through 
an inquiry into the sources of financing, particularly domestic borrowing. 
This is then related to its implications on domestic liquidity in the 
economy. Finally, a brief account of the governments monetary measures 
taken during the period under consideration as a means of economic 
stabilization is given.
7.1 The Significance of Deficit Financing - •
The analysis in this chapter focuses attention on thp post 1967 
period. This is because it was only during this period that the government 
resorted to deficit financing, particularly domestic borrowing, to 
finance its expenditures. As was said earlier, public sector borrowing 
was mainly due to budget difficulties characterized by the failure on the 
part of the government to increase domestic revenues accompanied by a 
sharp rise in expenditures particularly after 1967 as Table 7.1 
demonstrates. Since then, a fast rising current domestic deficit took 
place which shows that domestically generated revenues were not enough to 
cover a reasonable share of current expenditures. The government was 
aware of this situation and following several recommendations in 
successive development plans, some effort was taken to increase the share
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of domestic revenues in current expenditures which increased from
only 44% in 1968 to about 64% in 1979. This change has taken place
against the background of increasing domestic revenues faster than that of
current expenditures. For example, while current expenditures grew, on an
average, by about 16% per annum during the period 1968-1969, domestic
revenues grew by 20%. However, due to the fact that traditionally
current expenditures outpaced revenues in absolute terms, the faster rate
>
of growth in revenues was not enough to significantly close the gap.
This current deficit in budgetary resources has always been met by the 
inflow of foreign grants. The balance over current deficit covers 
part of development expenditures. Prior to 1967 foreign grants and 
loans were sufficient to finance the budgetary deficits and even in some 
years there were small surpluses. In 1968, however, government 
expenditure went up by over 20% compared to that of 1967 (see chapter 
three) and government revenues did not keep pace with at least a similar 
rate of growth. Therefore budget deficits started a steady increase 
immediately after 1967 which amounted to about 17% of total expenditures 
in 1968 and 20% in 1969. The current deficit even widened and showed its 
biggest jump in 1975-1976 period. This jump occurred for two different 
reasons. On the one hand, following the inflationary pressures which 
started in 1972 the government was compelled to significantly increase 
the public sector wages and salaries bill and indulged in a program of 
subsidizing food items and petrol products, which in turn increased its 
current expenditures. On the other hand, a sharp drop in foreign grants 
in 1976 took place. Both reasons taken together resulted in suddenly 
increasing the overall budget deficit from only JD 25.7 million in 1974 
to JD 88.7 million in 197^.
In order to assess the implications of deficit financing both the
*
sources and composition of financing are important since each source has a 
different impact on the economy. Broadly speaking, when the major sources
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of financing are considered, it appears that, on average, foreign sources 
are as important as domestic sources.
As for foreign loans, their inflow appear to correlate to the 
soundness of the economy and political stability not only in Jordan but in 
the whole region as well. This is apparent if one notices that the net 
utilization of foreign loans were minimal at best during the internal 
disturbances in 1969 and 1970 which amounted to JD 3.8 and JD 1.5 million 
respectively. This in turn financed about 212 and 10% of budget deficits 
during the same years. However, following the launching of the Three 
Year Development Plan 1973-75 and the increased international confidence 
in the economy, the share of foreign loans in financing governments budget 
deficit increased to almost matching that of domestic sources, amounting 
to about 44% by 1979, Table 7.3.
This increase in government foreign borrowing is manifested in a 
steady growth in debt outstanding. On the one hand, total government 
debt outstanding increased considerably during the seventies. For example, 
between 1969 and 1979, government debt rose, in absolute terms, from 
JD 39.9 million to JD 233.7 million registering the highest rate of 
growth ever, of about 30% annually during the period 1975-1979, on average. 
An important feature of this growth is the fact that at the closing 
period of this study the government seems to have increased its borrowing 
from foreign banks and commercial companies, which- increased from 
JD 2.3 million in 1969 to JD 21.6 million by 1979 or about 9% of its 
total outstanding debt*. As Table (7.2) demonstrates, the ratio of annual 
debt outstanding to GNP, which is one of the criteria usually employed as a 
measure of indebtedness, has been increasing during the 1970’s from only 
1.3% in 1969 to 9.7% in 1977, yet dropped to 7.1% by 1979.
While the level of indebtedness itself is of considerable importance,
1. For details on the composition of foreign public debt, data is 
provided in Appendix Table ( 14 )•
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Table (7.2) Debt Outstanding, Debt Service and 
Their Ratios to GNP
Debt Outstanding Debt Service
Year
Accumulated
Debt
(millions)
Annual Rate 
of growth 
%
%
to
GNP
Abs. in 
•(millions)
Z
of
GNP
Z
of
GDP
% of 
Export 
Earnings
1 9 6 9 3 9 . 9 5 . 6 1 . 3 1 . 2 2 0 . 7 0 0 . 6 8 . 3
1 9 7 0 4 1 . 8 4 . 8 1.0 1 . 6 4 1 . 8 0 0 . 9 1 3 . 5
19 7 1 4 9 . 6 1 8 . 7 3 . 9 2 . 5 3 1 . 0 0 1 . 3 6 2 2 . 1
1 9 7 2 6 1 . 2 2 3 . 4 5 . 2 3 . 0 5 1 . 3 8 1 . 4 7 1 7 . 9
19 7 3 6 8 . 3 1 1 . 6 2 . 9 5 . 9 9 2 . 5 0 2 . 7 4 3 1 . 6
197 4 7 9 . 8 1 6 . 8 4 . 1 4 . 6 9 1 . 6 8 1 . 8 9 9 . 4
1975 1 0 8 . 0 3 5 . 3 8 . 2 6 . 2 6 1 . 8 0 2 . 2 5 1 2 . 8
19 7 6 1 3 2 . 6 2 2 . 8 4 . 5 8 . 2 5 i 1 . 5 0 2 . 0 5 1 2 . 0
1977 1 9 3 . 1 4 5 . 6 9 . 7 1 2 . 0 5 1 . 6 0 2 . 5 1 4 . 7
19 7 8 2 4 4 . 1 2 6 . 1 7 . 0 1 4 . 1 1 2*. do 2 . 4 1 5 . 5
1979 3 0 6 . 3 2 $ . 5 7 . 1 2 8 . 3 3 3 . 3 0 . 4 . 0 2 3 . 4
Sources: (i) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin, vol. 17, No.5 May 1981; vol. 15, 
- No. 10, Oct. 1979; and vol. 11, No.4, April
1975
(ii) Appendix Table No. (3)
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debt servicing is of immediate concern due to its implications towards
increasing the budget deficits and the outflow of capital. As early as
1960 economists predicted that debt servicing obligations for developing
countries would rise. One reason given for this rise was the expiration
of the grace period on development loans received during the early 
2sixties . This is confirmed by recent statistics. For example, total 
LDC's debt service rose from US $6.2 billion in 1967 to reach US $32.0 by 
the end of 1976^.
Jordan in that respect is no exception in which debt servicing, 
that is, repayments of principals and interests showed a noticeable 
increase as of 1973 and has been increasing rapidly since then in absolute 
terms to reach a record high of JD 28.33 million in 1979. • While debt 
servicing still forms a relatively small fraction of GNP, i.e. 3.3% in 
1979, yet more importantly the ratio to export earnings of foreign 
exchange peaked in 1973 to reach about 32%. In spite of the fact that the 
increase in export earnings resulted in a drop in the ratio of debt 
service/export earning to 23% by 1979, however such a ratio is still 
considered a rather high one by other developing countries standards and 
is expected to further increase once the grace period of.loans contracted 
during the late sixties ends.
As for domestic borrowing, the forms of borrowing currently in
use are not different from those used by governments elsewhere in the
world. Short-term borrowing takes the form of treasury bills and
Central Bank advances, while long and medium-term borrowing are undertaken
through the issue of bonds. The latter source is usually augmented
in developing countries by the sale of non-negotiable savings certificates,
the use of provident fund^contributions of government employees and the
See for example Dragoslav Avramovic, et^  al. Debt Servicing Capacity and 
Post War International Indebtedness (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1958); 
Also see D. Avramovic, et al, Economic Growth and External Debt 
(Baltimore : John Hopkins press, 1966).
3. OECD, Observer, No. 90, July 1978.
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acceptance of savings deposits by the Post Office or Government Savings
4Banks . While some of these instruments are available in Jordan» such as 
the Pension Fund and Post Office Savings Fund, however the difference 
lies in the way in which such funds are channelled to the public sector. 
While in some countries such as India and Pakistan, they are directly 
taken into the budget, in Jordan they are partly invested in government 
bonds and partly in other productive investments. Therefore, practically 
the internal sources of finance are comprized of the utilization of the 
banking system and that of the sale of treasury bills and government 
bonds.
As was alluded to earlier, the government was compelled to make 
use of the Public Debt Law No. 96 of 1966, which was introduced following 
a recommendation by the Seven Year Programme for Economic Development 
(1963-1970). The planners at the time assumed that "A modest national 
debt owed to the citizens of Jordan should not be regarded as undesirable, 
in fact it is much more desirable than having foreign debts of similar 
size"\ In order to ensure that internal borrowing be compatible with the 
above statement, there are certain statutory restrictions, that temporary 
"ways and means" advances from the Central Bank may not exceed 10% of the 
average annual domestic receipts collected during the preceding three 
years and these advances may not be extended for more than 300 days during 
a fiscal year'; and the limit of outstanding government bonds may not 
exceed 15% of the average annual domestic receipts collected during the 
previous three years. However, realizing the need to increase the issue 
of bonds, the government in 1969 increased the limit on bonds outstanding 
to 25% of the currency in circulation or 25% of the average annual 
domestic receipts whichever was higher, with a ceiling on any issue of 45
4. UN, "Findings of the Seminar on Problems of Ecbnomic Development: 
Financing Public Sector Investment", Economic Bulletiil for Asia and the 
Far East", vol.19, No.2, Sept. 1968, p.18.
5. Jordan Development Board, op.cit., p.25.
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bonds in any one year of JD 8.0 million, which was increased to 
JD 32.0 million in 19786.
Issues of Treasury bills commenced in 1969 which amounted to JD 8.4 
million, however continued increasing rapidly reaching JD 58.00 million 
by the end of 1979. Despite the early increase of sales of Treasury 
bills, the budget continued to be in substantial deficit, particularly after 
the internal disturbances of 1970. Government bonds were then introduced 
in early 1971, the first issue of which amounted to JD 3.0 million in 
1971 with a maturity of four years, and an interest rate of 7.0%. Both 
sources together were not enough to cover the budget deficit, therefore 
recourse to advances from the Central Bank also grew rapidly, increasing 
from only JD 0.3 million in 1969 to a record high of JD 37.2 million 
and JD 25.4 million in 1978 and 1979 respectively, Table (7.3).
The Central Government's total internal debt has increased
substantially over the period under consideration and stood at JD 139.4
million by the end of 1979, (20%) of GDP. The composition of domestic
public debt is of particular importance, because each source has
different implications to the economy. This composition has changed in
recent years reflecting'the government's policy of promoting the issue
, ♦
of longer-term instruments and encouraging non-bank placement. Nevertheless,
Treasury bills held almost entirely by the banking system, and accounted
for almost half of the total in 1974, however, this ratio decreased
relatively to 37% by 1979. Treasury bills have a maturity of three
months. Government bonds maturing in four to seven years were increasingly
gaining acceptance, accounting for 40% of total domestic debt in 1979.
The government has made particular efforts to place these issues with
non-bank holders. Since^1973, it has been offering a preferential
interest rate of 7.5% to private holders combined with a lottery feature,
6. For details see, Central Bank of Jordan, Public Debt Law No. 69 of 
1966, Article (4.b). (Amman.: 1971); see also IMF, "Jordan - 
Recent Economic Development", Doc. (SM/73/207), August 1973.
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compared to the 5.75% rate for the banking sector, both rates were 
increased by one half percentage point in 1975. As a result-53% of all 
bonds outstanding by the end of 1975 were held by non-bank holders.
However, this should not conceal the fact that bonds held by the non­
banking sector included less than 25% held by individuals, and the 
rest was held by institutions such as saving funds and specialized credit 
institutions. Overall, although the share of the banking sector in 
the total outstanding domestic debt decreased from its highest level of 
91% in 1971 to 74% in 1979, yet for the banking sector to hold about 
three quarters of total domestic debt is no doubt a very high ratio,
Table (7.3).
The above shows that no success has been achieved in selling government 
securities to the non-bank non-institutional. investors. The question 
that may be asked here is whether it is really necessary to build up 
such a market for government securities and whether reliance on non-bank 
* institutions in particular cannot be given more importance. Investment 
in government securities by such institutions could be regarded as 
indirect investment by the household sector. Moreover, these institutions 
are statutorily required, in most cases, to invest in specified proportion 
of their investible funds in government securities and consequently they 
buy them as an investment proposition irrespective of such consideration 
as yield and liquidity. Hence, given the need to keep down the cost of 
government borrowing, reliance on such institutions seems necessary as it 
obviates the need for the government to compete for funds by offering 
higher interest rates. For that, it seems reasonable for the government 
to increase the share of the non-bank institutions in holding securities. 
However, there is always limit as to the ability of such institutions 
to absorb more government securities, beyond which the government has to 
compete in the market for the household ' savings.
The extent of the impact of government borrowing on economic activity
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stems from the inflationary potential of deficit financing. It is 
generally held that borrowing from the non-banking sector represents 
the diversion of genuine savings to the public sector; savings which 
otherwise may have been geared to consumption or other forms of 
investments. To the extent that borrowing from the non-banking sector 
results in a reduction in the current private sector purchasing power, 
then it would be non-inflationary. However, taking into consideration
the interest differential, if the non-banking sector borrows from 
commercial banks and investing in government securities then this would 
not result in a reduction in purchasing power and would perhaps be 
inflationary. Borrowing from the Central Bank, of course, is a simple 
case of credit creation as it results in a net addition in purchasing 
power in the economy. On the one hand, as the government spends the 
proceeds of borrowing from the Central Bank, these accrue as additional 
income. On the other hand, the government by placing some or all of 
its borrowed money from the Central Bank in commercial banks increases the 
ability of the latter to give more credit advances as a result of 
increasing its cash base. Borrowing from the commercial banks is some­
what different because it creates earning assets for the private sector u
i
and liabilities for the government whereas this is not the case for the 
Central Bank, for it is part of the public sector. However, it is 
argued that both have similar effects on the real income of the private 
sector and should therefore be grouped with that of the Central Bank.
Whatever the source of borrowing, it is well to bear in mind that 
in considering the inflationary/non-inflationary potential of deficit 
financing the dividing line between the two as regards borrowing from the 
banking system is thin. Certainly there are a host of other factors which 
have to be taken into consideration, such as the growth rate of real output, 
income viability of monetary resources etc. before any concrete answer is 
to be given.
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7.2 Monetary Developments and the Governments* Action
7.2.1 Monetary developments.
Having analysed the governments* deficit financing in section one, 
our attention is given in the present section to a review of the monetary 
developments after 1967 and the policy measures taken by the Central Bank 
as the main agent of the government.
It is generally argued that the main implication of deficit financing 
lies in its impact on domestic liquidity and hence on the role it may 
play in aggravating the price instability. However, this causal 
relationship may not always be the case, for one, the cause and effect 
relationship among such factors is so intertwined and such factors are 
interrelated so that it is hard to establish a straightforward causal 
effect.
However, during economic development, experience of developed countries
shows that as their per capita incomes increase they experienced a more
rapid growth in financial assets than in national wealth or national product^.
Data on monetary development in Jordan during the period under review shows
 ^ %
precisely that. As Table (7.4) shows money supply (M2) increased 
substantially over the period under consideration and this growth could 
, be subdivided into two separate periods. The first is that of 1967-1972 
period during which this monetary growth was absorbed by the rapid growth 
in the economy as the figures on GNP shows. However, the picture has 
changed since then whereby monetary growth outpaced significantly that of., 
the gross national product. This trend is clearly reflected in the ratio 
of money (M2) to GNP which increased significantly in the second period 
to reach about 91% by 1979, while during the earlier period it stabilized 
between 65 and 66%. Now*, these changes were reflected in a way in 7
7. J.G. Gurely & E.S. Shaw, "Financial Structure and Economic Development", 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 15, No.3, 1967, 
pp. 257-65.
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Table (7.5) Indexes of GNP, Money Supply (M.), Prices and the 
Money/GNP Ratio, 1967-1980. (per cent)
Indexes (1967 = 100) M2 to3
Year Consumer prices GNP in Current prices
Money Supply
(m 2)
GNP
Ratio
1 2 3 4
1967 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.66
1968 99.7 116.8 105.5 0.65
1969 107.5 138.5 126.2 0.60
1970 114.8 131.2 137.2 0.69
1971 119.7 139.9 143.6 0.67
1972 129.4 155.1 155.7 0.66
1973 142.9 169.5 187.6 0.72
1974 171.5 196.0 230.3 0.77
1975 192.1 240.3 295.1 0.81
1976 214.2 380.7 381.4 0.66
1977 245.3 437.5 "466.4 0.70
1978 262.4', 501.1 644..7 0.84
1979 299.7 598.7 821.6 0.91
Sources: (i) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin, vol.8
No.12, Dec. 1972; vol.13, No.9, Sept. 1977 and 
vol. 17, No.6, June 1981.
(ii) See also Table (1.8) page 28.
Note: a For data on M2 and GNP in absolute terms see ref (i)
above and Appendix Table (1).
<
294
consumer price index which followed a similar pattern, hence as of 
1972-1973 the first signs of the inflationary pressures were at work.
The composition of domestic liquidity has undergone a considerable 
change over the period under consideration. As for the components of 
narrowly defined money (M^), there has been a tradition of public 
aversion towards demand deposits vis-a-vis currency, especially during 
periods of political instability. This is evident during the period 
of internal strife of 1969 and 1970 when currency components of money 
supply increased by 12% and 16% during the two years respectively.
At the same time the currency to narrow money (M^) ratio was as high as 
78% in 1970. However since then this ratio has been dropping considerably 
to reach 59% by the end of 1980 with the ratio of demand deposits 
increasing significantly from 22% in 1970 to 41% by 1980. Also, the 
importance of time and saving deposits has been gaining ground : their 
ratio to broad money (M2) increased from 19% in 1969 to 39% by the end 
of 19808.
There has equally been a change in the factors affecting domestic 
liquidity, that is, broad money (M2) over the period-under consideration. 
Based on the conventional analysis in terms of external and domesticI *
credit factors, the expansion of liquidity prior to 1973 was mainly
attributable to an increase in domestic credit, except for 1968. This
domestic credit expansion was in turn a result of.a considerable increase
in net claims on the government. However, during the period 1973-1975,
the expansion in liquidity was attributable, almost equally, to both
external surplus and increase in credit to the private sector. The
increase in credit to the private sector accelerated from 24% in 1973
to 44% in 1975 (Table 7.6); the major portion of this credit to the
<
private sector was directed towards trade and real estate boom during that
8. For more detailed data on the components of money supply (M^ and M 2) 
see Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin, vol 17, No.6, June 1981.
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period which will be discussed briefly later in the chapter.
It is evident from this brief review of monetary developments that
during the period under consideration, on average, the government was
the more potent source of liquidity expansion. This was more so for
example in 1975 and the years following 1977 during which the governments'
surpluses increased considerably.
The increased liquidity in the economy was accompanied by price
increases as well, and may have aggravated the inflationary pressures
which were already apparent in Jordan. In the early post-war period
price increases were relatively gradual. Since 1972 inflation
accelerated significantly and remained in the 10-20% range. Clearly,
as Table 7.7 shows, the largest pressure on the overall cost of living
index came from increases in food stuff prices which reflect both imported
inflation as well as domestic pressures. However, in the last few
9years of the 1970's clothing and other services had their share .
In the absence of a comprehensive fiscal policy to combat inflation, 
the authorities seem to consider inflation as essentially a monetary 
phenomena and therefore resorted to monetary policy.in order to lessen 
its impact, at least in the short-run. In the rest .of this sectioni ' ♦
therefore we review the governments' action which was implemented by 
the Central Bank of Jordan as the governments' agent to influence 
liquidity in'the market and therefore inflationary pressures.
7.2.2. Monetary Policy : The Credit Control
There are two analytical problems imbedded in monetary policy, 
that is, the ability of the monetary authority to control monetary 
variables on the one hand, and the choice of the operational target
9. In 1975 the government felt that the then used bases for calculating 
the cost of living index resulted in inflating the price index, 
therefore both the weights given to the components, as well as the 
base year were changed. The base year was changed from (1967*100) 
to (1975*100) on the grounds that the former year was an unstable 
year and hence unrepresenting.
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Table (7,7) Cost of Living Index 1967-1980. 
(1967 « 100)
Year All items Food stuffs Housing Clothing Other (Goods & Services)
Weight (100.0) (35.0) (32.0) (12.1) (20.6)
1967 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1968 99.7 97.8 100.9 99.6 101.1
1969 107.5 118.8 101.2 101.3 101.4
1970 114.8 128.1 107.3 107.2 108.5
1971 119.7 136.1 111.3 112.4 109.9
1972 129.4 151.2 120.3 119.5 112.3
1973 142.9 179.7 125.0 133.1 124.1
1974 171.5 242.3 135.0 150.4 120.9
1975 192.1 279.9 141.4 160.5 140.4
1976 214.2 320.8 151.0 172.7 157.4
1977 245.3 366.7 162.3 223.6 186.5
1978 262.4 379.8 179.2 234 „5 214.3
1979 299.7 401.9 230.2 289.7 249.8
1980 371.1
i
445.0 247.9 306.9 299.8
Note: : In 1975 the government changed both the base year from 1967
to'1975, as well as the weights of the.components of the 
price index. Hence, figures for the years after 1975 
are adjusted to the base year 1967 * 100.0
Source : (i) Central Bank of Jordan, Statistics Pertaining to some
Aspects of the Jordanian Economy, Oct. 1974.
(ii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 
(January 1978 and April 1981).
<
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appropriate on the other. As far as the first is concerned, it is 
generally accepted that their is an interrelationship in the cause and 
effect between the monetary variables and the overall economic activity, and 
the main aggregates such as consumption, government spending, investment 
etc., a relationship which adds up to the problem of controlling monetary 
variables.
Secondly, the monetary authorities are often faced with a dilemma 
between long-run aim of smoothly operating financial markets and the need 
to achieve a restraining effect on private demand in the short run.
Some measures related to credit controls, such as ceilings on various 
types of financial flows are effective in the latter sense. In Jordan, 
the emphasis of monetary policy seems to have taken into consideration 
the short-term restraining effects rather than the long-term one, hence 
credit controls lies at the heart of monetary policy.
Prior to 1974, the only instruments of monetary policy in use were 
the reserve ratio, liquidity ratio and the bank rate which had been fixed 
at 10%, 25% and 5% respectively. Since then with the Central Bank (CB) 
addressing itself mainly to controlling domestic credit, as inflationary 
pressures built up, it resorted first to a mild use of moral suasion to 
influence the commercial bank lending. Failing to achieve the desired 
results, then the (CB) moved on to use quantitative credit controls along 
with a built-in selectivity element. It instructed the commercial 
banks to limit the increase in their outstanding credit to 5% of the 
corresponding amount at the end of 1974, however excluding credit 
facilities extended to finance industrial, agricultural and public works 
projects aiming at the rechannelling of commercial banks investment into
material producing sectors in the economy. These moves came against the
<‘
background that between 1969 and 1973 for example, commercial bank credit 
facilities provided for the commerce and trade sector'averaged about 41% 
of their total credit, while credit to the mining and industrial sector
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averaged only 9.8% over the same period, Table (7.8). The (CB) 
followed this by raising the reserve ratio to 12% by August 1974^.
These credit control policies were first introduced in the UK in 
1955, however were resented by banks on the grounds that they were 
thought to harm banker-customer relationship on the one hand, and were 
blamed for damaging financial efficiency, hence were abandoned in 1971^. 
Similarly, the Central Bank of Jordan was in 1975 concerned about the 
possible dampening effect of these controls on economic growth. Therefore, 
by mid-1975 the credit of the commercial banks was allowed not to exceed 
10% of its outstanding level at the end of the previous year. At the 
same time a credit/deposit ratio of 80% was introduced and liquidity 
ratio increased to 30%.
There is little doubt that the tightening of the controls on bank 
lending did effectively curtail expenditure, and the impact of the more 
stringent monetary measures was felt in 1976. Therefore, while maintaining 
the 10% ceiling on credit expansion, the credit/deposit ratio was reduced 
to 75%. At the same time, a minimum 1.5% interest rate was applied to 
commercial banks' loans and overdrafts. The banks-were also required 
to maintain with the (CB), over and above their cash reserves, a speciall •
deposit on their overdrafts. By the end of 1976, the reserve ratio on
demand deposits was raised to 15%, while that on time deposits remained
at 12%. By'setting a ceiling to the growth of bank lending through the
different measures, the authorities were able to exert some restraint on
money supply without abandoning the policy of interest rate stabilization.
However, the impact of the persistent use of credit controls was
manifested in the contraction in economic activity. With the significant
decline in credit facilities, the CB changed course by 1977 to temporarily<
10. Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, 1974, p.33 •• ............ ......... * ..........................
11. See for example Eric L. Furness, Money and Credit in Developing 
Africa, (London : Heinemann .Educational Books Ltd, 1975). Part. 
Chapter 9 which discusses the limitations of monetary techniques in 
developing countries.
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Table (7.8) Sectoral Distribution of Commercial Bank Credit, 
1969-1980 (in millions of JD's)
Year Agriculture
Mining and 
Industry
General 
Commerce and 
Trade
Other
Sectors ' Total
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. %
1969 0.7 1.5 4.2 9.3 19.1 42.0 21.4 47.1 45.4
1970 0.6 1.3 4.7 10.3 16.9 37.1 23.3 51.2 45.5
1971 0.8 1.7 4.6 9.8 19.0 40.5 22.5 48.0 46.9
1972 0.80 1.6 4.7 9.4 21.5 42.9 23.4 46.1 50.6
1973 2.1 3.4 6.3 10.2 25.1 40.6 28.3 45.8 61.8
1974 3.8 4.5 10.5 12.5 30.3 36.1 39.4 46.9 84.0
1975 3.6 3.0 15.1 12.4 51.4 42.3 51.3 42.3 121.4
1976 5.2 2 ‘8 22.1 12.1 81.6 44.4 74.8 40.7 183.7
1977 8.3 4.1 26.8 13.3 81.4 40.5 116.5 57.9 201.1
1978 12.7 3.8 38.3 11.5 100.5 30.2 181.7 54.5 332.8
1979 17.4 3.7 60.5 13.0 • 134.2 28.9 253.0 54.4 465.1
1980 12.7 3.1 73.1
1
13.0 167.0 29.6 306.6 54.4 563.9
Source: (i) Central Bank of Jordan Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin, vol. 17, No.6, June 1981, and 
vol. 13, No. 9, Sept. 1977, and vol. 8,
No. 12, Dec. 1972.
<
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Table (7.9) Interest Rates Structure in Jordan, selected years
1969 1972 1974 1976 1979
Central Bank of Jordan
Bank rate 5.25 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Long-term advances 5.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Short-term advances 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Deposits subject to notice 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Time 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Commercial Banks
Overdrafts 7.0 7.0 7.0 8.25 9.0
Loans 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
Demand deposits 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.5 5.5
Saving and time deposits 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.6 5.6
Time & subject to notice deposits 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.6 5.5-6.0
Specialised .Çtedit Institutions
Agricultural Credit Corp 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.0 7.0
Industrial Dev. Bank 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Housing Corp. 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Jordan Cooperative Org. 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
Municipalities & village fund 4-5.0 4-5.0 4-5.0 4-5.0 4-5.0
Housing Bank
deposits - - 5-5.2 5-5.7 5-5.7
loans ( - - 7.5-9.0 7.5-9.0 7.5-9.0
Jordan Treasury Bills 5.16 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.0
Government Bonds — 6.0 7.5* * 7.5** 7.5**
* For residents, while for non-residents it was 10%
** With a lottery prize each six months of JD 10.000
Source : Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Reports, Relevant
Years.
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relaxing its policy. First, by abolishing the special 3% deposit and
suspension of credit ceiling, and then by discontinuing the credit/deposit
ratio, therefore giving the banks incentives to increase credit facilities.
12The same measures were continued to be in force throughout 1978
The effects of the above measures on increasing credit facilities in 
the economy were realized by the early 1979, during which the increase in 
monetary indicators started an upward pressure on prices. Then the 
Central Bank resorted once again to its contractionary measures by 
re-introducing credit/deposit ratio of 70% which later in the year was 
decreased to 67.5%. On the other hand, the reserve ratio on demand 
deposits was increased by one percentage point to 16% and interest rates
on banks' overdrafts and loans were increased to 9% to residents and
1310% to non-residents .
While the stop-go policies were temporarily effective in restraining 
the growth of credit facilities in times of high liquidity in the economy, 
such policies failed to have the same effect on changing the direction of 
commercial banks credit from financing trade and land speculation to 
material producing sectors, namely, industry and agriculture. It should be 
mentioned however, that while the credit advanced to commerce and trade 
relatively decreased to about 30% by 1980 and that provided to the 
mining and manufacturing increased to about 13%. Yet this relative 
change was far less than what the authorities had wanted. More recently 
this issue was surfacing when the (CB) imposed compulsory investment 
requirements on commercial banks and investment companies in the country
in a move to "redress the lack of banks' participation in financing
14development efforts" The new regulations imposed were reported to
include a 3% of total assets of the commercial banks to be invested
12. Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report 1978, pp. 28-29
13. Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report 1979, pp. 24-26.
14. As reported in the Financial Times, London, July 15, 1981
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in Treasury bills and a 3.5% in government or corporate bonds*"*. These 
measures will increase the banks portfolio of Treasury bills and bonds 
but by no means could ensure a real change in the direction of investment 
by the banks in favour of industrial and agricultural sectors.
Before ending this section, a note is warranted on the governments’ 
attitude towards interests as part of an overall monetary policy. As we 
have indicated earlier, the government puts a ceiling on interest rates. 
This may have provided a desired stability in the structure of interest 
rates in times of high economic growth and no inflation. However, 
inflationary pressures resulted in reducing the real rate of return 
both on deposits and governments' internal debt. For example, while the 
nominal interest rate on savings in the commercial banks increased from 
4.5% to 5.25% between 1972 and 1976 respectively, the real interest rates 
were negative and increased from -2.97% in 1972 to -8.72 in 1976***.
As prices continue to rise, people learn to differentiate between the 
nominal vis-a-vis the real rate of return. . The fall in the real rates of 
interest may divert investments from financial assets into real assets 
possibly into speculation of land and real estate.
The above analysis shows that without a sound fiscal policy to 
. accompany monetary policy, the latter can only play a limited role.
Without such a compatibility between fiscal and monetary policies to 
ensure stability in the economy, the dangers of a continuing inflationary 
pressure will always be there. While the credit control policy may 
be effective in the short-run, it nevertheless may not provide the 
long-run desired effect in light of the high liquidity in the economy;
15. Ibid, p.3
<16. A. Hindi and G. Afram "The High Interest Rates Policy in Developing
Countries and the Possibility of its application in Jordan" an 
unpublished paper, Dec. 1977 (In Arabic). The real interest rates 
above were calculated using the formula, , 1+n where, r =
(r " TT7 “*>»real interest rate, n ■ nominal interest rate and v ■ cost of living 
index.
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that currency comprises a major proportion of total money supply; 
the relatively underdeveloped financial market and the high liquidity of 
the commercial banks. Unless such policies are also combined with 
tapping savings other than those of the commercial banks with the aim 
of properly channelling such resources into material producing sectors in 
order to ensure an increase in the count rys^productive capacity, more 
government borrowing and increasing liquidity seems to be destined to 
reinforcing the price rises which was the phenomenon of the seventies.
«
(
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CHAPTER EIGHT : CONCLUSION
This thesis has examined the structure and performance of the 
Jordanian tax system and public expenditures utilizing the theory and 
practice of public finance in developing countries. It also sought to 
see whether the fiscal system operations have been consistent with the 
macroeconomic objectives of the development strategy. While this 
chapter sets forth the main conclusions which emanated from the analysis, 
it nevertheless is not a substitute to the arguments presented in the 
text.
It should be clear, at the outset, that this study was constrained 
by the scarcity of data on government operations which certainly limited 
the analysis in many instances. It is my understanding also that perhaps 
this was a major reason in preventing many others from pursuing research 
in this field. Therefore, one implication of our research is that more 
serious attempts must be made towards data collection and efforts must 
be exerted to provide a continuous flow of information, not only for 
research purposes, but even to allow the government to conduct a proper
fiscal policy. On the other hand, although local government in Jordan
l
is still of minor importance as a result of centralization in decision 
making, this study would have been more complete had we been able to 
analyse local'government operations.
Having these limitations in mind, it is worth noting that ever since 
the country was established, Jordan was subject to drastic changes resulting 
from political and military instability in the Middle East. Subsequently, 
economic and social development was subject to widespread disruptions 
and frequently was severely curtailed.
However, backed by an ever rising foreign resources inflow, Jordan 
managed not only to avert extreme hardships in numerous occasions but also 
to achieve an acknowledged rate of growth by the standards of other
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developing countries. The fact remains that successive governments 
have failed to bring about the necessary conditions for a long-term 
sustained growth. This was perhaps a result of government policy, 
conditioned by the above factors, in which the long-term economic 
rationality has been sacrificed for the short-term economic solutions.
Having made the above general remarks, we shall in what follows summarize 
the main conclusions of our study.
(1) Thé government has increased its share of economic activity by
vastly increasing public spending and hence increasing the level of
bureaucracy. The growth of public expenditures over the period under
consideration followed a somewhat different path before and after the
1967 -war era. The rate of growth of public spending in the latter period
out-paced that of the former significantly. In our quest for the
determinants of government expenditure, it was clear that their behaviour
was strongly associated with the stage of economic development as measured
by per capita income. We also examined the "openness" hypothesis, in which
the import ratio was an important factor, a result which is not surprising
in an open economy such as that of Jordan. However, such determinants
are of a long-term nature. Of a more immediate impact*on a short-term
-basis, expenditures lagged - one year seems a significant determinant, and
this may have economic as well as non-economic factors behind it, which
have an important influence in shaping up the behaviour of public spending.
This was more so in the post-1967 period during which a host of factors
played a significant part in the growth of public spending. The rising
inflation for one, seems to have its effects on' over-stating public
spending, and if coupled with the polulation changes, may explain the need
for more public spending(f or which past levels of expenditures are
considered an indicator. Above all, it is perhaps the large foreign aid
*
receipts which permitted the government to increase the level of public
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spending. Without foreign aid public spending would not have reached its 
present levels.
Both political and military determinants have given priority to defence 
expenditures. Jordan's maintenance of a relatively sizeable defence 
establishment extracts a large portion of the budget, making the release 
of more resources for development objectives harder year after year.
Clearly the level of defence expenditure largely affects the composition 
of government expenditures by virtue of the trade-off among the different 
components.
In the absence of any political and military upheavals for which 
the country is susceptible, there seems to be no reason as to why the 
Jordanian economy cannot continue to make short and medium-term growth.
Any changes of this sort may bring nearer the possibility of a reduction 
or elimination of budget support, whose present level cannot possibly 
be maintained for ever, which would have grave economic and political 
consequences. An equivalent reduction in government revenues would have 
severe implications. For one thing, it would make it extremely hard 
for the government to function properly. In such a case a drastic cut 
in government expenditures may prove to be a must. The government may 
. have to take one of two alternatives or both, that is, a reduction in the 
civil service or a drastic cut in the military establishments both of 
which are hard options. Even in the event of releasing military 
manpower to the rest of the economy needs a reasonable period of 
adjustment. Moreover, a drastic reduction in budget support will also 
lead to a similar reduction in foreign exchange availability with its 
consequences on an already strained balance of payments.
The above indicates,* the need for policy orientation towards a gradual 
expenditure restraint, so that the available domestically generated 
revenues are, at least, enough to cover all recurrent expenditures. This
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should be viewed with a long-run prospect for the economy to adjust 
its foreign earnings and expenditure position to achieve ultimate 
independence of foreign aid. Certainly this may not be a separate action, 
but rather a part of a broadly based fiscal policy in which the tax system 
has a vital role.
(2) In the long-run, the fiscal system tends to be closely related to 
the industrial structure. A changing industrial structure need a parallel 
change in the revenue system, in particularly, the need arises to develop 
new means of raising revenues.
There is a basic revenue problem inherent in the development policies 
used by many developing countries, particularly relatively open economies 
such as that of Jordan’s, where imports supply the largest portion of 
domestically used manufactured products. More often than not such 
countries depend on import duties and some times«other domestic excise taxes 
on silimar goods for revenue raising purposes. As we have seen in the 
case of Jordan, these duties were often levied on mass consumption goods 
such as petroleum products, cigarettes and tobacco products, and other 
manufactured goods. Once the government embarks on’ import-substituting 
program there will quite likely be a loss of government, revenue after 
import replacement occurs unless other direct taxes on domestic incomes 
generated by the new production coupled with the other indirect taxes on 
domestic production are sufficient enough to offset the loss of revenues. 
However, as part of investment encouragement and the process of 
reorientation of the economy towards industrialization, government grant 
tax holidays to domestic producers as well as keeping other domestic 
indirect taxes below import duties for protection purposes. In addition 
it is customary for developing countries to start import replacement in 
the consumer goods industries, which bear higher rates of import duties.
As the import replacements occur the import composition changes in
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favour of low duty items and therefore import duties per unit of import 
will fall.
This process of industrial structure change approximate that of 
Jordan. It is therefore imperative that the tax system be reformed in 
such a way that is compatible with the broadly based development strategy.
(3) The primary purpose of any reform in the tax system is to secure one 
which promotes the broad objectives of economic policy: a satisfactory 
rate of growth; internal and external economic stability and a broadly 
shared distribution of income and wealth.
A properly designed fiscal system may be directed towards enhancing 
economic growth in developing countries by providing enough resources 
for capital formation. Extra emphasis must be given to fiscal policy 
in developing countries in that respect as the market system fails to 
generate enough savings due to its own deficiencies and factors which 
inhibit its proper functioning such as for example high consumption 
patterns. Furthermore, while it has to provide resources for financing
i
investment, tax policy must create a setting in which private investment 
will proceed efficiently. The corporate sector has a- vital role to ¡lay 
as a good channel for private savings and as a means for securing a 
generally favourable change in business structure. However, excessive 
tax holidays and allowances, if not properly designed and administered, 
could be counter productive. They may not be enough to succeed in 
attracting investment and more importantly channelling such investments 
in areas which benefit the overall development effort, let alone the fact 
that they involve revenue loss to the government. .Moreover, they may as 
well, in certain instances, lead .to inefficiency in the economy if not 
again properly designed an/d1 constantly evaluated, setting criteria for 
granting such allowances is not in itself sufficient enough to ensure 
their proper and effective use, a follow up process of evaluation is
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a must if the pre-set objectives are to be achieved.
On the other hand, the fact that developing countries in general 
have small open economies characterized by dependency on foreign 
markets either for few exports of primary products or to satisfy their 
needs of manufactuted goods and foodstuffs, make them prone to world 
market fluctuations and their destabilizing influences. If this 
coupled with their own domestic deficiencies which themselves produce 
domestic destablilising factors, then it seems rather obvious that a 
reasonably developed fiscal policy may serve as a stabilization device 
important enough to lessen the frequent and diversified destabilizing effects. 
Above all, given the fact that in most developing countries income and 
wealth distribution is unfairly based to benefit the upper income classes, 
fiscal policy assumes a very important role to play. Here fiscal policy 
may be used in such a way that while it serves the humanitarian interest 
in sharing economic well-being more equally, it also provides for 
efficiency interest in the form of incentives to the private sector as 
well as individuals to make their own contributions. Striking a 
balance between these two, sometimes, incompatible objectives may prove 
to be the challenge faces developing countries in general, and Jordan 
in particularm in securing a more equitable society.
(4) In Jordan, the income tax has failed to achieve any of its 
macroeconomic objectives. In particular it failed to make a significant 
contribution to government revenues despite the fact that the tax base 
has developed considerably,
Our analysis has shown that the bulk of income tax revenues come 
from shareholding companies. This may reflect two factors, that is, 
a considerable increase in the tax base of shareholding conpanies on the 
one hand, as well as the fact that this sector is sufficiently developed 
and organized which makes it easier to tax.
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However, notwithstanding the obvious increase in the tax base 
in general in the economy, the vast majority of self-employed, traders; 
professions and the like are still not appropriately covered by the tax 
net. Their assessment poses a challenge to the Tax Department as 
they rarely keep audited books, and even when they do, they fail to 
produce enough information for assessment. Both tax avoidance and tax 
evasion are recognized as widespread phenomena in this sector. In spite 
of the fact that the law requires each and every taxpayer to fill in 
a tax return, only relatively minor percentage of taxpayers do, and the 
rest is left to the Tax Department with its meagre resources to follow 
up. If the tax is to be of any significance, then these two areas, 
namely the tax composition as well as tax evasion must be vigorously and 
seriously tackled.
(5) While the income tax law in Jordan rightly applies the global income 
concept, that is, pooling all income from different sources in a single 
total which is subject to a single progressive rate, it nevertheless limits 
the tax base by not including into the taxable income that part which 
originates outside the country. By doing so, the'law exempts a large 
portion of the gross 'national product from income tax.. Such a limitation 
results in fact in that Jordanians working abroad completely escape the 
Jordanian tax on their incomes. This runs counter to both the ability-to- 
pay as well as the benefit principals, because these people and their 
dependents enjoy free education and health services etc., so that it is 
only reasonable to bring their incomes into the tax net on equal basis 
with others.
(6) The income tax law also treats the income of the taxpayers sympatheti­
cally in the range of allowances and excessive exemptions and deductions
it grants. While some of these exemptions may be justifiable, yet the*
range of such exemptions as well as their effectiveness in achieving the
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objectives sought after are disputable. For example, while the
economic situation may permit some relief to be given to the civil service 
sector, however it is not justifiable on the premis that the tax is 
better enforced in the public sector than it is in the private sector.
Such a situation must be corrected in bringing the tax into better 
enforcement in the private sector which may then negate the need for a 
50% exemption for the former. This may affect the efficiency of the 
Tax Department which deals with about 90 thousand public sector employees 
annually which in turn produce relatively a minor share in the overall 
income tax revenues. Secondly, while it is recognized, as said before, 
that the corporate sector is an important one and has a positive role 
to play, however the excessive tax holidays effectiveness in their 
present form in achieving the objectives set forth is questionable. 
Therefore, it is strongly believed that this is an area which ought to 
be reviewed particularly in the absence of any follow-up measures to 
determine their economic and social contributions to society.
(7) There is a built-in bias in company taxes against small shareholders.
The law considers the tax paid up by the company final and cannot be
\
set-off against any tax from other sources of income. * Had the law
allowed the tax to be set-off and refunded, this would permit the dividends
to be grossed up with other sources of income and taxed at the appropriate
bracket with the tax paid by the company being credited to the taxpayer.
Such a modification is necessary on equity grounds according to which the
small shareholder would benefit and this may as well attract hesitant
small savers to the market. Moreover, a better encouragement to
investments may be added by shortening the period during which loss could
be set-off. This may 'provide an incentive to capital intensive projects
which involve high start-up capital. In addition, it seems more realistic
0
to abandon the present straight-line approach to an accelerated form of
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depreciation allowances. While such a move may prove to be a revenue 
loser in the short-run, however its advantages in terms of investment 
encouragement as well as a steady stream of revenues in the future may be 
more productive. Such moves may be considered in the context of 
reviewing the overall tax exemptions under the present investment 
encouragement laws.
(8) v Property taxes still of a very minor importance even if only from a 
revenue standpoint. It is recognized that a better enforced land and 
building tax could prove to constitute a major step forward towards 
achieving a more equitable tax system. Moreover, such tax may provide 
the government with a lucrative source of revenues. The developments in 
the economy which took place during the 1970's in particular, necessitate 
a more frequent revaluation of annual rental values which incidentally 
took place for the last time back in 1967. Efforts should also be 
vigorously exerted to deal with the existence of a great deal of tax 
delinquency, even if it requires very harsh penalties to be introduced into 
the law..
(9) If thé tax system is to be geared towards achieving a more equitable 
distribution of income and wealth, then taxing capital gains on both 
equity and economic grounds seems to be a must. Certainly there is no 
justification in taxing earned income and leaving aside unearned income
in the form of capital gains. Their exclusion from the scope of taxation 
constitutes a serious discrimination in favour of a particular class of 
taxpayers against the rest of society. It is acknowledged that the real 
estate boom during the seventies in Jordan put a lot of strain on the 
overall development strategy. Steps to divert speculative funds into 
productive investments is a case in hand. Moreover, capital gains 
taxation, besides its effect on income and wealth redistribution could 
provide the government with a much needed source of revenues especially 
in the medium and long-term period. However, in the very short-term the
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problem that may arise to the authorities is the phasing out of the land 
and building sales tax with the introduction of a capital gains tax.
The former currently provide the government with an ample source of funds. 
Here two options are at hand. Firstly, abolishing the land and building 
sales tax altogether and instead introducing the proposed capital gains 
tax or, secondly, augmenting the former in the latter and gradually phasing 
it out. From both a practicality standpoint as well as its revenue 
consequences the second option seems more reasonable. This would ensure 
both modifying the tax system and at the same time ensuring a steady flow 
of revenues to the Treasury with the least effect on revenue stability.
Coupled with this, a death duty is another tax to be considered on 
equity grounds. While its introduction may positively add to achieving 
a more equitable tax system, yet taking the present available administration, 
efforts may be used for potentially more lucrative sources of revenues.
Here it is believed that the equity criteria must yield to the administrative 
constraints.
(10) It is important for developing countries in general and Jordan in 
particular to have a tax system designed to be responsive to inflationary
pressures, but one;which makes sure to neutralize inflation besides beingi
income-elastic. In other words the tax system should be responsive to 
change in money as well as real income, but leaves those whose real income 
has not changed with no more tax to pay because of the impact of inflation. 
The most important thing to ensure an automatic increase in tax revenues 
as income increases, is to have a tax structure whereby the marginal 
tax exceeds the average tax, in other words an income elasticity of tax 
revenues greater than unity. Also, in order to make the tax structure 
responsive to inflation, then most of the specific duty rates on a wide 
range of goods have to be changed to an ad valorem form, if the tax is to 
be responsive to price changes. On the other hand, tax allowances and
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concession, which are widespread in Jordan, must be reconsidered in the 
light of the overall development and economic conditions. While the 
elasticities of both the income taxes as well as the rest of indirect 
taxes have been above unity, yet it is worth pointing out that the 
magnitudes of taxes started from a very low basis. To reiterate, while
it is very important to secure an income-elastic tax system, it is 
equally important to secure one that is responsive to inflation. This 
is most important during periods of inflationary pressures when tax 
revenues lose much of their real value and fail to increase by a similar 
proportion to that of public spending.
(11) Exemptions from import duties should be reduced to the greatest
extent possible. We have argued in Chapter Four in particular, that 
the use of tax holidays for investment incentives purposes has failed to 
produce the results expected. It led for example to an almost negligible
increase in foreign investments in Jordan, and this is to some extent 
supported by the experience of other developing countries. Also, it 
failed considerably to redirect investments to deprived areas other than the 
Amman region. On the other hand, a re-examination of both the range of 
such exemptions as. well as the institutions on the exemption list isi
needed. The wide ranging exemptions particularly granted to government 
and other public sector connected departments, if not properly checked, 
may lead to one of two possible repercussions or both. On the one hand, 
it is highly likely that it will lead to financial inefficiency which 
finds its way in an environment of rapid development of bureaucracy.
Also, it may lead towards increasing such departments preference to
imported goods instead of supporting locally produced ones.
(
(12) The study has shown that supplements to the main taxes are a 
feature of the Jordanian tax system. The simplification of the tax 
system is important for both the taxpayers as well as to administration.
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The wide range of supplements to customs tariff should be integrated into 
the latter, particularly in light of the fact that the reasons originally 
behind such separations are no longer valid. Moreover, the surcharge 
known as the Social Services Tax must be integrated into the income tax. 
This may help simplify tax compliance as well as to simplify the process 
of administering taxes in order to enable the administration to focus 
its efforts on effective enforcement with lower administrative costs.
(13) If the present level of tax revenue is to be increased and maintained 
then a new look into the ways and means of coordinating custom duties
and other domestic taxes, particularly excises, is needed. In light 
of our argument in 3 above, it may prove desirable that greater reliance 
on internal taxes should gradually be introduced into the system. One 
area of clear need in the coordination process to be examined is luxury 
consumption which needs to be properly identified and separated from 
protection purposes.
(14) An overall perceived policy of licencing, protection and exemptions
vis-a-vis ad hoc decision making is needed, if the long-run distortions,
• .. « 
internal frictions and resource allocations among the various sectors of
tthe economy are to be eliminated. While recognizing the existence of such 
consequences of government policy is important, however positive action in 
policy terms is much more important to create a healthy economy.
(15) While export taxes have several advantages particularly simple 
expediency, flexibility and political desirability, however keeping them 
at very low level in the early stages of industrialization is necessary 
in order to lessen their restrictive effect on the growth of the export 
sector. This seems more so in Jordan's case because of the need to 
stimulate export-orientated industries which need to be competitive 
particularly in neighbouring Arab countries. In view of Jordan's 
imbalance in its trade balance that desperately need the growth in export
•x
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it seems undesirable in the foreseeable future for the government to 
embark on a scheme of export taxation. However, the absence of export 
taxes must be foreseen in a wider context which involves the wide range 
of tax holidays in order to ensure higher efficiency. In the case of 
the phosphate export tax, it is believed that changing the form of the 
tax to an ad valorem one would be highly desirable because it will be more 
responsive to both price and demand conditions in the international market 
and would save the company a lot of hardship.
(16) The Excise system is still limited in coverage. Even with that 
in mind, only three products contributed the bulk of excise revenues.
In view of the need for the mobilization of greater domestic revenue sources, 
coupled with the changing economic structure, the need arises for a 
wider coverage of the excise net. Equally important is the fact that
at present the nature of the tax on various products is the source of 
some complaint. If the present excise taxes are to be more revenue 
productive, then the nature of most taxes may have to be changed into 
an ad valorem form. This may as well satisfy the equity criteria in 
many instances and the system will be more responsive to price rises.
i(17) Excises on services and transactions, namely '"fees and licences" 
are emerging as a potentially lucrative source of revenues. While it 
is thought that such potentiality must be further explored in the light 
of government services rendered to the public and their costs, however 
certain stamp duties may cause some harmful and disruptive effects on 
many economic activities as well as inconvenience to the public. Their 
seemed to be some overlapping in certain areas whereby a quite different 
tax is levied on the same transaction or services. Therefore, the 
abolition of the nuisance causing ones as well as the unification of the 
rest as best as possible would result in the ease, of application; less 
administrative cost and better understanding on the part of the public.
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A new tax on the rapidly expanding tourism business may be considered, 
and in view of the considerable increase in hotel capacity it may provide 
the government with ample source of revenues.
(18) Our analysis has shown that conclusions derived from cross-section 
data do not necessarily hold when time series data for a particular 
developing country is used. This is because the former may overlook 
many differences pertaining to the characteristics of a number of countries 
which do not necessarily appear in others, let alone the fact that most
of the mentioned studies combined both developed and developing countries 
whose basic characteristics are different.
Using time series data in the case of Jordan, confirmed the above 
reservations whereby many of the variables considered in cross-country 
studies were tested on time-series data for Jordan and many of them were 
not statistically significant.
The fact that the import-ratio was highly significant in determining
government revenue shares, while not surprising, have had serious
implications for the future. This reinforced our conclusion that the
, «tax system needs to be developed in line with the changing economic 
structure. \
(19) The above finding was also reinforced in our analysis of the 
revenue instability in Jordan.^ It was found that apart from Tel.
and Telg., import duties were the main contributer to such instability. 
Accordingly, any future policy must take this into consideration. So 
far the question of domestic revenue instability in Jordan has not been 
addressed. Certainly the measures suggested in this study, it is hoped, 
would contribute significantly towards more stabilization in government
i
revenues. Government awareness of the existence of instability and its 
sources may well indicate the particular areas needing more attention.
(20) Unless the fast rising domestic deficit is, checked, the government
319
risks a similar increase in the public sector borrowing requirement. 
Government domestic borrowing which is based mainly on Treasury bills 
and development bonds has a high liquidity element injected into the 
economy at a time when the main monetary policy objective is to check 
the high liquidity in the economy. Moreover, government foreign 
borrowing which at the closing years of this study contained a new 
element of borrowing from commercial banks may aggravate the level of 
deficit financing. With the lack of most of the necessary instruments 
of policy to control inflation, the continuous increase in deficit 
financing may as well aggravate the inflationary pressures which were 
the phenomenon of seventies. As we have indicated in the text credit 
control policy is only effective in the very short-run, however if the 
government is to embark upon a sensible stabilization program then 
coordinating both fiscal and monetary policies is vital. Without such 
coordination conflict in objectives as well as the means of reaching them 
may arise. It is perhaps necessary in that context that a fresh 
look into the interest rate structure is necessary bearing'in mind the 
need to keep the costs of government borrowing"down as much as possible.
It is hoped that policy recommendations pointed»out in this study 
may prove to be of help in improving the performance and role of the 
fiscal system in Jordan. Naturally, unless detailed statistics are 
forthcoming, it is hard to think how a proper fiscal policy for Jordan 
could be designed and its implications to the economy could be properly 
assessed.
It was felt that areas like tax incidence and tax burden in 
particular need to be investigated. The tentative results on taxable 
capacity need to be improved and further investigation is needed. 
Moreover, the possible ways and means of coordinating custom duties and
t
other indirect taxes may prove to be of utmost concern in the near
320
future hence detailed analysis in that area is also needed. The 
impact of fiscal policy on income and wealth redistribution is 
another area which lacks serious research. It would seem, from the 
arguments presented in this thesis that these areas of research are 
necessary to assess present as well as future policy implication on 
the development process of the Jordanian economy.
\
\
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TABLE (2) Government Expenditure at Current and Constant 
Prices, Implicit Index of Prices (1972=100), and 
Per Capita Expenditure, 1954-1979.
(in mn of JD's)
Year
Gov. Exp. 
in
(Current
prices)
Implied Index 
number of 
prices 
(1972=100)
Gov. Exp. 
in
(Constant
prices)
Per Capita 
Gov. Exp. 
(Current 
prices)
Per Capita 
Gov. Exp. 
(Constant 
prices)
1954 16.6 67 24.8 11.9 17.8
1955 17.6 67 26.3 12.2 18.3
1956 21.3 68 31.3 14.4 21.1
1957 23.9 69 34.6 15.6 22.6
1958 29.3 70 41.9 18.5 26.5
1959 30.7 71 43.2 18.7 26.3
1960 32.8 74 44.3 19.4 26.2
1961 33.0 75 44.0 19.3 25.7
1962 37.5 76 49.3 21.2 27.9
1963 39.4 77 51.2 21.6 28.1
1964 43.6 77 56.6 23.2 30.1
1965 47.0 78 60.3 24.1 30.9
1966 38.6 81 47.7 19.2 23.7
1967 68.1 82 83.0 62.2 75.9
1968 80.5 86 93.6 71.5 83.1
1969 88.4 87 101.6 55.3 63.5
1970 80.7 90 89.7 48.4 53.8
1971 83.1 95 87.5 48.2 50.8
1972 105.9 \ 100 "105.9 59.7 59.7
1973 119.5 113 105.8 65.3 57.8
1974 146.6 128 114.5 77.6 60.6
1975 204.9 145 141.3 107.8 74.4
1976 262.5 167 157.2 130.0 77.8
1977 337.8 207 163.2 158.6 76.6
1978 332.7 207 160.7 151.4 73.1
1979 495.6 207 239.4 218.5 105.6
Sources: (i) Central Bank, of Jordan, Dept, of Economic Research. 
(Unpublished data).
(ii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, vol.14 
#= 4, (April 1978), and vol. 16, #  2, (Feb. 1980).
(iii) Dept, of Statistics, National Accounts in Jordan, 1952-1976 
(Amman: Dept, of Stat. Press, March, 1978).
(iv) For Data on Population and their Sources. See Table ( ).
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TABLE (3) Gross National Product, Gross Domestic Product, Per Capita 
G.N.P. (All in Current and Constant (1972) Prices), and Population,
1954-1979.
Year
Gross National 
Product
Gross Domestic 
Product Populationin
millions
Per Capita G.N.P.
Current
prices
Constant
prices
Current
prices
Constant
prices
Current
prices
Constant
prices
1954 52.4 78.2 51.3 76.6 .. 1.39 37.7 56.3
1955 49.8 74.3 47.3 70.6 .1.44 34.6 51.6
1956 68.5 100.7 66.6 97.8 1.48 46.3 68.1
1957 70.1 101.6 67.5 97.8 1.53 45.8 66.4
1958 77.1 110.1 75.5 107.9 . 1.58 48.8 69.7
1959 99.1 139.6 93.5 131.7 '. 1.64 60.4 85.1
1960 105.7 142.8 98.3 132.2 1.69 62.5 84.5
1961 127.1 169.5 120.1 161.1 • 1.71 74.3 99.1
1962 130.8 172.1 118.9 155.7 /1.77 73.9 97.2
1963 173.6 225.5 129.1 168.1 ' . 1.82 75.6 123.9
1964 160.6 208.6 148.9 192.5 1.88 85.4 110.9
1965 180.5 231.4 167.6 213.8 1.95 92.6 118.7
1966 185.8 229.4 170.6 213.2 2.01 92.4 114.1
1967 142.5 173.8 131.2 160.1 1.094 130.3 158.8
1968 166.4 193.5 156.1 181.8 1.126 147.8 171.8
1969 197.4 226.9 183.4 210.7 1.600 123.4 141.8
1970 187.0 207.8 174.4 194.2 1.668 112.1 124.6
1971 199.4 209.9 186.2 196.2 1.723 115.7 121.8
1972 221.0 221.0 207.2 207.2 1.774 124.6 124.6
1973 241.5 213.7 218.3 193.8 1.831 131.9 116.7
1974 279.3 218.2 247.3 193.2 1.890 147.8 115.5
1975 342.5 236.2 278.6 191.9 1.900 180.3 124.3
1976 542.5 324.9 366.2 219.3 2.020 268.6 160.8
1977 623.5 301.2 477.6 230.5 2.130 292.7 141.4
1978 714.1 345.0 569.1 274.7 2.198 324.9 156.9
1979 853.2 412.2 685.2 330.7 2.268 376.2 181.7
Sources: (i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
Royal Scientific Society, Numerical Index for Population and 
Vital Statistics. (Amman: March 1979).
U.N., Statistical Yearbooks, 1960-1973. (New York: U.N. 
Publications, relevant years), 1954-1966.
Dept, of Statistics, Statistical Yearbooks, 1973. (Amman:1974). 
Dept, of Statistics, National Accounts in Jordan, 1952-1976. 
(Amman: Dept, of Stat. Press, March, 1978).
Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, vol.16, 
No. 3, March 1980.
Hanna S. Odeh, Economic Development of Jordan, 1974-1971. 
(Amman: 1972).
Dept, of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1974. vol. 25 
(Amman: 1974). Particularly notes to Table (1).
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TABLE (A) Total Government Expenditures, Main Components by 
Economic Use and Their Percentages of Total, 1954-79.
(in urn's of JDfs)
Current Expenditure Capital Expenditure Total Gov. Expenditure
Abs. Z Abs. Z Abs. %
1954 13.334 80.5 3.226 19.5 16.560 100.0
1955 14.872 84.3 2.761 15.7 17.633 100.0
1956 18.258 85.6 3.063 14.4 21.321 100.0
1957 19.558 82.0 4.300 18.0 23.858 100.0
1958 23.523 80.2 5.820 19.8 29.343 100.0
1959 25.904 84.4 4.797 15.6 30.701 100.0
1960 26.862 81.8 5.980 18.2 32.842 100.0
1961 28.045 85.0 4.937 15.0 32.982 100.0
1962 29.926 79.7 7.599 20.3 37.525 100.0
1963 33.193 84.4 6.154 15.6 39.347 100.0
1964 34.457 79.0 9.166 21.0 43.623 100.0
1965 35.810 76.2 11.178 23.8 46.988 100.0
1966 28.240 73.2 10.360 26.8 38.600 100.0
1967 44.651 65.5 23.496 34.5 68.147 100.0
1968 57.186 71.0 23.334 29.0 80.520 100.0
1969 65.231 73.8 23.170 26.2 88.401 100.0
1970 59.028 73.1 21.673 26.9 80.707 100.0
1971 60.706 73.0 22.439 27.0 83.145 100.0
1972 70.311 66.5 34.563 33.5 105.874 100.0
1973 78.608 65.8 40.903 34.2 119.511 100.0
1974 103.603 70.7 43.019 29.3 146.622 100.0
1975 125.692 61.4 79.172 38.6 204.864 100.0
1976 185.894 70.8 76.590 29.2 262.484 100.0
1977 195.587 57.9 142.252 42.1 337.839 100.0
1978 211.051 63.4 121.623 36.6 332.674 100.0
1979 291.496 58.8 204.089 41.2 495.585 100.0
Sources: (i) See notes to Table (2)
(ii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 
vol. 14, No.4, (April 1978}
(iii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 
vol. 16, No.2 (February 1980).
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(Percentage)
TABLE (5) Shares of Current and Capital Expenditures (in
current and constant 1972 prices) to G.N.P., 1954-1979
Year
Share of Current Expenditure 
in G.N.P.
Share of Capital Expenditure 
in G.N.P.
Current prices Constant prices Current Prices Constant prices
1954 25.4 38.0 6.2 9.2
1955 29.9 44.6 5.5 8.4
1956 26.7 39.3 4.5 6.7
1957 27.9 40.9 6.1 8.8
1958 30.5 43.6 7.6 10.8
1959 26.1 36.8 4.9 6.7
1960 25.4 34.4 5.7 7.7
1961 22.1 29.3 3.8 5.1
1962 22.9 30.0 5.8 7.6
1963 19.1 24.8 9.5 4.7
1964 21.5 27.9 5.7 7.4
1965 19.8 25.4 6.2 8.0
1966 15.2 18.7 5.6 6.6
1967 31.3 38.2 • 16.5 20.1
1968 34.4 40.0 14.0 16.3
1969 33.0 37.9 11.8 13.5
1970 31.6, 35.1 11.6 12.9
1971 30.4 ! 32.0 11.3 11.3
1972 31.8 31.8 15.6 15.6
1973 32.5 28.8 17.0 15.0
1974 37.1 29.0 15.4 12.0
1975 36.7 25.3 ' 23.1 15.9
1976 34.3 20.5 14.1 8.4
1977 31.4 15.2 22.8 11.0
1978 29.6 14.3 17.0 8.2
1979 34.2 16.5 23.9 11.6
Source: Appendix tables (3) and (4).
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TABLE (6) Government Current and Capital Expenditure in
Current and Constant (1972) prices, 1954-79
(in mn JD*s)
Year
Current Gov. Expenditures Capital Gov. Expenditures
Current prices Constant prices Current prices Constant prices
1954 13.3 19.9 3.2 4.8
1955 14.9 22.2 2.8 4.2
1956 18.3 26.9 3.1 4.6
1957 19.6 28.7 4.3 6.2
1958 23.5 33.6 5.8 8.3
1959 25.9 36.5 4.8 6.7
1960 26.9 36.4 6.0 8.1
1961 28.0 37.3 4.9 6.5
1962 29.9 39.3 7.6 10.0
1963 33.2 43.1 6.2 8.1
1964 34.5 44.8 9.2 11.9
1965 35.8 45.9 11.2 14.4
1966 28.2 34.8 10.4 12.3
1967 44.7 54.5 23.5 ; 28.7
1968 57.2 66.5 23.3 27.1
1969 65.2 74.9 23.2 26.7
1970 59.0 65.6 21.7 24.1
1971 60.7 t 63.9 22.'; 4 23.6
1972 70.3 70.3 34.6 34.6
1973 78.6 69.6 40.9 36.2
1974 103.6 80.9 43.0 33.6
1975 125.7 86.7 79.2 54.6
1976 185.9 111.3 76.6 45.7
1977 195.6 94.5 142.3 68.7
1978 211.1 102.0 121.6 58.7
1979 291.5 140.8 204.1 98.6
Source: Appendix Tables (2) and (4)
339
(in JD's)
TABLE (7) Per Capita Current and Capital Expenditures in
(Current and Constant 1972 prices) 1954-1979
Per capita Current Exp. Per capital Capital Exp.
xear
Current prices Constant prices Current prices Constant prices
1954 9.7 14.3 2.3 3.5
1955 10.3 15.4 1.9 2.9
1956 12.4 18.2 2.1 3.1
1957 12.9 18.8 2.8 4.1
1958 14.9 21.3 3.7 5.3
1959 15.8 22.3 2.9 4.1
1960 15.9 21.5 3.6 4.8
1961 16.4 21.8 2.9 3.8
1962 16.9 22.2 4.3 5.7
1963 18.2 23.7 3.4 4.5
1964 18.4 23.8 4.9 6.3
1965 18.4 23.5 5.7 7.4
1966 14.0 27.1 5.2 6.1
1967 40.9 49.8 2115 26.2
1968 50.8 59.1 20.7 24.1
1969 40.8 46.8 14.5 16.7
1970 35.4 39.3 13.0 14.4
1971 35 .£ 37.1 13.0 13.7
1972 39.6 39.6 19.5 19.5
1973 42.9 38.0 22.3 19.8
1974 54.8 42.8 22.8 17.8
1975 66.2 45.6 41.7 28.7
1976 92.0 55.1 37.9 22.6
1977 91.8 44.4 66.8 32.3
1978 96.0 46.4 55.3 26.7
1979 128.5 62.1 90.0 43.5
Source: Appendix Tables (2), (3) and (4).
TABLE (8) Functional Distribution of Government 
Expenditures and Percentage of Total Exp. 
1954-1979
(in mn of JD*s)
General
Services Defence
Social
Services
Economic
Services
Abs. % Abs % Abs. % Abs. %
1954 1.962 1 1 . 8 8.951 53.9 1.479 8.9 4.168 25.1
1955 2.035 11.5 9.355 53.1 1.731 9.8 4.514 25.6
1956 2.338 10.9 12.187 57.2 2.013 9.4 4.783 22.4
1957 2.611 10.9 11.781 49.2 2.440 1 0 . 2 7.026 29.3
1958 3.184 1 0 . 8 14.669 50.0 3.340 11.4 8.151 27.8
1959 3.566 1 1 . 6 15.822 51.5 4.335 14.2 6.958 2 2 . 6
1960 3.606 10.9 16.155 49.2 4.946 15.1 8.135 24.8
1961 3.698 1 1 . 2 16.420 49.8 4.103 12.4 8.761 26.8
1962 4.041 10.7 16.805 44.8 4.673 12.5 12.005 32.0
1963 4.577 1 1 . 6 18.569 47.2 5.100 13.0 1 1 . 1 0 1 28.1
1964 4.685 10.7 18.570 42.6 5.400 12.4 14.968 34.3
1965 5.280 1 1 . 2 18.770 39.9 6 . 2 1 0 13.2 16.728 35.5
1966* 4.501 1 1 . 6 14.374 37.2 5.660 14.7 14.065 36.4
1967 6.711 9.8 34.164 50.1 8.036 1 1 . 8 19.235 28.2
1968 7.241 8.9 35.165 43.7 8.096 1 0 . 0 30.018 37.2
1969 8.158 9.2 41.471 46.9 8.716 9.9 30.050 33.9
1970 8.479 to . 5 33.070 41.0 10.217 12.7 28.941 35.8
1971 8.640 10.3 33.780 40.6 9.391 11.3 31.334 37.7
1972 10.099 9.5 39.250 37.1 9.661 9.1 46.864 44.2
1973 11.168 9.3 42.013 35.2 10.857 9.1 55.473 46.4
1974 13.200 9.0 44.475 30.3 18.373 12.5 70.574 48.1
1975 17.717 8 . 6 48.300 23.6 23.931 11.7 114.916 56.0
1976 20.133 7.6 93.336 35.6 31.659 1 2 . 1 117.356 44.7
1977 25.436 7.5 82.563 24.4 35.545 10.5 194.295 57.5
1978 29.926 8.9 88.641 26.6 42.033 12.5 172.074 51.7
1979 39.645 7.9 114.866 23.2 36.393 11.4 284.681 57.4
Notes Table (8) (see over)
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NOTES TABLE (8)
(i) General Services: include the following:-
(a) Public Administration (expenditures of the Royal Court, 
Houses of Parliament, the Cabinet, Audit Commission, and 
Civil Service Commission); (b) Security and internal affairs 
(Public Security Forces, Ministry of Interior, Justice and 
Shari’a); (c) Ministry of International Affairs and (d) The 
Ministry of Culture and Information.
(ii) Defence: Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces.
(iii) Social Services, Ministry of Education, Health, Ministry of 
Social Affairs, Youth Care Organization, The Potable Water 
Authority and The Ministry of Reconstruction and Development.
(iv) Economic Services Includes:
(a) Ministry of Communication (b) Ministry of Transport,
(c) The Telecommunication Corp. (d) The Civil Aviation 
Dept, (e) Ministry of Industry and Comm. (f) Ministry of 
Supply, (g) Ministry of Finance (h) National planning Council, 
(i) Ministry of Public Works (j) Ministry of Agriculture 
(k) The Regional Corporation (1) Ministry of Municipal and 
Village . Affairs (m) The Natural Resources Authority 
(n) The Dept, of Statistics.
Sources: (i) see notes to Table (2)
(ii) CBJ, Monthly Bulletin, vol. 14 ^ ’4, (April, 1978) 
and vol. 16, ^ 2  (Feb. 1980).
(iii) Ministry of Finance, Annual Reports, various 
issues. *1966 nine months only,
i
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Table (9) Government Expenditure by Function as 
a percentage of GNP, current prices, 1954-79
(Percentages) -------  -
Year GeneralServices Defence
Social
Services
-- -- -- --------- --------------- — «-
Economic
Services
1954 3.7 17.1 2 . 8 7.9
1955 4.0 18.7 3.4 9.0
1956 3.4 17.7 2.9 6.9
1957 3.7 16.8 3.4 1 0 . 0
1958 4.1 19.0 4.3 10.5'
1959 3.5 15.9 4.3 7.0
1960 3.4 15.3 4.6 , 7.6
1961 2.9 12.9 3.2 6 . 8
1962 3.0 1 2 . 8 3.5 9.1
1963 2 . 6 1 0 . 6 2.9 6.3
1964 2.9 11.5 3.3 9.3
1965 2.9 10.3 3.4 9.2
1966* 2.4 7.7 3.0 7.5
1967 4.7 16.9 5.6 13.4
1968 4.3 2 1 . 1 ' 4.8 18.0
1969 4.1 2 1 . 0 4.4 15.2
1970 4.5 17.6 5.4 15.4
1971 4.3 16.9 4.7 15.7
1972 4.5 17.7 4.5 2 1 . 2
1973 4.6 17.3 4.4 22.9
1974 4.7 15.9 6.5 25.2
1975 5.2 14.1 6.9 33.5
1976 3.7 17.2 5.8 2 1 . 6
1977 4.0 13.2 5.7 31.1
1978 4.1 12.4 5.8 24.0
1979 4.6 13.4 6 . 6 33.3
Source: Appendix table (3) and (8) *nine months only.
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TABLE (10) Composition of General Services, 1954-79
(in million of JD*s and % of Total)
Year
Public
Administ­
ration
Security and 
Internal 
Affairs
Internation­
al
Affairs
Culture & 
Information 
Services
Total
General
Affairs
Abs. 1 Abs. % Abs % . Abs. % Abs. %
1954 0.166 8.4 1.569 79.9 0.144 7.3 0.083 4.2 1.962 100
1955 0.204 1 0 . 0 1.596 78.4 0.153 7.5 0.081 3.9 2.034 100
1955 0.298 12.7 1.723 73.6 0.196 8.3 0 . 1 2 1 5.1 2.338 100
1957 0.234 8.9 2.024 77.5 0.241 9.2 0 . 1 1 2 4.2 2.611 100
1958 0.294 9.2 2.473 77.5 0.241 7.5 0.176 5.5 3.184 100
1959 0.314 8 . 8 2.654 74.4 0.267 7.4 0.331 9.2 3.566 100
1960 0.323 8.9 2.669 74.0 0.288 7.9 0.326 9.0 3.606 10 0
1961 0.338 9.1 2.697 72.9 0.353 9.5 0.310 8.3 3.698 100
1962 0.361 8.9 2.753 6 8 . 1 0.538 13.3 0.389 9.6 4.041 100
1963 0.361 7.8 2.956 64.5 0.619 13.5 0.641 14.0 4.577 100
1964 0.384 8 . 1 3.011 64.2 0.654 13.9 0.636 13.5 4.685 100
1965 0.486 9.2 3.396 64.3 '0.656 12.4 0.742 14.0 5.280 100
1966* 0.357 7.9 2.743 60.9 0.606 13.4 0.795 71.6 4.501 100
1967 0.454 6.7 4.383 65.3 0.771 11.4 1.103 16.4 6.711 100
1968 0.602 8.3 4.239 58.5 0.871 1 2 . 0 1.529 2 1 . 1 7.241 100
1969 0.616 7.5 4.691' 57.5 0.964 1 1 . 8 1.887 23.1 8.158 100
1970 0.628 7.4 5.140 60.6 0.998 11.7 1.713 2 0 . 2 8.479 100
1971 0.768 8 . 8 5.106 59.0 1.067 12.3 1.699 19.3 8.640 100
1972 1.005 9.9 5.822 57.6 1.253 12.4 2.019 19.9 10.099 100
1973 1.039 9.3 6.384 57.1 1.301 1 1 . 6 2.444 2 2 . 0 11.168 100
1974 1.006 7.6 8.071 61.1 1.553 11.7 2.580 19.5 13.200 100
1975 1.041 5.8 10.034 56.6 2.354 13.2 4.288 24.2 17.717 100
1976 1.194 5.9 11.473 56.9 2.957 14.6 4.509 22.3 20.133 100
1977 1.318 ; 4.4 14.419 56.6 3.053 1 2 . 0 6.646 26.1 . 25.436 100
1978 2.328 7.7 16.750 55.9 3.073 1 0 . 2 7.775 25.9 29.426 100
1979 2.972 7.4 23.394 59.0 4.002 1 0 . 0 9.277 23.4 39.645 100
*1966 nine months only
Source: (i) See sources to Table (2)
(ii) Ministry of Finance, Annual Reports, various Issues,
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TABLE (11) Rates of Growth of Government Current and 
Capital Expenditure 1954-79
(percentage)
- --------
Year
Annual
Rate of Growth of Year
Annual
Rate of Growth of
Current Exp. Capital Exp. Current Exp. Capital Exp.
1954 5.7 16.0 1967 58.1 126.8
1955 11.5 -14.4 1968 28.1 -6.9
1956 2 2 . 8 10.9 1969 14.1 -7.0
1957 7.1 40.4 1970 -9.5 -6.3
1958 20.3 35.3 1971 2 . 8 3.5
1959 1 0 . 1 -17.6 1972 15.8 54.0
1960 3.7 24.7 1973 1 1 . 8 18.3
1961 4.1 -17.4 1974 31.8 5.2
1962 6.7 53.9 1975 21.3 84.0
1963 20.9 -19.0 1926 47.9 -3.3
1964 3.8 48.9 1977 , 5.2 85.7
1965 3.9 2 2 . 0 1978 7.9 -14.5
1966 -2 1 . 1 -7.3 1979 38.1 67.8
Average
1954-56
y
7.6 13.6 Average1967-79 2 1 . 0 31.3
Source : Appendix table (9)
c>
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TABLE (12) Total Government Revenues by major 
components 1954-1979
(in millions of JD’s)
Foreign*
Revenues
Domestic Revenues Total
Domestic
Revenue
1----------------
Year Indirect
Taxes
Direct
Taxes
Tax
Revenues
Non-tax
Revenues
Total
Revenues
Na
1954 15.7 4.9 0 . 8 4.8 2.7 7.5 23.2 18.4
1955 15.5 4.8 0.9 5.7 2.3 8 . 0 23.5 17.9
1956 17.0 4.9 1 . 1 6 . 0 2.7 8.7 25.7 19.7
1957 1 1 . 2 5.8 ' 1 . 2 7.0 1 2 . 2 19.2 30.7 23.4
1958 24.5 6.7 1 . 0 7.7 3.6 11.3 30.4 27.7
1959 23.8 8.4 1 . 2 9.6 3.7 13.3 35.8 27.5
1960 23.4 9.3 1.3 1 0 . 6 3.3 13.9 37.1 26.7
1961 24.1 1 0 . 0 1.5 11.5 3.2 14.7 38.8 27.3
1962 23.0 10.9 1 . 8 12.7 8.4 2 1 . 1 44.2 31.4
1963 22.5 1 2 . 2 2 . 0 14.2 5.1 19.3 41.8 27.6
1964 27.8 13.9 2 . 0 15.9 7.9 23.8 51.6 35.6
1965 23.9 18.0 2.5 20.5 6 . 2 26.7 50.6 35.7
1966 17.7 15.6 2 . 0 17.6 5.4 23.0 40.7 30.1
1967 44.92 16.08 2.16 18.24 7.26 25.5 70.4 23.1
1968 45.65 17.27 1.99 19.26 7.11 26.4 72.0 56.8
1969 43.86 20.71 2.49 23.20 ' 9.44 32.6 76.5 58.3
1970 38.34 18.63 2.69 21.32 8.75 30.11 68.4 52.7
1971 43.40 2 0 . 0 2 3.12 23.14 12.45 35.6 79.0 65.4
1972 52.84 24.03 3.54 27.53 14.81 42.4 95.2 81.6
1973 57.06 29.90 4.12 34.02 12.06 46.1 103.1 85.6
1974 74.03 37.15 5.89 43.04 22.17 65.2 139.2 106.0
1975 116.76 48.22 9.36 57.58 24.48 82.1 198.8 150.4
1976 8 6 . 1 2 76.91 9.43 86.34 18.52 104.9 191.0 1 2 1 . 6
1977 180.71 102.04 13.30 115.39 24.51 139.9 320.6 2 2 0 . 2
1978 148.00 107.76 21.90 129.66 34.14 163.8 311.8 211.7
1979 257.92 118.95 25.90 144.85 37.05 181.9 439.8 322.3
*Includes, budget support, Econ. and Tech, Assistance, and Foreign Loans. 
N “ Foreign Revenues and Non-Tax Revenues
Sources: (i) Ministry of Finance, Annual Reports, Relevant Issues.
(ii) Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Reports, Relevant Issues.
(iii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin,
(Sept. 1980).
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Table (13) Total Indirect Taxes by Major Source,
1954--1979 (in million of JD’s).
Year Cus toms Duties
Excise
Taxes Licences Fees
Additional
Tax
Total
Indirect
Taxes
1954 2.721 0.242 0.365 0.522 0.096 3.946
1955 3.169 0.267 0.445 0.534 0.365 4.780
1956 3.187 0.307 0.466 0.539 0.403 4.902
1957 3.880 0.326 0.516 0.644 0.462 5.828
1958 3.968 0.355 0.279 1.606 0.480 6.687
1959 5.093 0.424 0.320 1.985 0.575 8.397
1960 4.939 0.623 0.849 2.104 0.768 9.283
1961 4.530 1.487 0 . 8 6 6 2.075 1 . 0 0 1 9.959
1962 4.894 1.474 0.942 2.328 1.299 10.937
1963 5.047 2.123 1.034 2.577 2.441 1 2 . 2 2 2
1964 6.058 2.513 1.055 2.764 2.483 13.873
1965 8.709 3.746 1.481 2.596 1.479 18.007
1966 8.186 3.468 1.260 1.751 1.300 15.965
1967 8.003 4.361 1 . 0 1 0 1.814 0 . 8 8 8 16.076
1968 8.679 4.380 1.410 1.497 1.304 17.220
1969 10.439 6.009 2.042 1.570 0.422 20.482
1970 8.906 5.094 1.876 1.540 1.353 18.769
1971' 7.463 6.872 2.132 2 . 2 1 1 1.507 20.185
1972 9.263 7.780 2.749 2.791 1.920 24.503
1973 11.871 1 7.860 3.606 3.973 2.300 29.610
1974 16.414 8.985 4,975 4.120 2.900 37.394
1975 20.680 10.657 5.910 7.668 3.646 49.287
1976 39.733 9.097 10.605 12.664 5.286 77.385
1977 63.995 9.103 12.517 10.980 6.324 102.919
1978 67.800 1 0 . 2 0 0 13.400 10.660 5.700 107.760
1979 71.200 1 1 . 2 0 0 16.250 13.300 7.000 118.950
Sources: (i) Ministry of Finance, Annual Reports, various issues
(ii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 
various issues.
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Table (15) Data on the Dependant and Independant variables 
used in the Model for the Determinants of 
Taxable Capacity in Jordan, 1954-1979.
Year TRY
Y
P
M
Y
F
Y
I
Y
Q
Y
AN
N
A
Y |
>
►d|
*d D
1954 13.2 37.7 37.8 29.9 8 . 0 34.7 3.0 27.0 - 0 . 0
1955 16.1 34.6 53.8 31.1 10.4 41.4 3.6 12.4 v - 0 . 0
1956 12.7 46.3 38.2 24.8 9.2 33.6 2 . 8 27.7 - 0 . 0
1957 27.4 45.8 46.2 16.0 9.7 36.7 3.4 18.3 - 0 . 0
1958 14.7 48.8 47.6 31.8 9.9 36.3 3.3 16.7 - 0 . 0
1959 13.4 60.4 43.5 24.0 8.7 29.3 3.7 1 0 . 6 - 0 . 0
1960 13.2 62.5 44.6 2 2 . 1 6.5 29.3 3.0 13.8 - 0 . 0
1961 1 1 . 6 74.3 36.7 19.0 6.9 28.0 1 . 2 19.9 - 0 . 0
1962 16.1 73.9 39.6 17.6 6 . 2 32.9 3.5 16.0 - 0 . 0
1963 1 1 . 1 .75.6 35.1 12.9 6 . 1 27.6 2 . 8 12.7 - 0 . 0
1964 14.8 .85.4 35.3 17.3 7.8 33.3 3.3 2 1 . 2 - 0 . 0
1965 14.8 .92.6 53.2 13.2 9.0 35.6 3.7 18.9 - 0 . 0
1966 12.4 . 92.4 41.3 9.5 9.3 40.8 3.1 14.9 - 0 . 0
1967 17.9 130.3 42.0 31.5 9.4 58.6 0.5 16.4 0 . 0 1 . 0
1968 15.9 147.8 44.2 27.5 9.7 65.4 3.7 9.7 3.0 1 . 0
1969 16.5 123.4 49.5 2 2 . 2 9.4 60.1 0.4 11.4 8 . 0 1 . 0
1970 16.1 1 1 2 . 1 41.1 20.4 8.5 69.0 4.3 8.3 6 . 0 1 . 0
1971' 17.9 115.7 44.6 2 1 . 8 8 . 2 6 8 . 1 3.3 1 2 . 0 4.0 1 . 0
1972 19.2 124.6 53.3 23.9 8.4 6 6 . 2 3.0 1 2 . 0 9.0 1 . 0
1973 19.1 131.9 56.5 23.6 4.1 72.9 3.2 7.3 1 0 . 0 1 . 0
1974 23.3 147.8 70.2 26.5 10.9 77.6 3.2 1 0 . 8 2 0 . 0 1 . 0
1975 24.0 180.3 68.3 34.0 13.7 81.0 0.5 7.6 13.1 1 . 0
1976 19.3 268.6 62.6 15.9 13.4 6 6 . 1 6.3 6.9 11.5 1 . 0
1977 22.5 292.7 72.9 29.0 13.6 70.4 5.4 6.7 14.5 1 . 0
1978 22.9 324.9 62.2 20.7 1 1 . 8 83.6 3.2 7.1 6.9 1 . 0
1979 23.9 376.2 69.1 30.2 13.0 89.5 3.2 5.6 14.2 1 . 0
Note : For the variables codes see text.
Sources : (i) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 
vol• 16, No. 10 (Oct. 1980^
(ii) IMF, International Financial Statistics, 
various issues.
(iii) Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, various issues.
(iv) Department of Statistics, National Accounts for Jordan, 
1952-1976.
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